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Abstract 
Lobbyists for hire - commercial lobbyists - are a small, distinct,, accepted but 
minor addition to the dramatis personae of UK public policy-making. Their 
differentiating feature,, marking them off from other types of lobbyist., is that 
they are for hire and it is the feature which is the least previously researched. 
There is little explicit theory of commercial lobbying: it is best accounted for 
as an implication of neo-pluralism. Through primary fieldwork amongst 
them and the two groups with whom they interact - clients and decision- 
makers - the nature of their hiring is analysed. They are mostly hired by 
large businesses and less so by public sector interests facing change. Clients 
show varying propensities to hire and services hired in by clients can be 
grouped under four headings. Commercial lobbyists are client-led and have 
no independent political influence. They are businesses seeking market 
share,, offering only what hirers want. Their work can be viewed through the 
prism of two ideal types: backgrounder and foregrounder. On balance, they 
work on the processes of policy-making rather than its contents; are less 
rather than more visible in the policy process; more reactive than proactive in 
their client relationships. They have a range of negative and positive 
relationships with decision-makers, who accept them in terms of supplying 
information otherwise difficult to access. There is no demonstrated 
methodology for evaluating their contribution to policy outcomes. The data 
suggests that this contribution is minor. But this 'minor' conclusion has to be 
qualified when looked at from the hirers' viewpoint: for them the hiring may 
help yield competitive advantage. Commercial lobbyists are corporate 
accessories and the source of any concern about their practices and about 
asymmetrical access to decision-makers lies in the nature of their 
relationships with other more substantial players in the UK policy process. 
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Notes: 
This work is specifically referred to in the text as 'this research' or 'this 
thesis. ' 
In the text outside of quotations, 'Government' is spelt with an upper case 
'G' when the reference is to the UK and with a lower case `g' when usage is 
generic. 
To identify a reference to a note at the end of a Chapter, the notation used is, 
for example, (3n). Other numerical references, for example (5), are to pages 
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Chapter One 
Lobbyists for hire: a literature review 
'You have to see lobbying as a battle. ' 
(The Government 35) 
Introduction. 
This Chapter undertakes a critical evaluation of material published about UK 
lobbyists for hire (commercial lobbyists) who came to notice, if not notoriety, 
in the 1980s. It reviews the published material on image and self-perception; 
titles; relationship with public relations; growth, size and fees; clients; 
occupational background; functions; nature of the lobbying intervention in 
the policy process; quality and effectiveness and draws conclusions for the 
further progress of this thesis. 
Mercenary Soldiers of the Empire 
Finer (1966,2nd. ed. ) noted the increase in lobbyists offering themselves for 
hire in the eight years between the first and second editions of his 
Anonymous Empire. By 1966, he had detected that the Empire was making J 
more use of what could be described as an 'army of mercenaries' - 
professionals offering their services to interests which wanted to lobby public 
office holders and which were willing to pay for those services. He made 
clear that he was talking about lobbyists for hire, although he did not use 
that term. 
He was explicitly not concerned with what can be called the 'regular army' of 
lobbyists, those who are employed full-time by an organisation. Instead he 
links the lobbyists for hire with the then 300 public relations firms in London 
which had a relationship 'something like that of an advocate' (Finer; 136) to 
their clients. He listed some of the issues with which these firms could have 
been involved: the aftermath of the Belgian withdrawal from the Congo; the 
public standing of the Portugese dictator, Dr. Salazar, in the UK, and the 
activities of the North Scotland Hydro-Electric Board. 
He wrote that 'a number of PR agencies have begun to act as "'contact men" 
with Members of Parliament' (138). He did not object intrinsically to 'this 
go-between role. ' It was the failure to disclose it which irked him and he 
suggested the establishment of a body like the Press Council which would 
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enforce an ethical code and register lobbyists, their clients, payments, 
methods of lobbying and the legislation targeted. Finer notes that the 
"suggested Council by its nature would disclose MP advisers to PR firms 
who acted for a consideration' (139). Finer's major focus of criticism was the 
lack of transparency in British lobbying and he would not have been 
surprised that it took until 1992 for a Select Committee to recommend a 
register of commercial lobbyists. 
Finer's work looked at interest group politics at the points of decision- 
making in Whitehall and Westminster: the focus in this research is a practice 
in support of those politics. Clearly group politics are a necessary condition 
for the existence of commercial lobbying while commercial lobbying is not a 
sufficient condition for group politics. Because of the centrality of groups to 
UK politics, academic study of them is established (inter alia Stewart [1958]; 
Alderman [1984]; Wilson, G. K. [1985]; Grant [1989]; Jordan & Richardson 
[1987]; Rush (ed) [1990]; Richardson [1993]). 
But in this literature commercial lobbyists hardly figure, with little more than 
occasional walk-on parts in a larger play. Those parts are centre stage here 
and the other happenings and role players of groups are off centre to this 
research - though always present, just outside the main frame and always 
providing the contextual linkages through which to understand 'for hire' 
lobbying. 
Commercial lobbying - a'naughty and nice' image? 
There was a time in UK politics when hiring lobbyists was hardly known and 
what was known was not admired. Doig (1990; 49) reported that Attlee's 
Government set up a Select Committee in 1950 which did not 'see any future 
for the "the intermediary", the private middleman... ' 
Doig also noted (50) that the Committee on Intermediaries was not prescient: 
'What it did not, or could not anticipate, however, was the possibility of 
those from inside the "system" setting themselves up as intermediaries and 
selling their knowledge, access and contacts. ' 
Today these lobbyists for hire are now a distinct, additional and quite visible 
feature to the British system of public policy-making. Indeed Finer can be 
credited in part with the term "the lobby' coming into the mainstream of UK 
language: his obituarist (The Times, June 1993) noted that it had a "rather too 
American ring' to win speedy widespread usage and that 'lobbyists' only 
became current in the 1980s. 
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These 'for hire' lobbyists have been described variously. Apart from 'contact 
men" (1966; 138), Finer also called them 'hired advocates, (139). Another 
term used is 'commercial lobbyists' (Jordan & Richardson 1987; 261) and 
/parliamentary consultants" (Alderman 1984; 132) yet another. Alderman 
wrote that: 
Parliamentary consultants are brokers. They act as advocates for 
their clients in much the same way as solicitors and barristers 
present cases in court. They spend a great deal of time just 
meeting people, listening as well as talking. A pressure group 
could lobby on its own: many do so. Others, particularily those 
immersed in the ways of the British government or not fortunate 
enough to have acquired the services of an MP or ex-MP or an 
'honorary research assistant' to an MP, save themselves a great 
deal of time and probably money by employing professional 
assistance. 
Grantham (1989) favoured the description 'political consultant' but noted 
also the titles 'public affairs, 'government relations, and 'political PR. ' 
Later, "political consultant" is again favoured by Grantham and Seymour-Ure 
(1990). 
Turning to the three contexts in which lobbying is most discussed, (the 
political, the journalistic and the academic), the most common descriptor is 
also the oldest: lobbyist. It is the description used by the House of 
Commons' Select Committee on Members' Interest in their 1987-88 and 1990- 
91 reports. Bryce (1928; 928) used lobbyist when he wrote at the end of the 
19th century and quoted an American source, Mr. Spofford, in an amusing 
listing of the different versions of the lobbyist's calling. Greer (1985; 19) used 
it when he wrote about the professional lobbyist and called for a register of 
such people. 
Some practitioners, however, appear to be coy about the word lobbyist. Of 
the 129 members of the Public Relations Consultants" Association (PRCA) 
listed in its 1989 Public Relations Year Book less than 20 listed lobbying as a 
service offered but none used the word itself. Favoured instead were titles 
such as 'government relations', 'government affairs', 'issue management', 
"parliamentary counselling', 'parliamentary relations', 'political counselling', 
/political opinion forming' and 'public affairs" (the most common). This 
plurality of titles makes it difficult to accurately measure amounts of 
lobbying done by public relations firms (and by lawyers). In the case of 
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PRCA members, measurement in the first instance would mean establishing 
that different titles are descriptions of the same or similar activities and 
secondly it would mean establishing that lobbying can be separated from 
public relations activity in general. 
Why did PRCA members not use the word lobbying? This is perhaps an 
indication that its connotations are both negative and positive - and perhaps 
predominantly negative for practitioners vis-a-vis their own self-esteem and 
commercial advancement. Indeed many references to lobbying are 
pejorative. Wootton (1970; 17) described 'lobby' as 'derogatory an epithet as 
one can think of ... ' in the US. In a forward to deKieffer (1981), 
Congresswoman Pat Schroeder noted that in the 18th century, lobbyists were 
called 'lobbiers and were little more than merchants of greed' and that 'today 
... the greed factor has been diluted by the rise in citizen group lobbying. ' 
Alderman (123) referred to pressure groups (sometimes the clients of 
lobbyists for hire) as generating 'suspicion, mistrust and even fear' in British 
Government. He had already noted (5) that 19th century English writers 
described lobbying in a tone which suggested that it was 'foreign if not 
actually immoral. ' Richardson and Jordan (261) quote Alderman as above 
and then target the 'for hire' lobbyist for a sceptical mention: 
For no very clearly articulated reasons, "professional' lobbying 
seems to give rise to more unease than a cause or a company 
putting forward its own case. (264) 
Jordan picked up the same tone when he writes about 'naughty and nice' 
lobbying, (1989; 107-113) and the front cover of the first UK book entirely 
devoted to the subject (Jordan (ed), 1991) shows a huddle of rather worn, 
raffish, middle-aged men talking over drinks and a cigar. The sub-title of the 
text is Politics for Profit in Britain. A practising lobbyist for hire, Ian Greer, 
reflected this air of being at the shadowy edge of the acceptable. He wrote: 
(1985, acknowledgements) 
The Parliamentary lobbyist who emerges from the shadows to 
write a book about the intricacies of his art must, in the public 
perception, be a contradiction in terms. What has emerged is an 
attempt partly to dispel the mystique in which the media fondly 
shroud the work of the lobbyist. 
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Later he expands on the role of the press in this murky image creation (119) 
with the observation that the "press at times likes to portray the lobbyist as a 
somewhat shadowy or sinister figure working furtively behind the scenes on 
behalf of equally shady clients .. .' Greer would no doubt feel vindicated on 
reading one vitriolic attack on his 'art' by a journalist under the headline 'The 
Unsavoury Enemies of Democracy. ' (Howard, 1989) 
Jordan perhaps best summed up this air of uncertain moral standing when 
he quotes an American lobbyist: 
My mother has never introduced me to her friends as 'My son, the 
Lobbyist. ' 'My son, the Washington Representative, maybe. Or 
'the Legislative Consultant. Or 'the Government Relations 
Counsel'. But never as 'the Lobbyist'. I can't say I blame her. 
(Jordan; 13) 
Dubs went beyond social embarrassment and (1989; 193) mounted a critique 
of 'for hire' lobbyists: they can 'buy' influence because they have 'much 
greater resources than social lobbyists'; they have conflicts of interest, 
working sometimes for both Government departments and clients who relate 
to those departments; they claim 'success' fees (fees predicated on pre-stated 
outcomes) and they retain MPs. 
Concern over "buying' influence was also picked up by Rush (1990) who 
wrote about commercial lobbyists as a resource in what he called 'pressure 
politics', adding: 
... although it does not follow that the wealthier will always 
succeed, there is a danger that, however legitimately, money will 
be the key to success. (146) 
But these lobbyists also have countervailing advantages for Dubs (195): they 
reduce overheads for their clients; they have computer databases for 
targeting groups; they know MPs and civil servants; they can do research, 
and can lobby Brussels. In the end, although he criticises the activity, he 
recommends it in some circumstances. 
But the major thrust of his book was to develop another category of lobbying 
in contra-distinction - social lobbying which is defined (192) as 'lobbying by 
pressure groups, trade unions and concerned individuals done for non- 
commercial motives which are usually ideological or political! In fact, his 
text can be seen as a DIY manual on how the politicised layperson can lobby: 
he de-professionalises lobbying, saying that much of his advice is common 
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sense. The Government (1987) can also be seen as a training text but 
for the professional. It surveyed MPs, Ministers and officials and drew a 
picture of the operational circumstances facing lobbyists which could be the 
content of a staff development programme. Wolpe (1990) set himself this 
training task for the Washington DC professional lobbyist and deKeiffer 
(1981) for the citizen group lobbyist. 
Nomenclature 
This variety of descriptors raises the question of which title to use in this 
research. In talking about the general process of groups influencing 
governmental decision-making, there is no reason for departing from the 
generic title of 'lobbyists' and 'lobbying. ' A choice, however, is faced when 
we turn to lobbyists 'for hire. ' The phrase 'for hire' lobbyist is attractive 
because of its Anglo-Saxon directness and its focus on the concept of 
switching among interests to be represented. 'Influence peddler' and 
'corridor creep" are unacceptable, at least on ground of propriety. 
Dropping the epithet leaves just the proper noun 'lobbyist' and that 
descriptor is the most common referent to the subject in political, journalistic 
and academic circles. (Davies [1985] noted that 'lobby' was used in 
Washington in 1832 and quotes OED that it entered British politics in 1856). 
But on its own, 'lobbyist' is not specific enough for it includes lobbyists who 
are the full-time employees or voluntary workers of an organisation. This 
research follows Thomas and Hrebenar in defining in-house lobbyists as 
lobbyists who lobby only for their employer (1990; 5). 
Reluctance on the part of some lobbyists to use Iobbyist' publicly about 
themselves has been noted earlier. Perhaps these recalcitrants are seeking 
the exclusiveness of a new title which will be attractive commercially because 
of its novelty. This is not a relevant concern for this research and it is argued 
that 'lobbyist' should be used but with an epithet which distinguishes the 
mobile freelance from the full-time employee. 'Professional' will not do as it 
implies that there is another category which falls below some standard of 
behaviour. 'Parliamentary' as the epithet would be misleading as much of 
the lobbying is not directed to Westminster, while 'political consultant' is too 
broad, not fully connecting with lobbying and suggestive of American 
image-makers operating in politics. 'Consultant' is another possible epithet 
but it carries two possible connotations which are in tension with each other. 
These connotations are: an air of functional superiority as implied by teams 
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of medical doctors in a hierarchy headed by a clear chief; and secondly an 
expert available for hire to address a wide variety of situations, as in 
management consultant. 
The first of these connotations carries an air of functional hierarchy and 
status superiority which is unwarranted here and the epithet should 
therefore be avoided. The second connotation is close to the "for hire" sense 
which needs to be expressed but the mixing of the two senses above makes 
the use of 'consultant' confusing. 
'Commercial' has a market place connotation which is relevant and suggests 
movement between clients without being mercenary. 'Commercial lobbyist' 
is therefore perhaps the least unsatisfactory descriptor to use about 
individuals. It is noted that Jordan and Richardson (1987) used this title as a 
generic descriptor in their book and that The Independent newspaper (31 
December, 1991; 1) also employed 'commercial lobbying' in a report on a 
Commons' register for lobbyists. The Commercial lobbyists was the title of 
the first complete UK text (Jordan) devoted to lobbyists for hire. 
This thesis will therefore use 'commercial lobbyist' as the major descriptor. 
But the phrase will not be used in the sense of lobbyists working only for 
commercial interests, for as the data will demonstrate later, such usage 
would be inaccurate. For variety and ease of reading, the terms 'lobbyist for 
hire' and 'hired lobbyist' will be used as alternative descriptors. (Jordan [65] 
pointed out that the descriptor 'contract lobbyist' is largely an American 
usage. ) When writing about a group of commercial lobbyists organised 
together in a business, the term 'lobbying firm' will be used. 
Relations with public relations: an illuminating dispute 
The review of what commercial lobbyists call themselves reveals a debate 
(reflected later in the fieldwork Chapter Five, 122-125) as to whether they are 
in public relations or not. Some are emphatic that they are not and behind 
this self-defined act of exclusion is apparently a perception by them that 
public relations has a lightweight, non-respectable, gimmicky reputation 
which some lobbyists, who perceive themselves to be participants in public 
policy making, do not want to be associated with. 
It can be argued that this judgement is behind the views of two lobbyists 
who have spoken publicly about the relationship. jenny Jeger, who was a 
founder member of the lobbying firm GJW Government Relations, is quoted 
by Marketing magazine (1984), as saying: 
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We do not consider ourselves to be PR people- in fact we dis- 
associate ourselves strongly from PR agencies. 
This was a long held view for she repeated it in the public relations weekly 
trade magazine PR Week (1989) under the headline 'Lobby falls foul of its 
'booze and bribes' image', adding the charge of incompetence. 
The latter charge is repeated by Greer (1985; 121) who says that 'a great deal 
of damage' has been done to the reputation of commercial lobbyists because 
public relations companies have lobbied without the "necessary knowledge 
and skills to support a client's case. ' Hull (1991; 8) takes up a similar 
allegation when he writes about lobbying in Brussels from his vantage point 
of adviser to the EU Environment Commission: 
Public relations firms on the whole are not well regarded. They 
tend to be perceived as glib purveyors of a tale which they have 
prepared for a particular meeting and unable normally to get 
involved in any kind of detailed discussion of an issue because 
they do not understand it fully once the discussion strays outside 
their brief. 
The Government Repor also asked its sample of MPs, Ministers and officials 
about whether lobbying is part of 'PR'. There were critical remarks about 
public relations with over 70% of the sample not wanting to be 'PR targets' 
(21), and with PR personnel picked out for a general broadside against 
inappropriate, lightweight lobbying. 
But The Government Report assumed definitions of public relations and did 
not explicate them. Lack of research, one-sidedness and overselling (12-13) 
were castigated as lobbying failures and lobbying success was found to lie in 
large part in 'quality of the argument' (4) and in 'advocacy' of a case 
delivered with 'professionalism' (4). There is a tendentious quality to the 
report in this respect because the implication is that these points of good 
lobbying practice cluster around a non-public relations pole which could be 
described as lawyer-like issue advocacy. Behind this may be the usage of 
the words 'public relations' as a ritualised term of disapproval. 
This dis-association theme is developed by lobbyist Charles Miller (1987; x) 
who wrote that he wanted to take the 'science and art' of dealing with the UK 
Government out of the 'often lightweight province of an exercise in PR and 
put it in its proper perspective. ' He added that working with Government 
borrows technical knowledge from the legal profession and contacts from 
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public relations. Lobbying is an extension of public relations when image 
building and mobilization of opinion is required but parts company from the 
latter when advocacy and knowledge of public policy is required. 
He makes public relations a strong peripheral device aiding lobbying but 
outside the core activity of case advocacy to public policy makers. He 
concluded that the two disciplines work well side by side and that both must 
be learnt by those seeking to influence Government. (Hennessy [1989; 342] 
writes of Miller's book as the 'equivalent of Questions of Procedures for 
Ministers for those who would influence the mighty. '] 
All this positioning - polite and impolite - has business consequences in the 
market place for commercial lobbyists. The manoeuvring continued when 
PR Week (1989) reported that many commercial lobbyists were not members 
of the Public Relations Consultants Association (PRCA) while another 
director of GJW, Wilf Meeks, is quoted as saying that his company supports 
the introduction of a Parliamentary register of lobbyists but does not want it 
to be policed by the PRCA -'a self-important trade association. ' Again the 
thrust is dis-association from public relations. 
On the other side, the PRCA (1n) believes that most of its members are 
engaged in lobbying and that there had been a substantial increase in fee 
income from the activity. 
It is clearly not in the interests of public relations consultancies to let 
themselves be excluded by job demarcation from a growing activity - 
especially if the boundaries are drawn up by competitors. Equally, it is not 
in the interests of lobbyists who have no financial or organisational link with 
public relations firms to welcome newcomers into their market. These 
lobbyists are a business. The business development perspective should 
always be in mind when relations between independent lobbying firms and 
public relations consultancies are discussed. 
This public argument about the lobbying/public relations connection is 
important for this thesis because it is a reminder that commercial lobbying is 
a competitive business with matters of perceived status surrounding it. The 
connection also illuminates what commercial lobbyists do. 
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Business asQects - size and activity levels. 
A 1986 estimate, (Norton & Grantham, 1986; 4-8), put the number of lobbying 
firms at between 30 and 40 while there was another 40 to 100 individuals 
who operated alone as lobbyists. On top of these categories, there were the 
40 to 200 public relations companies which offer lobbying as one service 
among many. Dod's Parliamentary Companion in 1987 (716) included for 
the first time a list of 'parliamentary consultants' (commercial lobbyists) and 
by 1989 the list had nearly trebled to 36 (504) and to 45 (797) by 1993. The 
1991/92 Directory of Public Affairs and Government Relations (Lloyd & 
Atack) had 35 entries (but publication was discontinued). Hennessy (1989; 
340) judged them to be a necessary inclusion on another list - that of 
'pressures pushing through the walls of Whitehall and onto the ministers' 
and officials' desks. ' Grantham (1989; 503-518) describes it as 'one of the 
major growth industries. ' There is some evidence that demand for lobbying 
continues to grow in the 1990s: PR Week (1994, May 26) reports that lobbying 
accounts for a third of the reasons given by companies for hiring PR 
agencies. 
Doig (1986a; 518-519) wrote that there are 'two main reasons for the upsurge 
- or the awareness of the upsurge - in the use of professional parliamentary 
lobbyists or consultants. ' He listed the lobbyists as being more sophisticated 
in their techniques of persuasion and secondly 'an increasing number of Mps 
for whom the world of lobbying and consultancy work is a lucrative activity 
that they can handle together with their Parliamentary duties, thus 
complementing adequate but not excessive parliamentary incomes. ' 
Grantham and Seymour-Ure (Rush, 1990; 46-47) are more systemic in their 
analysis of growth. They write of groups pushed out of the policy process by 
Thatcherite dismantling of corporatism seeking ways back to decision- 
makers and of the impact of 'radical policies' such as privatisation and 
deregulation on 'previously dormant groups'. Willis and Grant (1987) have 
written about the paradox of the 1980s anti-intervention administrations 
making for the increased politicisation of business as Government seeks to 
make it responsible for economic management. 
There is no current, comparative data on commercial and in-house lobbyists 
in terms of numbers employed; budgets; issues lobbied on, and contacts with 
decision-makers. Other dimensions of commercial lobbying are as ill- 
defined. For example, client identities, their numbers and their public or 
private status are not clear. What are fee levels and how are they 
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constructed? How is value for money determined by clients? How do 
decision-makers view commercial lobbyists? Are they seen positively or 
negatively? The literature is largely silent on these matters. 
A start to profiling has been made by Moore (1991) who has done in the UK 
the only previous research which focuses on the business and organisational 
aspects of commercial lobbying. He looked at GJW, one of the oldest 
lobbying firms in the UK, and found that 126 organisations were on GJW 
books over the financial year 1991-2. Companies accounted for 66% of the 
total and trade associations for another 14%. Public bodies were 12% and the 
remaining eight per cent were charities and pressure groups. Moore noted 
the 'overwhelming' predominance of the private sector, listing companies 
such property developer Olympia & York, British Sugar and the shipbuilding 
and armaments manufacturer VSEL (27). Grant (Jordan ed., 1991; 100) also 
noted that "a large company will probably make use of outside consultants' 
while earlier Willis and Grant (1987; 170) had listed hiring lobbyists as one of 
five routes through which companies try to influence public policy. 
Balance sheet and profit and loss figures are not given by Moore. But 
journalism has reported some other important financial indicators. In 1980 
three partners formed GJW as a private company but they sold out to the 
advertising group Lowe Howard-Spink and Bell in 1987 for an estimated 
f5m; bought it back in 1993 for Elm, and then achieved an audited fee 
income of E2,739,000 (PR Week, April, 1993). This placed them in 14th 
position in the PR Week Top 150 consultancies for 1993. 
Commercial lobbyist Charles Miller, of the Public Policy Unit, has been the 
most forthcoming in public about the business aspects of his work (Financial 
Times Weekend, Feb. 29/March 1,1992, p. X). He reported a turnover of 
E770,000 with a pre-tax profit of E115,000 in 1991 from some 30 clients. He 
had a E38,000 salary. Another lobbyist, Douglas Smith, was also forthcoming 
about the financial aspect of establishing a new lobbying firm (PR Week, 
May, 1993) when he stated that his firm Westminister Advisers moved from 
E16,000 fees to E166,000 in 12 months. 
Even if there was better knowledge about the size of UK activity, it would 
not be a big business by the standards of Washington DC. In Jordan (1991), 
Graham Wilson (65) explained why contract lobbyists have flourished there 
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to the extent of 23,011 registered lobbyists. Moore (54) estimated that they 
generate the equivalent of E10 billion income, suggesting that American 
commercial lobbyists are more numerous and productive than the British 
coalmining industry. 
The latest US figures are in Heinz et A (1993; 11) who reported a lower total: 
in the decade up to 1975, there were between 3,000 and 4,000 lobbyists in 
Washington and that by 1988, the figures were between 15,000 and 20,000. 
Business al2ects - fees 
Apart from journalistic and self-interested estimates, there is no accurate 
estimate of total fees of commercial lobbyists in the UK. This section brings 
the published references together for the first time. In 1984 the Select 
Committee on Members' Interests noted an increase in lobbying generally in 
its final report but did not quantify (House of Commons 1984-85,2). A 
problem here is separating lobbying from other public relations activities. 
Willis and Grant (172) noted large growth in the latter in the 1980s but the 
figures quoted do not distinguish lobbying from marketing support work. 
The PRCA (1n) estimated that in 1983 income from commercial lobbying for 
its members was 'very small' but that by 1988 it had increased to f7m and 
was some six per cent of the membership's total income. The 1989/90 
edition of the PRCA Public Relations Year Book showed the latter was 
E142m. Assuming a 6% share again, this gives commercial lobbying a f8.5m 
turnover by 1990. 
Grantham (1989; 505) said that'... the industry as a whole is now believed to 
be worth in excess of Mm a year, up from an estimated. E3.25m in 1983/4. ' 
He also quoted a 1985 survey of 180 sizeable UK companies which found that 
four out of every ten hired lobbyists. Hollingsworth (1991; 111) wrote that 
political lobbying had fifty firms in the field and a estimated total turnover of 
E10m. PR Week reported (October, 1993) that turnover has risen to an 
estimated E20-25m. Hollingworth quoted the 1985 survey mentioned above, 
suggesting that there is no up-to-date monitoring of the field. 
Hollingsworth also reported that fees per client range from E2,500 to E5,000 a 
month and the average annual rate is about E30,000. PR Week reported 
(October, 1990) Westminster Strategy, a large lobbying firm, charging its 30 
clients average retainer fees of between E1,500 and E15,000 a month with the 
average company paying E4,000. Berry (1992; 221-222) set out some fee 
bands. He noted that for monitoring and information service work, 
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commercial lobbyists charged fees between E500 and; CI, 500 a month and that 
for direct lobbying work in contact with Ministers and civil servants and for 
high profile media campaigns, the fee of E5,000 per week was not 
uncommon. He noted that lobbying companies were professional in the 
sense that they are in the business of making money and that most lobbyists 
worked for the highest bidder. Miller (1992) reported individual fees 
between; C1,000 and E15,000 a month. At the other end of the scale, Berry 
noted that lobbyists will 'in exceptional cases ... work for nothing' for 
charities. Moore supported this (27), noting that some clients of GJW in the 
charity /pressure group sector were non-fee paying. 
Fees are also paid out by lobbyists for hire to those who supply services to 
them and Berry, Doig and Hollingsworth have looked at these payments. 
Berry said (225) that 'on one level, the relationship is clearly about making 
money' and that MPs retained by commercial lobbyists were 'likely' to 
receive annual payments of around E5,000 and E10,000. He noted (226) that 
some lobbying companies refuse to make such payments on the grounds that 
it is possible to have access to the policy-making without payment and that 
such a 'practice is ultimately counter-productive and even potentially 
damaging. ' He calculated that at least 29 PR and lobbying companies are 
making such payments. 
Doig (1986a; 524) calculated from the Register of Members' Interests that 150 
MPs held 280 consultancies between them and that 99 are 'consultants on 
parliamentary matters'. Hollingsworth estimated much higher figures (1) of 
382 MPs in January 1991 with commercial interests, holding 522 directorships 
and 452 consultancies. But these figures appear to be the totality of all MPs' 
commercial relationships outside the Commons. Links with lobbying firms 
would be a sub-set of that total. Hollingsworth calculated (119) that there 
were 35 MPs who were paid advisers or directors to lobbying firms, a figure 
based on the Register of Members' Interests. His estimates were perhaps 
accurate for PR Week (April, 1993) calculated 'at least 38 MPs linked to 
agencies. ' Doig's figure was 39 MPs who are involved in 'ownership of or 
employment by consultancy or public relations firms. ' He is the most 
persistent academic critic of the current lobbyist-MP relationship and he has 
focused on the money linking MPs and lobbying firms (534): 
Support of interests as a result of a personal or ideological interest 
is one thing: support of interests in return for payment is another. 
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By American standards, UK commercial lobbying is under-developed but it 
would appear to have doubled or trebled in size during the 1980s. One 
journalist believed that the political climate in which it operates has become 
more propitious. In the Independent, Marr noted (1992), in a commentary on 
public expenditure, that "the days of listening to lobbies are back. ' 
EuroDean and Canadian asl2ects 
Growth in lobbying has also been noted at EU institutions by Hull (1991), 
Galle (1992) and Mazey & Richardson (1993) and is analysed here as a 
comparator of the UK experience. M. Galle, a Euro-MP, has been asked by 
the European Parliament to devise a scheme of regulation for the 3,000 
lobbyists he quoted as operating there. At the same time and perhaps not by 
co-incidence, the European public relations industry has showed an interest 
in the control of lobbying and and in what may be a defensive move, their 
trade association CERP (Confederation Europeenne des Relations Publiques) 
is reported by PR Week (February, 1993) to be circulating a proposal for a 
register of lobbyists. 
But the Galle figure above may understate activity,, for Van Schendelen (1993; 
6) reported 10,000 such persons and puts the rapid growth in numbers down 
to the implementation of the 1986 Single European Act. UK lobbyists were 
represented in Europe in some force for Lloyd & Atack (viii) reported 15 
London lobbyists with European offices. An example of their attention to 
matters European is the background briefing on EU institutions produced by 
Laptev (1993) for lobbying firm Charles Barker. 
Mazey & Richardson (8) repeated the 3,000 estimate of Galle. They note that 
one of the 'most striking developments since the mid-1980s has been the 
rapid increase in the number of professional lobbyists, financial consultants 
and law firms locating in Europe. ' They quoted the magazine Fortune as 
reporting that the PR firm Hill and Knowlton had 21 consultants in Brussels 
in 1990 and gave the magazine as a source of the 3,000 figure -a figure which 
was three times higher than in 1987/88. They suggested that saturation had 
been reached and may be followed by a 'shake-out' as clients 'become more 
sophisticated in their understanding of the EC (sic) and demand more than 
mere information-gathering. ' 
Commercial lobbyists are registered by law in Canada and Rush (1993) has 
reported that the Canadian Lobbyists' Registration Act of 1989 requires an 
up-to-date, computerised record open to the public. Commercial lobbyists 
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must register and give the names of clients and the subject matter lobbied on 
but, after themselves lobbying, they fought off a proposal that fees be 
disclosed. Despite their opposition to registration, Rush (15) showed how 
some lobbyists have used the register for business intelligence, revealing 
competitors' accounts and suggesting sources of new work. By extension, a 
more informed profile of the UK commercial lobbying business would be a 
by-product of the proposed Commons' register of paid lobbyists (House of 
Commons 1990-91; 81). 
The paragraphs above focus on commercial lobbying in the national contexts 
of Europe and Canada. But Helm (1991) in The Independent touched on - 
and for the first time in the literature -a new, international context for 
commercial lobbying. She noted a trend of 'privatising diplomacy' where 
foreign governments can be represented in the UK by lobbyists; what was 
new was not the overseas provenence of the client but that the clients were 
governments. 
Their Background 
Grantham, (1989; 507-509), noted the 'disparity' of occupational backgrounds 
and listed fifteen lobbyists by name, summarising their pasts. But what 
stood out, rather, was the common background of previous involvement 
with Government as either MP, research assistant, party worker or civil 
servant. Grantham and Seymour-Ure (1990; 50-56) have drawn up a table of 
seventeen of the biggest lobbying firms and given short details of their chief 
personnel: it was in essence a list of people who have changed roles inside 
the public decision-making process, not a collection of people drawn from a 
range of significantly different backgrounds. The implication for this 
research is that commercial lobbyists are likely to be political insiders and 
that they are hired because they possess detailed knowledge of the processes 
and personalities in the public decision-making process. This insider status 
may be a major supply side factor affecting their fee levels. 
Jordan and Moloney (1993) reviewed the literature on the background of 
hired lobbyists and noted their 'insider' status: they concluded that the UK 
literature repeatedly makes the point that lobbyists should first know the 
political system well from the advantage point of cognate careers. These are 
usually identified as political, civil service or party apparatachik careers and 
there is, they argue, an implication that good lobbying can only be done with 
such backgrounds. 
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What do commercial lobbvists do? 
Hollingsworth (112) wrote that their role is 'to act as a conduit between 
commercial and consumer outfits and the government' because both parties 
needed an introduction to each other. Greatorex (1989; 9) elaborated with: 
Clients are offered three main services by lobbyists: monitoring (a 
daily summary of what goes on at Westminster); mine-detecting 
(looking for legislation which may affect a client's interests), and 
fire-fighting ( last-ditch aid for a client under threat from new laws 
or needing political support in a crisis). 
In more formal language, Charles Miller told the Commons' Select 
Committee on Members' Interests (House of Commons 1987-88,6 ; 416) that 
lobbying was: 
the business of advising organisations on understanding, 
monitoring and dealing with the system of government 
effectively. 
He added that the essential characteristic was a combination of research, 
intelligence gathering and advocacy to targeted individuals in Whitehall and 
the Commons and that his workplace was organised like a barrister's 
chambers to achieve this (417). 
Wolpe (1990), however, entered the debate about lobbyist/ advocate 
similarity with a strong assertion about the political nature of the lobbying 
act: 
It is also a myth that only lawyers are capable of providing the 
most effective lobbying material, or that a lawyer is essential to 
drafting a bill or amendment. Lawyers hardly have a monopoly 
on the lobbying process which is based on political and 
substantive expertise. In lobbying, their legal skills are secondary 
to their persuasive and rhetorical abilities... If anything lawyers 
tend to be verbose: on the Hill, the premium is on brevity and 
punch... As with anyone else, lawyers make good lobbyists when 
they exhibit political skill. (28) 
The lobbying firm GJW told the Select Committee (House of Commons 1987- 
88,6; 439) of three lobbying functions - monitoring; explanation and 
education; and influencing legislation (a process Wolpe [3] has called the 
'dance of legislation. ') 
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Grantham and Seymour-Ure (1990; 66-67) have described monitoring as the 
daily scrutiny of the Order Paper and Hansard for both Houses; of Green 
and White Papers; of Early-Day Motions; of Select and Standing Committees 
meetings; of departmental press notices; of Government and other official 
reports, and of the output of bodies such as think-tanks and political parties. 
They then list a more active and substantial task which is to identify those 
actors in the political process who influence decisions important to their 
clients. They add that the principal aim is: 
to build up a body of relevant parliamentarians and officials (and 
anyone else involved with a policy) who are well informed and 
well-disposed towards a client's case. 
But well-informed and well-disposed people are not enough for lobbyists 
seeking to influence behaviour because: 
... it is not passive support that is sought. MPs (and where 
appropriate, peers) will be urged to table Questions and Early-Day 
Motions and, where relevant, amendments to bills and advance 
the case in debate and through meetings and correspondence with 
the minister. 
What these definitions share is a description of lobbying as a continuum of 
activity which is passive at one end and active towards decision-makers at 
the other end. It is the difference between collecting data and arguing a case. 
This continuum was more fully described by commercial lobbyist David 
Wedgewood (1987) who delineated his work into an intelligence role and an 
operational one, each of which can be divided into three sub-areas. Thus 
monitoring, interpretation and research comprise the intelligence role while 
the operational role is planning, passive representation and active 
representation. Wedgewood notes that this latter is popularily known as 
lobbying and consists of contact with decision-makers to start, stop,, or 
amend legislation; initiate or respond to debate; or have a question asked or 
countered. He concluded that without the previous five stages, this sixth is 
unlikely to be successful. For Smith (1992), who is also a commercial 
lobbyist, lobbying again has several ingredients: communication and 
pressure. Its objectives range from seeking information, agenda-setting to 
redressing grievances. Green (1992) also made a distinction between 
monitoring and lobbying but apparently as distinct and unrelated categories. 
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Whom do commercial lobbyists lobby? 
It is a common theme in the literature that the targets of lobbying are 
Westminster and Whitehall but the nature of the issues lobbied on gets little 
attention. 
About location, Grantham noted (1989; 503) that the title 'Parliamentary 
consultancy' tends not to be used because it over-emphasises the importance 
of Westminster. The Government (23) also picked up on the role of 
Westminster and half the reports sample of decision-makers thought that 
lobbyists suffered from 'a failure to appreciate the difference between 
appearance and reality in the power of MPs ... 'A junior Whip is quoted: 
There is a major difference between an MP being involved and 
committed to an issue and mechanically passing representation to 
a Minister. The MP as a post box is a greatly over-valued asset. 
Organisations think they are accessing power when in reality their 
representations either reach the right people via a longer route or 
they pass through the system unnoticed. 
Over 70% of the survey believed that failure to deal effectively with 
Government stemmed from: 
inadequate understanding of the workings of Government and 
particularly of the way in which decisions are made on policy and 
legislative issues. (13) 
One former Minister said: 
Much lobbying forgets the real art of Government-related 
advocacy: knowing where decisions gel in the system. Success 
usually lies in putting your arguments well to officials. You can 
take MPs to lunch at the Horseguard's Hotel and often see across 
the room the officials you ought to be lobbying. (17) 
Casey has called the focus on the legislature a 'very narrow definition' 
(1991j) and he preferred 'to solicit the support of influential people': 
perhaps unsurprising in his case given that he was an Under-Secretary at the 
DTI before practising as a commercial lobbyist. Miller (1988; 13) graphically 
makes the same point when he says that 'the real lobbying work is still 
carried on in those dull [Whitehall] offices. ' But this does not appear to be a 
point taken by lobbyists generally for The Government Report found that 
current and former civil servants reported that they were neglected by 
lobbyists. 
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But the case for Parliament as a significant, continuing target for lobbying is 
made by judge (1990; 19-31). He is critical of pluralist writers such as 
Richardson and Jordan who characterise policy-making as 'bureaucratic 
accommodation' between Government departments and pressure groups 
arranged in "policy sectors" and 'policy communities. " This leads to the 
sectorization of Government into 'sub-governments. ' 
Judge counter-argued with a restatement (28-29) of the views of classical 
pluralists like Dahl and Truman that pluralism operates in a climate of 
shared values which are expressed in elections and representative 
institutions. In this way, lobbyists (in-house or commercial) have to heed 
Parliament as its consent to 'bureaucratic accommodation' is needed in the 
"last instance. ' (39) 
Jordan and Moloney (13) have argued that good lobbying practice about 
where (and how) to lobby must be predicated on assumptions about the case 
being made. They noted criticism about the lack of access to official channels 
in Britain and the EU but they suspected that groups with access difficulties 
are making demands too major to be handled in such channels. The lobbyist 
who is using official rather than political channels (Whitehall rather than 
Westminster) was likely to want something specific and congruent with 
established values and policy. Here the lobbyist was in a position to argue 
that in the light of existing understandings, a minor sounding change would 
be sensible. The lobbyist was not usually in the business of asking for things 
that appear to be controversial. 
About the nature of issues lobbied on, technical policy can hide the 
politically controversial and how the technical and the political aspects of an 
issue are presented is a major lobbying skill. For example, by getting 
lightweight trucks reclassified as cars in 1989, Japanese industry was able to 
save $500m in US taxation per year (Choate, 1990; 4). 
The technical competence of civil servants can also influence where lobbyists 
lobby. The relatively high UK level of official competence means that 
Whitehall is a very substantial target but, ironically, lobbyists in Brussels can 
sometimes find under-developed competence an advantage. Gardner (1991; 
66) noted: 
The low ranking Eurocrat working on a technical proposal 
frequently suffers from a 'European information deficit' all his 
own. He may be the only government official assigned to develop 
a proposal in a highly technical area. 
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Hull (1991; 4) also painted a picture of isolated Brussels officialdom: 
the early thinking about any proposal takes place usually in the 
office of one person who will have the responsibility of drafting 
legislation. .. At the beginning he is a very lonely man with a 
blank piece of paper in front of him, wondering what to put on it. 
Berry (1984; 120) also took up the competency point when he argued that 
successful intervention at the technical level requires mastery of the brief by 
the American lobbyist: 
Lobbyists who have mastered the complexities of their policy area 
enter a select group of experts who talk the same language. 
Washington representatives with a high level of policy expertise 
are more valuable to those in government because policy makers 
can draw upon their knowledge of efforts to solve difficult issues. 
Miller makes a similar point when (1987; 135) he analysed the roles of 
advocacy and public relations in UK lobbying. 
Lobbying style 
In an analysis of lobbying styles, Jordan and Moloney (9) argued that a too 
high profile style and a too long request list adopted by some American 
lobbyists were inappropriate in the UK and Europe. As a member of the 
European Parliament put it,, 'hard sell" and 'instant' lobbying are out of tune 
and even seen as offensive (quoted in Gardner; 63). Lobbying over the fine 
point of policy was more likely to succeed than frontal assaults on principles. 
Scholzman and Tierney (1986; 369) made this point about American 
lobbying: 
The probability of success appears to vary inversely with the 
scope of the demand. Organisations whose political ends are 
narrow and technical are more likely to be influential than those 
whose goals are more encompassing. In general, it is easier to 
affect the details of policy than its broad outlines: and ... this is 
not a negligible form of influence. 
Berry (1984) noted that no US interest group ever gets all it wants. So the 
lobbyist is engaged in indentifying the workable compromise. Wittenberg 
and Wittenberg (1989; 105) agreed: 
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Lobbying is often the art of compromise, so the guy you represent 
must agree in advance on what would be an acceptable result. 
And you need some flexibility to make a deal. 
Smith (1988; 323) gave the example of Congressional staff going out to 
lobbyists to get expert views on proposals: 'Does that work? Does that solve 
your problem? And, if not, how can we correct itT The fieldwork amongst 
decision-makers in Chapter Six puts the above behaviour into a UK context. 
Are commercial lobbyists effective? 
According to Grant (1989; 113-115), methodological problems prevented a 
clear answer to the larger question of evaluating interest group effectiveness. 
Wootton called it (1970; 73) 'a real Irish bog of a subject that has claimed 
many victims': Wilson (1990; 34) concluded that it was impossible to 
measure. And it is argued here that by extension the same problems prevent 
a clear answer to the narrower and dependent question of evaluating the 
effectiveness of commercial lobbyists. Miller Gordan 1991; 63) and Grantham 
and Seymour-Ure (Rush 1990; 72) made similar points. Noting Richardson's 
(1993; 7) view that policy-making is becoming more complex and 
unpredictable because of 'the increased mobilisation of interests in society, 
the chances of developing a methodology decrease. 
Grant (1989) listed the difficulties of evaluating group effectiveness. They 
were the problems of secret government; the simplicity or complexity of 
objectives sought through lobbying; difficulties of identifying whether 
lobbying action or some other behaviour brought about success; internal 
politics of the group influencing which and how issues are lobbied, and 
finally government tactics of initially appearing obdurate in order to concede 
later. 
Commercial lobbyists, as the agents of interests and an intervening variable 
between interests and Government, are another difficulty. Interests groups 
(usually in the form of sectional groups) are their clients. Commercial 
lobbyists are therefore constrainted in their actions by the institutional and 
environmental factors which influence groups - their clients. They have to 
act in the context given by their principals and this constraining context 
makes evaluation of their effectiveness problematical. None of the UK 
literature offers a methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of hired 
lobbying but there are and often self-interested claims in the 
literature that particular lobbies were effective (Rush (ed), 213-231; Jordan 
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(ed), 120-135; Grantham, 509-511). The fieldwork amongst lobbyists in 
Chapter Five indicates that they do not claim any evaluation methodology: 
furthermore they hesitate to claim that their lobbying was the single cause of 
effectiveness in any particular case. 
In the US literature, Heinz et al (1993) showed similar reticence in their study 
of Washington lobbying but Thomas and Hrebenar in their analsysis of 
lobbying at state level (1990) offered a model for evaluating effectiveness. 
(See Grant [1989; 117] for a typology of factors affecting group effectiveness. ) 
They surveyed (25-27) 'policy-makers and political observers" in US states 
and combined ten factors into their model. These included how well the 
public official knows the commercial lobbyist; perceived levels of lobbyist 
credibility; nature of the specific issue lobbied on, and overall political 
influence of the group. But their model has a millenarian air about it in that 
conditions 'must all be present to produce the ideal situation of maximising 
the influence of a lobbyist ... ' Secondly it is not clear whether the model is 
about the effectiveness of groups or of hired lobbyists: one of the factors is 
'potential for the lobbyist's group to enter into coalitions and to 
compromise! The model also has a low predictive quality in that most of the 
conditions have high degrees of non-measurability (e. g. 'political 
cohesiveness of the lobbyist's group membership'). Secondly it is not clear 
how to relate degrees of effectiveness to various factors. 
On balance the measurement difficulties remain. Grant (73) summed up: 
... it must be noted that although many consultancy firms are 
very politically sophisticated and display a high level of 
professional skill, there is always an element of the 'emperor's 
clothes' about the work of professional lobbyists. There is never a 
tangible end product which can be attributed to the efforts of the 
lobbyist: if the campaign is successful, it may have nothing to with 
the lobbyist's efforts. 
Grant (116) suggested, after Whiteley and Winyard (1987), that interviewing 
participants and getting their subjective assessment may be the best available 
method for measuring lobbying effectiveness if the direct observation of 
policy-making was not possible. This research makes the same judgement 
and has used interviews as its principal fieldwork method. 
Alongside the effectiveness debate about the activity of lobbying, there is a 
literature (mostly US) on the perceived behaviour of the individual lobbyist. 
it lists personal attributes. Thomas and Hrebenar did this when they made 
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perceived levels of lobbyist 'credibility, reliability and knowledge' one of 
their factors. The American literature has several other examples of 
attribute-listing: Milbrath (1963); Dexter (1969); Berry (1984); Drew (1985) 
and Cates (1988). Jordan and Moloney (1993) have shown that there is a 
remarkable agreement among them as to which one single attribute makes 
for a 'good' lobbyist - high ethical standards of personal behaviour. 
Hull (10) set out another list of (seven) personal attributes for the 'good" 
lobbyist at the EU Commission where he worked for 14 years. The list was a 
distillation of his personal experience and as such is marked off from the 
Thomas-Hrebenar list which was distilled from a survey. The Hull list 
included: research the case; tailor the case to the official involved, be brief. 
But it is important to note that what is being described in attribute-listing is 
the perceived 'good' behaviour of individual lobbyists - not a methodology 
for evaluating lobbying outcomes by groups or by lobbyists. The distinction 
is similar to that between the behaviour of the "good' soldier in battle and 
why a battle is won. 
Conclusion 
The review above shows commercial lobbyists as a small, distinct addition to 
the dramatis personae of UK public policy- making; an addition which grew 
in size and influence in the 1980s. The literature mostly sees them as part of 
the interest/ sectional group picture. But in the focus of this research, they 
are businesses offering services to clients in order to get client interests 
treated favourably in the public policy process. They trade under various 
titles and some declare themselves to be in public relations. Their public 
image is a mixed one. 
By occupational background, hired lobbyists are mostly men from political 
and public administrative areas. They sell their services generally to the 
highest bidder and work mostly for big business. (Bruce [1994] reported a 
survey that medium-sized businesses use trade associations, their own 
directors and MPs for lobbying before hiring someone. ) They are mostly 
discreet about their clients' identities, what they do for clients and the issues 
lobbied. But there is no or little evidence that the lobbying methods they 
employ are different from the methods of in-house lobbyists. Good practice 
on when to lobby on policy formation, on what aspects and to whom appears 
common with in-house lobbyists. Evaluating their effectiveness is mostly 
difficult, if not impossible. 
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This review therefore indicates that there is a significant knowledge gap 
about commercial lobbyists in relation to their 'for hire' characteristic - their 
differentiating feature and one which puts them into a competitive battle for 
clients. A task of this thesis is to investigate questions generated by this 
characteristic. Questions such as: what do clients hire them for and why; 
how are they used; how do clients judge value for money; how do hired 
lobbyists find clients and how do they describe their work; how do MPs, 
Ministers and civil servants view lobbyists for hire; why do decision-makers 
interact with them, and what can be said about effectiveness. 
The next Chapter sets out theoretical perspectives through which commercial 
lobbyists can be analysed. 
Note 
Interview by the author with Mr. Colin Thompson, PRCA Director., at 
London headquaters on 12 Sept, 1989. Notes available. 
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Chapter Two 
Lobbyists for hire: public relations and group 
theoretical perspectives. 
Introduction 
The preceding Chapter critically reviewed the literature about commercial 
lobbying and found that most of it dealt with the concrete, observable and 
measurable aspects of the topic. There is no literature on a theory of 
commercial lobbying, explaining and predicting its role in public policy- 
making processes or in interest group activity. There is not even a less 
rigorous attempt to build a perspective relating the phenomenon to more 
theoretically developed areas. 
This Chapter starts with a basic empirical observation and tries to relate it to 
various theoretical perspectives. The observation (explored by Moore 1991) 
is that the commericals hire themselves out principally to business interest 
groups (1n) and that it is only their hiring which makes them players in the 
public policy process. 
This Chapter explores whether commercial lobbying can be explained in 
terms of theoretical perspectives drawn from public relations and interest 
group activity. It is argued here that conceptually, commercial lobbying can 
be viewed either as public relations activity or as that political behaviour 
known as interest group activity. 
By way of general characteristic, commercial lobbying is an adjunct, an 
embellishment to group activity and it can only be analysed and understood 
as a linked activity. Without linkages to groups, commercial lobbyists have 
no meaningful role. Norton and Grantham (1986) have developed further 
this linkage concept with groups and have usefully described commercial 
lobbying as a hyphen, bringing together interest groups and government. 
Commercial lobbying is a parasitic activity in that it relies on group activity 
and could not happen without it. (It could also be portrayed as doubly 
parasitic in that it also needs government activity. ) Therefore the question 
explored in this Chapter becomes: is there a theoretical perspective on public 
relations and on group activity which accounts for business lobbying in such 
a way as to explain, at least implicitly, the hiring of lobbyists? 
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Although commercial lobbying will be viewed as public relations activity in 
this Chapter, it should be remembered that - as noted in the preceding 
Chapter - this claim is disputed by some commercial lobbyists. As public 
relations, it can be explained in the terms of competing perspectives. 
It is not disputed in the literature that group activity, and commercial 
lobbying as an extension of such activity, is an act of politics. The title of 
Truman's text (1951) on groups is The Governmental Process; Holtzman 
(1966; 1) and Hague and Harrop (1989; 114) assert that politics and interests 
are inseparable; and the sub-title of Jordan's Commercial Lob (1991) is 
Politics for Profit in Britain. This Chapter looks at pluralist and more 
hegemonic models of public relations and group activity. 
Commercial lobbying may raise some new questions about the nature of the 
representation by MPs, given that the latter say they are now the objects of 
much more lobbying by commercial lobbyists and that most of that lobbying 
is not constituency-based. These questions are related to the main focus of 
this thesis but are separate and are treated in Appendix Three, 221. 
Evaluating the outcomes of commercial lobbying is not dealt with here for it 
has been reviewed in Chapter One, 30-32: it is a pervasive fieldwork theme 
(see in particular Chapter Seven, 182-186) and is analysed in Chapter Eight, 
204-208. 
Relationshil2s with public relations persi2ectives - the pluralist. liberal 
model. 
While the first Chapter described the relationships between commercial 
lobbyists and public relations people largely from the position of practice, 
there is a set of problematic relationships to be explored from the vantage 
point of public relations theoretical perspectives. 
Commercial lobbying can be related to either of two competing perspectives 
about public relations. These perspectives are the application of concepts 
developed in political studies. The linkages between public relations 
practice., theoretical perspectives and their philosopical underpinning have 
been analysed by Grunig and White (1992). 
Public relations perspectives are the product of a small, applied but 
developing academic discipline, largely led by Americans, which attempts to 
theorise the activity of public relations in relation to management, political 
and communication studies. The emerging results are three perspectives (the 
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systems, the critical and the rhetorical) with the dominant one in the US and 
the UK being the systems perspective, first fully stated by Grunig & Hunt 
(1984). The systems perspective regards lobbying as a public relations 
function (it is usually labelled the public affairs component of public 
relations: see Mackey [1994] for an introduction to paradigmatic thinking 
about the latter) and it is seen as one-way or two-way communication 
between organisations and external public groups. Indeed the preferred 
form of public relations is two-way symmetrical communication and Grunig 
wrote (1989; 29) that organisations employing this form: 
use bargaining, negotiating, and strategies of conflict resolution to 
bring about symbiotic changes in the ideas,, attitudes,, and 
behaviours of both the organisation and its publics. 
The group environment in which this activity unfolds is, in other words, 
pluralistic and Grunig (38) identified 'interest group liberalism', complete 
with open competition among groups, as a pre-supposition for this preferred 
form. For Grunig, lobbying and his favoured (two-way communications) 
form of public relations are largely synonymous. 
Pearson (1992; 114) developed this public relations - as - pluralism theme in a 
review of public relations histories. He quoted Hiebert (1966) who wrote in a 
biography of Ivy Lee, one of the founders of modern American public 
relations, that: 
Ivy Lee and public relations played a significant role in preserving 
the pluralism of American society by opening channels of 
communication and allowing opposing groups to understand each 
other. 
Hiebert is also referenced with: 'Without public relations, democracy could 
not succeed in a mass society. ' This liberal, pluralist perspective is reflected 
in American textbooks on public relations. For example, Baskin and Aronoff 
(1988; 338) wrote about lobbying: 
Although the term has acquired an unsavory connotation of graft 
and influence peddling, lobbying has long been recognised as a 
legitimate activity. James Madison, writing in 1788, held that an 
essential characteristic of a representative society is that the 
various interest groups in society are permitted to compete for the 
attention of government officials. 
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Cutlip, Center & Broom (1985; 15) wrote that 'lobbying is an outgrowth of ... 
a democratic system functioning in a pluralistic society' and later (451) that 
'It is a basic democratic right that every idea, individual and institution shall 
have a full and fair hearing in the public forum ... ' while Wittenberg and 
Lesly (Lesly, 1991; 75) called attention to... the many years of punching, 
pushing, tugging and shoving by the multiple interests that demand to be 
heard and attended to in the American democracy. .. ' Canfield and Moore 
(1973; 305) and Ross (1977; 166) take similiar positions. 
Crable & Vibbert (1986; 36) wrote that: 
Instead of waiting until an issue of critical importance arises, 
organisations can engage in a more or less continual dialogue with 
citizens' groups, public officials, and special interest groups in 
their environment. 
In the UK, commercial lobbyist Ian Greer (1985) develops the liberal, pluralist 
theme. He writes, inter alia, about 'how the law-maker is only as good as the 
information he is given. ' His choice of title is indicative - Right To Be Heard - 
and he says (9): 
In a democratic society, we have not only the right but also the 
duty to inform our political representatives of our views on 
matters than affect us. 
From the viewpoint of this liberal public relations perspective, lobbying is 
pluralism in progress. It is pluralism happening. It is the activity of the 
interests competing with each other and pressing their cases on public policy. 
And it is arguable that there is public benefit in these representations because 
often legislation is 'better' as a result. Jenny Jeger, one of the founding 
directors of lobbying firm GJW (2n), shared this view of democratic benefit, 
when she rejected the view that lobbying is anti-democratic: 
What the question says is nobody should ever criticise any 
element of any piece of legislation; legslation is beautifully 
drafted; there are no flaws in it; people should be un-informed 
about legislation in front of them; members of the Shadow Cabinet 
who have no resources to find things out except by those who 
volunteer should not be informed about arguments; should not be 
meeting people who are against legislation or who want a point 
put they can"t find accepted by the Government; that civil servants 
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should not talk to outsiders about how to draft legislation; should 
not seek advice; that everybody has so much time to do all this 
properly and thoroughly and carefully. 
From this perspective, therefore, lobbying - in both its commercial and in- 
house versions - is legitimated and is so from two aspects. There is the 
functionalist legitimation that it is a communications system which 
negotiates, bargains and resolves conflict (Grunig and Hiebert). Secondly 
there is the constitutionalist endorsement that it enhances American and 
British politics. Greer suggested that it is a 'right'; Jeger argued that it leads 
to more effective legislation. 
The constitutionalist argument can be expanded into the above-mentioned 
'hyphen effect' where lobbying is a smoothing interface between 
Government which needs information about the effects of its actions, and 
outside interests which need access to public policy-making in order to 
protect their interests. Norton and Grantham (1986; 7) wrote: 
While the activities of some lobbyists constitute a problem, 
professional consultancy firms can and often do help provide a 
link between Whitehall /Westminister and outside bodies. They 
constitute something of a hyphen in the relationship. The benefit 
is a two-way one. 
Broadly the evidence of the literature review supports the explanatory power 
of the liberal, pluralist perspective of public relations. From this perspective, 
it is clear that commercial lobbying, as a sub-set of lobbying, is an activity 
which undertakes the 'hyphen effect' between groups and government. It is 
also clear from this perspective that lobbying as public relations is essentially 
a liberal, pluralist activity in the political studies sense. Here the liberal, 
pluralist perspective of public relations and the liberal, pluralist perspective 
of group activity are one and the same and are describing the same benign 
activity in the same language but from different disciplinary stances. 
From these two perspectives, any critique of commercial lobbying: 
lies not so much in what they do (which can be beneficial to the 
making of public policy) but rather in the manner in which they - 
or at least some of them - do it and in those who undertake it. 
(Norton & Grantham, 7) 
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What can a liberal, pluralist perspective of public relations offer to this 
research? Its major effect will be to divert the spotlight away from questions 
of legitimacy, either functional or political /consititutional, and to focus 
instead on questions of effectiveness and efficiency. The spotlight will be 
turned away from the following categories of question. Is the hyphen an 
accessible and open bridge for all groups? Or is the bridge closed to all but 
the wealthy and the powerful? Is this good, bad or immaterial to the society 
in which it happens. 
Olasky (1987) has given an answer to these questions and it is negative. He 
declared that he wrote for 'political conservatives and libertarians. ' He 
argued that contact between the business interest and government is inimical 
to free enterprise and to political freedom and that public relations 
practitioners should stop making that contact. For him, the hyphen makes 
for a degraded society: 
For over a century, many major corporate public relations leaders 
have worked diligently to kill free enterprise by promoting 
government-big business collaboration. Over and over again, 
many corporate public relations executives have supported 
economic regulations with the goal of eliminating smaller 
competition and ensuring their own profits. They have sold such 
restrictions on freedom by promising better service, but their 
frequent inability to deliver has left residue of public disbelief in 
the promises of corporate America. (2) 
For Olasky, the hyphen is a negative, part of the machinery of "corporate 
collaborationism' which he defines as alliances of large corporations with 
each other and with the Federal Government. 
Relationships with 12ublic relations perspectives - critical theory. 
A competing perspective to the liberal, pluralist one is that of critical public 
relations theory as exemplified by Smythe (1981), Gandy (1982 and 1992) and 
again it is argued that it is closely derived from a broader political studies 
perspective. In this case, the basic paradigm is neo-Marxist in its ideological 
form. Smythe argued (71) that public relations is part of a 'Consciousness 
Industry' creating acquiesence to monopoly capitalism. Gandy (1982) 
developed an explicit theory of how this acquiesence was achieved - his 
concept of "information subsidy. ' He sought to explain how the mass media 
agenda is set and for what purposes, and how this affects the distribution of 
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power and values in society. He argued (8) that there is a market for 
information in society "characterised by both shortage and supply. ' Because 
information is 'at the heart of individual and collective decision-making, 
control of information implies control of decision-making. ' The exchange of 
information is determined largely on an economic basis and "mal- 
distribution in economic resources will be reflected in mal-distribution of 
information. ' This mal-distribution is aided - if not caused - by 'information 
subsidies' which reduce the price of information creation and distribution. 
He concluded: 
It is through the provision of information subsidies to and through 
the mass media that those with economic power are able to 
maintain their control over a capitalist society. (8) 
He described the role of public relations, which includes the lobbying 
function, in the production of information subsidies (64): 
It is the modern public relations firm that plays the central role in 
the design and implementation of information subsidy efforts by 
the major policy actors. Unlike the advertising agency, it is the 
responsibility and general practice of public relations specialists to 
generate unpaid publicity. It is, in fact, the public relations 
specialist who is most often relied upon to deliver the undercover 
subsidy where the source and the source's self-interest is skillfully 
hidden. 
Gandy (1992) has updated these views in the light of the 'Information Age' 
which is characterised by work changes 'where increasingly larger shares of 
the workforce are engaged in the production of information goods and 
services! (158) He argued that public relations will play a part, via 
information subsidies, in the US's international role of spreading the 
messages of deregulation and privatisation. 
Firstly it should be noted that this public relations model shares one 
characteristic as with the previous liberal, pluralist model: it is largely the 
micro development of a larger macro view. Secondly, it has developed a 
theoretical concept in 'information subsidy' which parallels, in 
communication studies, the economic concept of cost subsidy and which at 
the level of conceptual tool has considerable explanatory power. 
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But there are methodological problems about demonstrating empirical 
support for this perspective. These are the same obstacles as those facing the 
larger critical theory and neo-Marxist projects. The first relates to the general 
difficulty facing all Marxist statements about dominant group activity 
producing 'false consciousness. ' Does the "modern public relations firm' of 
Gandy (or the commercial lobbyist of this research) recognise what they do 
in the same terms as Gandy? Are they conscious of operating a subsidy for 
the purposes attributed to them: and if not, how is Gandy's case 
demonstrated, as opposed to asserted? 
The general argument here is that it is unlikely that the public relations firm 
(or commercial lobbyist) will reject the conventional, self-enhancing values 
associated with the liberal perspective of public relations and see themselves 
from the critical theory stance. There is no data so far showing that they do 
reject the liberal perspective and Gandy (1982) offered little empirical 
evidence: he listed (69) some public relations techniques in an implied critical 
way but he did not offer case studies or interview data of information 
subsidies being constructed. Gandy (1992) is largely theoretical assertion. 
An analysis by Turk (1985) of the effect of information subsidies operated by 
state agencies to get their material into Louisiana newspapers was 
inconclusive in that only about half of the coverage came from subsidised 
sources. 
The claim of validity for a critical theory perspective on public relations and 
on commercial lobbying has yet to be demonstrated and whether it can be 
done through empirical evidence is an open question. 
A demonstration of theoretical validity, as opposed to empirically based 
validity, could be argued through critical theory in the manner of the 
Frankfurt School (Bottomore, 1984). Such an argument is essentially non- 
empirical, if not anti-positivist, and could be set out as follows. Commercial 
lobbying is an information subsidy in operation in that it furthers a powerful 
organisation's interests vis-a-vis public policy. The subsidy is paid to a 
lobbying firm to construct an information good, in the economist's sense, on 
behalf of the commissioning organisation and that organisation is likely to be 
a large business. The creation and presentation of the good and the 
persuasion employed to get it accepted is often done in a confidential way 
through private meetings with Ministers, civil servants and MPs. The 
characteristics of this process are control of economic resources by powerful 
business interests and privileged access to decision-makers. 
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However, this current research rejects any notion of validity claimed through 
critical theory as too metaphysical and therefore methodologically unsound. 
Instead, it roots its claim on validity, as will be argued below, in a nominalist 
approach to observation and interviews. It therefore searches for data which 
supports as large a measure of inter-subjective agreement as possible on the 
meaning of researched phenomena. 
But the critical model of public relations does offer an alternative model to 
the liberal, pluralist one and it therefore has the value of creating an 
opposing and challenging theoretical pole: the theoretical tension between 
the two may be fruitful in generating new analysis. The concept of 
'information subsidy' is useful in creating this tension. It is also possible that 
the evidence of fieldwork will demonstrate the model to be fully or partially 
valid. 
Overall, this section concludes that the liberal pluralist perspective on public 
relations developed by Grunig and Hunt accounts for the observation that 
much of the public relations of business is competitive against other groups. 
But it makes no explicit elaboration of a public relations practice called 
commercial lobbying. 
Political studies Dersi2ectives on commercial lob 
The above section looked at competing public relations perspectives as 
explanatory models of commercial lobbying. It also concluded that the 
perspectives are largely, if not exclusively, re-expressions of broader, 
political studies perspectives on group behaviour. This re-emphasises the 
derived and applied nature of public relations theory and raises a question 
about its theoretical under-development. 
It is appropriate, therefore, to apply a broader perspective to this research. 
Can political studies perspectives on groups explain commercial lobbying, 
even implicitly? A literature review undertaken for this section has shown 
that the broader political studies literature is not explicit about hired 
lobbying where it theorises about lobbying by groups. The task of this 
section is to examine whether these perspectives have the implicit capacity to 
account for commercial lobbying. 
A starting point is to relate commercial lobbying to a typology of groups. 
Commercial lobbyists are in contact with the protective and promotional 
type of interest groups developed in Hague and Harrop's typology (1989; 
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121-125) rather than with the customary and institutional types of groups. 
Hague and Harrop (115) also noted about pluralistic models that they 
compete for the attentions of government. 
The classical gluralist 'fit' 
The literature review suggests that commercial lobbying (lobbying capacity 
hired by an interest) will 'fit' with pluralist models of politics associated with 
Truman, Dahl (3n) and Lindblom (and, it will be argued, particularly with 
the latter). This is because lobbying, persuasive contact with government, is 
a consequence of competitive group activity. 
Truman's model of pluralism raises fruitful questions of 'fit, particularly 
when relations with business interests are explored. Truman (37) noted that 
any group in society may function as a political group making a claim on 
government. Thus 'An economic group, such as a corporation, that seeks a 
special tax ruling in that respect functions as a political interest group. ' 
Groups compete for access to decision-makers and access is influenced by the 
social standing and the internal organisation of a group, and also by the 
nature of the governmental institutions. 
His model identifies business - which is the majority client of hired lobbyists 
- as a powerful interest. He said (265): 'Perhaps the most basic factor 
influencing access is the position of the group or its spokesmen in the social 
structure. ' He added with specific references to business interests: 
The deference accorded a high-status group not only facilitates the 
acceptance of its propaganda but also eases its approach to 
government. 
In contrast, he gave the examples of 'labor organisations' which had 
difficulties of access owing to "handicaps in status. ' Dahl also identified 
business people as economic notables: 'their authority is particularly great 
when policies impinge directly on business costs, earnings, investments and 
profits.. .' (1961; 76) 
But it should be noted that while Truman's model attributes high-status to 
business interests and therefore much lobbying influence, it does not offer 
any very specific or elaborated theoretical explanation of why business needs 
to lobby, let alone hire lobbyists. He also noted that not all interests in the US 
are organised (511) but argued that associations of people with shared 
attitudes will organise into a political interest group if there is sufficient 
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disturbance in the behaviour or expectations of those associated people. 
Here Truman has made observations with some power to explain 
commercial lobbying. Firstly disturbance to the behaviour or expectations of 
an interest,, such as business, leads it to organise lobbying which could 
include hiring in capacity. Secondly there is actual or potential 
countervailing power opposing high-status business interests. Heinz et al. 
(1993) also remarked on the countervailing power concept in their study of 
American interest representation. Where there is countervailing power, it is 
argued here that business may use an extra resource to help it lobby. 
Holtzman (1966; 8) has developed this disturbance-in-relationships concept 
as a disequilibrium theory of why interest groups are active in society: when 
their stable patterns of interaction are upset or threatened and - critically - the 
resort to private action fails to reproduce a favourable stability, they turn to 
the state to re-establish those patterns. What is useful here for the 
commercial lobbying phenomenon is that interests will only resort to a 
hyphen function such as lobbying government after inter-group mediation 
has failed. 
'Fit' with other models 
But other authors would doubt that group /commercial lobbying activity 
supports a classical pluralist model such as Truman's. Rather they would 
say that it re-inforces a hegemony of powerful interests. Domhoff (1978) 
described himself as holding a 'class-hegemony paradigm. ' He identified 
'the special interest process' as one of the four ways in which the American 
dominant class maintained its position and has a place for lobbying. He 
wrote (25): 
Ruling class domination of government can be seen most directly 
in the workings of lobbyists, backroom superlawyers, trade 
associations, and advisory committees to governmental 
departments and agencies. 
He noted that the people in the above groups who operated this special 
interest process were neither well known nor prominent members of the 
ruling class. They did not have to be: the process was structural. 
The position of McConnell (1966) is less hegemonic than Domhoff but still 
concerned about the primacy of interest groups over broader interests. 
Writing before Lindblom (1977), the powerful position of private business 
interests concerned McConnell because he argued - with case studies of 
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business, labour, land use and reclamation - that group politics were in 
conflict with a national politics in the USA. While he described, along with 
Lindblom, a scenario of advantage or privilege for some groups, he went 
further and expressed a Madisonian concern over a threat to the public 
interest from private interests. He wrote, shortly after Olson (1965) that 
'relatively homogeneous groups have been effectively organised and have 
assumed a strong degree of power over particular areas of public policy 
through close collaboration with segments of government ... (338) A British 
critique which is concerned with overweening interests is by Rivers (1974; 8) 
who warns about groups 'manipulating society to accord with their own 
interests. ' Neither McConnell nor Rivers were explicit about hired lobbying. 
Olson's thesis (1965) that interests large in numbers are less likely to organise 
than small interests is relevant to the differential power of groups. It 
provides an explanation of why numerically few producer groups such as 
businesses can be more effectively organised as groups than their customers, 
much more populous groups. (Mazey and Richardson [1992; 1051 noted that 
producer groups are 'usually the most effective lobbyists' in EU institutions. ) 
His application of this differential to the UK's relative economic decline led 
him (1982) to attribute that decline to organised producer groups. 
McFarland (1976) predated the latter Olson thesis with an analysis which 
married Michels's law of oligarchy to group lobbying -' organised, narrowly 
based elites tend to defeat unorganised majority interests. ' (28) 
Downs (1957) took the market as a model for democratic politics: 'our main 
thesis is that parties in democratic politics are analogous to entrepreneurs in 
a profit seeking economy ... they formulate whatever policies they believe 
will gain the most votes. ' (295) He introduced lobbyists into the model as a 
non-governmental intermediary between voters,, parties and government 
who, as influencers, provide information on policy decisons. 
Those most affected by a decision are those likely to bear the cost of 
providing information on policy and therefore to be the most well informed 
and the most listened to by government. A small producer group is more 
likely to incur lower costs in providing information than a large dispersed 
group such as consumers. Downs illustrated this with an example on tariff 
legislation where the cost to consumers of collating data, making informed 
judgements and supplying relevant information is much higher than for 
producers. Producers are therefore more likely to supply the information. 
(There is similarity between this model and Gandy's information subsidy 
[1982]. ) 'Under these conditions, government is bound to be more attentive 
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to producers than consumers when it creates policy. ' (255) He added (256): 
'Economically speaking, government in a democracy almost always exhibits 
an anti-consumer, pro-producer bias. ' 
This research can relate lobbying generally - whether in-house or hired - to 
Downs's thesis in the following way. Lobbying is a cost to the public policy- 
making system which can be transformed into a benefit by the process set 
out below. Government has to take into account the information provided 
by lobbyists about the effects of its decision-making. Voters do not express 
views on most of government's decisions outside of elections but 
government wants an estimate of the effects of their decisions. Lobbyists are 
non-govemmental intermediaries who claim representativeness and who 
have information about policy effects. If Government takes the lobbyist's 
information into account and the outcome is a representative decision (i. e. 
one in line with what voters want), then the cost of lobbying has been 
transformed into the benefit of a governmental action which voters would 
approve of in an election. 
But can commercial lobbying, as a sub-set of the general lobbying category, 
be related to this market analogue of political decision-making and so add to 
the descriptive power of Down's model? It could be argued that it adds to 
the costs and benefits of the policy-making system by increasing the supply 
of accurate information about policy consequences from a bigger number of 
interests. This would increase the representativeness of decision-making and 
increase the appeal to voters of governmental decisions. Demonstration of 
this argument is another matter. 
What Olson and others above offer by way of inferred explanation about 
commercial lobbyists is that their majority clients - businesses - are producers 
likely to be better organised than more populous groups; better resourced to 
pursue their interests, and therefore they may hire lobbyists as an extra 
resource. 
But none of these authors was explicit about hired lobbyists. There is also 
the larger problem of any hegemonic group model (like producer group 
ones) bringing forth convincing empirical support. It is needed for it is 
manifest that business /businesses have varying experiences of advantage 
and disadvantage in liberal, market societies and that some businesses fail 
altogether. The neo-pluralist model can account for such negative business 
experiences. 
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A neo-121uralisfic 12ersi2ective 
The classical pluralist model is not developed enough in its analysis of the 
business interest to explain why large businesses hire lobbyists. It cannot 
take the argument much beyond the implication that Truman's high status 
groups such as business do lobby. It does not have much power to explain 
why individual businesses lobby against other businesses; why some 
lobbying fails. 
Marsh and Locksley (1983; 1-21) noted that the power of capital was 
"qualitatively as well as quantitatively different' from other groups. 
Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987; 293-297) noted that for neo-pluralists 'business 
interests occupy a position of special importance compared with other social 
interests when it comes to influencing public policy-making. ' Smith (1990) 
further developed the classical, reformed and neo-pluralist typology by 
identifing the amounts of influence attributed to the business interest as the 
distinguishing feature between the categories. He described the key feature 
of neo-pluralism as the assumption that the business interest in the modern 
Western state is privileged as opposed to advantaged (316) and that the 
distinction springs from structural power. He was following Lindblom 
(1977) who argued that the state needs the economy to be successful and that 
it therefore has to give to business inducements to ensure that end. The neo- 
pluralist argument of Smith/Lindblom is that the market economy gives 
business the power to make many decisions and that these many decisions 
are outside of government control. These decisions are in the hands of 
business with whom government must collaborate to make the economy 
prosperous. (See Wilson, G. K. [1985; 6] for an elaboration of Lindblom that 
business incurs opportunity costs in the form of lost profits when the state 
does not co-operate with it and that business needs state involvement. ) 
Wilson in Jordan (1991) asserted the structural power of business, writing 
about the American experience of commercial lobbying (75) that: 
American politics has often been criticised as being even more 
biased to the wealthy than politics in other democracies. The rise 
of contract lobbying [commercial lobbying] strengthens this 
criticism as contract lobbyists are necessarily more available to 
those with money to pay them. 
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Alderman, one of the first UK academics to identify commercial lobbying as 
an area needing more analysis, made a similar point (1984; 133) in the UK 
context that the cost of hiring lobbyists makes them available only for 
wealthy interests. 
A privileged interest? 
Smith's distinction is based on the assumption that there is a significant 
difference between advantage which is variable according to circumstance 
and privilege which is entrenched. Grant (1994; 41) noted that privilege can 
mean both an observable quantity of extra advantage and a value judgement 
about worthiness. 
But if business is privileged in Grant's first sense, why does business lobby in 
a general sense and hire lobbyists in particular? If the business interest is 
strong, why hire: if lobbyists are hired, is business weak? The response to 
this apparent paradox starts with the recognition that the category 'business' 
is a complex entity in a Western, liberal, market economy. To accord it a 
privileged position in one or both of the senses above would not necessarily 
deny that business has strong and weak characteristics in different political 
circumstances; different sectors; in different sized units (Grant, 41) and, as 
Vogel has argued (1989), in different historical periods. 
The elaboration of the neo-pluralist perspective by Lindblom offers a way of 
handling this complexity. So far, the argument has used the undifferentiated 
category 'business' and it may be an adequate term at the level of macro 
theory which Lindblom sought to develop in Politics and Markets. He was 
describing (132 footnote) Western nations which demonstrated polyarchy 
(defined by Dahl [1971; 202]) as a regime where the opportunities for public 
contestation are available to the bulk of the population) and he was relating 
the two categories 'business' and 'government' to that concept. 
He noted unequal resources among groups and how the inequality was 
maintained in ways which include commercial lobbying (141): 
The second characteristic [of polyarchy] is that participants in 
polyarchical politics remain grossly unequal in wealth. Some can 
hire a supporting organisation; others cannot. Some can hire 
public relations consultants, broadcast time, newspaper space and 
other public platforms; others cannot. 
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Lindblom also noted (179) that there is conflict between government and 
business and (187) 'businessmen do not get everything they want. But they 
get a great deal. And when they do not get enough, recession or stagnation 
is a consequence. ' So at the level of macro categories, business (what Grant 
[1987; 3] called the aggregate of businesses) has to compete for power and 
influence with government in some circumstances. Seeking extra resource 
such as hiring lobbyists may be an indicator of this competition. 
But Lindblom went on to deconstruct the category 'business' and argued that 
there is conflict between different business sectors and disagreement over the 
benefits they seek. He stated (178): 
On some issues, of course, privilege granted to one segment of the 
business community represents the withdrawal of a privilege from 
another. 
Thus at this micro level of the category 'business' (the level of business 
sectors and of individual firms) as well as at the macro level, businesses have 
unsatisfied demands. Grant (1993) illustrated this double layering of 
dissatisfaction in his review of interest groups in the EU (4n). 
Lindblom's elaboration of neo-pluralism allows a fuller explanation of the 
business/ commercial lobbyist link than is available from other pluralist 
perspectives. It offers the following implicit response to the question: why 
do businesses lobby, including using hired lobbyists? Business is the most 
powerful and best resourced group in a liberal, market economy but it is 
more or less susceptible at different times to influence against its interest by 
government and by a few powerful groups. Business lobbies, therefore, as a 
bloc because it wants benign government policies towards the market. 
Businesses lobby as sectors or as single units because they want competitive 
advantage over peers in markets. They add to their existing lobbying 
capacity by hiring in more capacity where extra resource could gain 
advantage. 
But the Lindblom position still has a weakness for this thesis in that it offers 
no specific explanation of why business(es) hire in lobbying capacity. It takes 
the argument to the point of positing a generally strong business lobby but 
not specifically lobbying by hired lobbyists. The implication is that business 
will lobby using any lobbying type appropriate and that there is nothing so 
salient in the lobbying type known as commercial lobbying for it to be worth 
a distinct theoretical account. 
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Conclusion 
The literature review of Chapter One did not reveal any specific theory of, or 
perspective on, commercial lobbying and why business uses it. This Chapter 
has asked which competing theoretical perspectives from public relations 
and from interest group activity offer the more satisfactory, inferred 
explanations? 
The liberal, pluralist perspective on public relations is a better 'fit' 
explanation of the data than the critical theory one,, at least from the 
viewpoint of empirical demonstration. The former posited that all types of 
lobbying (of which commercial lobbying is but one) are acts of two-way 
communication between bargaining groups. But the liberal perspective 
offers no very powerful explanation for asymmetrical distribution of power 
between groups. On the other hand, the concept of information subsidy 
from the critical public relations perspective was a good conceptual tool for 
explaining this asymmetry. Demonstrating it is another matter. 
The classical pluralist perspective of group activity, liberated from the 
narrow confines of public relations, offers only a generalised explanation of 
why business /businesses lobby. The elaboration of neo-pluralism by 
Lindblom is a better 'fit' explanation. It is able to account more explicitly for 
business/ government lobbying (they need each other) and for individual, 
usually big, businesses lobbying (they are in competition). Because this 
perspective makes business the privileged but challenged and fractured 
interest in a market economy with many resources at its disposal, it infers 
that hired lobbyists will be used (and Lindblom specifies public relations 
consultants) as one lobbying type amongst others. 
Notes 
This research follows Truman (37) in not using the term "pressure 
group' on the grounds that it emphasises a stage in group political 
acitivity and instead uses 'interest group' on the grounds that it is a 
'more inclusive and more nearly neutral term. ' 'Interest group' is 
defined, after Wilson (1990), as a collection of people who are 
organised; who are distinct from from government and political party, 
and who want to influence public policy. 
2. Said in a recorded and transcribed interview with jenny Jeger at GJW's 
offices at Clapham Rd., London on June 21,1993. 
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3. Dahl's definition of 'Madisonian' democracy (1956) is, in part, an outcome 
of group competition: '. .. an effort to bring about a compromise 
between the 
power of majorities and the power of minorities. .. ' (4). What he calls the 
Madisonian axiom of a non-tyrannical republic is conditional on his 
paraphrase of Madison, namely that 'Factions must be so controlled that they 
do not succeed in acting adversely to the rights of other citizens or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community. " (11) 
4. Grant writes in Lobbymg in the European Community (44): 
Although business interests are likely to remain the most 
important category of interests organised at the Community level, 
this is not the same thing as saying that business generally gets 
what it wants at the Community level. The Member States remain 
highly influential, and they have political objectives of their own 
which are often not the same as business. The Commission also 
has its own agenda which often does not coincide with that of 
business. Business itself is, of course, divided. Some firms (e. g. 
firms in industries threatened by international competition such as 
consumer electronics and motor vehicles) may welcome a 
relatively interventionist 'European Champion' industrial strategy 
by the Community. Others (e. g. international chemical firms) 
would prefer the Community to concentrate on removing those 
remaining barriers which obstruct the free flow of capital between 
Member States, and those regulations which impair the operation 
of the market mechanism on a Community-wide basis. 
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Chapter Three 
Lobbyists for Hire: a research methodology and 
design. 
Introduction 
The research questions asked in this thesis concern the differentiating feature 
of commercial lobbyists - the 'for hire' aspect of their work. It is also the least 
researched, a conclusion identified after the application of a research method, 
i. e. a literature review. 
Being first in the field has implications for the research design of this thesis. 
There is no direct examplar. Secondly, commercial lobbying involves three 
distinct groups of social actors - the clients who hire lobbyists, the lobbyists, 
and the decision-makers. The questions asked touch sensitive and 
confidential aspects of the work of all three. (The decision to sample these 
three groups was made in 1992 before the publication by Heinz et al [1993; 
17] of their study of American interest groups and lobbyists: they 
interviewed the same groups). The paramount need is for a research 
methods design which will facilitate a valid collection and interpretation of 
the revelant data and allow its release into the public domain. Social 
research is a self-reflexive and interpretative activity, it is asserted, which 
involves difficult questions of philosophical assumption and of research 
validity. This Chapter seeks to develop a research methods design adequate 
to the challenges above. 
The methodological background: 12revious research 
The need for a critical approach to the research topic ( Gill & Johnson, 1991; 
21) is especially pressing when there is much general material to review. It is 
evident that the politics of lobbying and of interest groups generally have 
been substantially covered (Finer 1958,1966; Potter 1961; Wootton 1975; 
Richardson and Jordan 1979; Alderman, 1984; Wilson, 1985,1990: Grant, 1987, 
1989,1993; Richardson (ed) 1993). And it was also evident from the 
observation of British politics during the 1980s that lobbying was developing 
a new feature - the high profile appearance of 'for hire' lobbyists. Jordan 
(1991; 18) and Berry (1991; 1) reported on this decade of growth. 
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It is Silverman (1985; 9) who supplies a methodological reason for 
researching so much material. He wrote of a 'typology with empty boxes'. 
When this concept is overlaid on existing lobbying research, it shows that 
previous writers in the UK have extensively covered the lobbying process 
from Finer's Anonymous Empire (1966) onwards but that commercial 
lobbying was largely untouched research ground until the middle Eighties. 
Jordan et al (1991) have largely filled that 'box' with their general profile. 
Now one stage further on, the literature review of Chapter One has shown 
that there is a largely empty 'box' concerning the 'for hire' aspects. 
Previous research by the four UK authors who come closest to this thesis 
raises methodological questions which need to be considered. The paucity of 
research on the topic means that there is no clear pointer to an established 
and successful research design which has worked in the past. Berry (34) has 
pointed to definitional questions of isolating accurately the research target. 
Moore (1991; 5) has followed a mixed qualitative/ quantitative approach 
using interviews, documents and business activity data in his profile of one 
lobbying company (GJW). His paper clearly showed the value of prolonged 
access to lobbying professionals and their papers but the constraint of 
confidentiality requested by the company (13) was a substantial limitation to 
developing a complete profile. The same constraint has to be negotiated by 
this research for the questions asked here enquire into sensitive business and 
political matters; e. g. issues lobbied on; attitudes of clients towards lobbyists; 
value for money; attitudes of decision-makers. 
Moore appeared to hold an idiosyncratic view of methodology. It is argued 
here that he was confusing methodology with the working practices of 
lobbyists: the former per se tell us nothing of the latter but tell us how to find 
out. He treated methodology (32-45) in a way which seems to confuse 
substance and method. He stated that there is a general ignorance about 
lobbying methods, a suspicion about some lobbyists and that a 'study of 
methodology' is important to show how lobbyists work and whether there is 
a basis for criticism of them. This is asking too much of methodology, for as 
the science of method, it can only confer a claim of validity on the substance 
of research which itself alone will indicate whether there are answers to 
Moore's questions. Moore demonstrated his elision of process and substance 
when he offered four sections under his methodology section which are clear 
matters of substance about the lobbying activity: he lists a discussion of 
lobbying styles; an examination of services offered by lobbyists; their take-up 
by different client groups, and implications for the political process in 
general. 
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However, Moore has a major attraction in that he is one of the few 
researchers to concentrate on the business practices of "for hire' lobbyists and 
for that he is innovative. But his vehicle was a working paper based on the 
practices of one company. His work would be increased in value if he had 
investigated other lobbying companies and investigated other role players in 
the equation: clients and decision-makers. This current research will tackle 
these two areas. 
Berry (34-36) divided lobbyists into two broad categories - those working in- 
house as employees of companies, 'peak' organisations and trade 
associations; and secondly commercial lobbyists of whom he noted that 
almost all their work was geared towards the private sector. He further sub- 
divided the commercial lobbyists into four categories of company on the 
basis of the link with a parent organisaton and suggests an approximate total 
of 62 UK lobbying firms. 
This research agrees with Berry that it is 'almost impossible' to be accurate 
about the number of firms: for example, some lobbyists assert strongly that 
they are not part of public relations: yet it is via the two UK representative 
public relations organisations that the researcher is best able to get an 
overview, admittedly self-proclaimed, of who is lobbying. Some lobbyists, 
fond of the 'political barrister' image, may not like the public relations 
association: but almost all public relations practitioners are happy to be 
associated with lobbying. 
Rush et al. (1991) carried out a survey of 253 organisations outside 
government which examined the activities of pressure groups in relation to 
Parliament and their work touched on commercial lobbyists. The sample 
included 'peak' organisations (such as the TUC), trade associations, 
professional bodies and voluntary organisations, all drawn from the 
Directory of Pressure Groups and Representative Organisations (Shipley, 
1979). The survey was done in 1986 and took as its population some 1,700 
national organisations listed in the Directory and from which a sample of 
approximately one in five was drawn. The three dates mentioned in this 
paragraph raise questions about the up-to-dateness of the findings generally 
and about the sampling frame in particular. Rush et al. were primarily 
concerned with the interplay of interest groups and Parliament and there 
was a Chapter on political consultants - their title for commercial lobbyists - 
by Grantham and Semour-Ure. The authors used the survey data to give, 
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inter alia, 'examples of current or former clients' of the 28 commercial 
lobbyists they identified. As with Moore, they touched on the present topic 
but did not probe it. 
An induction-led research model. 
The hypothetico-deductive model of research in its rigorous experimental 
mode is associated with the natural sciences and is not considered by many 
social scientists to be the appropriate paradigm for their investigations 
(Wilson, 1979; 108; Baker, 1988; 17: Silverman, 1985; 3: Hughes, 1990; 107). This 
research, therefore, does not start with a precise theoretical statement of 
general inference looking for particular instances and one which can be 
hypothesized and operationalised. Nor does it end with one. Nor does any 
other published research examined in the literature review start - or finish - 
with any nomothetically determined theory. 
It follows that the methodological approach will be of verstehen, 
explanation-by-understanding, rather than explanation-by-covering-law. 
Hughes (93) has defined verstehen as the attempt 'to reconstruct the 
subjective experience of social actors'. The understanding sought is in the 
ethnographic tradition because of the reflexive nature of social action, 
including research; because of the difficulty of accurately identifying motives 
for behaviour, and because of the lack of a neutral language for observation. 
These classic problems of social research draw this thesis towards an 
interpretative methodology. For in a striking phrase by Hughes (136), social 
researchers have to face 'the fact that their subject matter also has a voice. ' 
This ideographic approach has advantages which have been outlined by 
Glaser (1978; 38): 
The researcher can make shifts of emphasis early in the research 
process so that data gathered reflects what is actually occurring in 
the field rather than speculation about what cannot or should have 
been observed. 
This is particularly relevant here because the research area has not been 
systematically investigated before and the data gathered to date is thin. 
Glaser also suggested (38) that basing research on pre-formulated hypotheses 
may thwart the researcher's theoretical sensitivity. 
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A priori hypothesis would be a false friend in this area where there is little 
research and no theory. The approach here, therefore, is to use grounded 
theory method -a method which suits an area of under-developed theory. 
Strauss and Corbin (1990; 23) said about it: 'One does not begin with a 
theory, then prove it. Rather, one begins with an area of study and what is 
relevant to that area is allowed to emerge. ' 
Choice of research methods. 
To paraphrase Hughes (143), research methods are where social researchers 
get their hands dirty. The commitment of this research to an interpretative 
approach steers the choice of method. But Silverman (xi), Hammersley and 
Atkinson (1983; 23) and Strauss & Corbin (18) have both argued that social 
researchers should choose from the full range of research methods and not 
from either qualitative or quantitative approaches. Patton (1980; 20) wrote 
about a 'paradigm of choices' which calls for the matching of method to the 
research situation and which does not privilege qualitative over quantitative 
or vice versa. Gill & Johnson (1991; 127) also set out the case for 
'methodological pluralism. ' 
But an interpretative approach cannot give parity to both qualitative and 
quantitative methods and the pluralism above is rejected. It was clear from 
pilot fieldwork that quantitative methods would be inappropriate here. 
Small scale postal surveys were considered and were ruled out because the 
relatively low level of knowledge about the topic hinders the generation of 
significant questions and because there are substantial problems of access 
and confidentiality. Commercial lobbying involves its actors in what they 
perceive to be sensitive relationships. Ticking boxes on a postal 
questionniare may reveal something about the patterns of behaviour but 
little about purpose and motive. The research methods used here were 
interviews, backed up by observation and document analysis. 
There is so little data on the 'for hire' aspects that it is essential first of all to 
build up a basic bank of information. Open interviews (see below) are the 
best way to start filling up an empty bank. Their course is not pre-set and is 
driven by the thrust of the phenomenon under scrutiny; their yield of 
material is comprehensive and varied and they provide a 'thick' floor upon 
which to build conceptual insights. 
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Historically, ethnography has framed the work of those researchers who 
observed the work of relatively small social groups in order to understand 
the meaning of their social interaction. It has also underpinned studies 
involving a small number of cases (Gill & Johnson, 1991; 124). It is user- 
friendly for this research. 
Sampling lobbying behaviour 
The research design here follows Morse (1991) in that sampling for fieldwork 
interviews should be appropriate and adequate: the former in that the 
sampling methods help understand the research problem and the latter in 
that they generate good quality data. The sampling was purposive as 
opposed to random and took the form of representative and theoretical 
sampling. 
It was clear that the three sub-populations to be interviewed were 
homogeneous in the sense given by Patton (1990): they shared the same sub- 
culture. For example, the employers of commercial lobbyists are nearly 
always corporate officers in substantial bureaucracies, very often publicly 
quoted companies and invariably reporting directly to their boards. This 
common background allowed the application of representative sampling: if a 
small number was interviewed, there was a good probability that the 
number was representative of the whole sub-population. 
The three samples for interview were drawn from the following frames. 
Clients interviewed (not necessarily clients of the lobbyists sampled) were 
chosen from two sampling frames - the Charing Cross Dining Club and and 
Caxton Group, the former with 10 members and the latter with 12. The 
researcher discovered that these informal, social groupings brought together 
public affairs and government relations professionals working for large 
companies. They are the people who employ commercial lobbyists. They 
are the lobbyists' bosses. 
The sampling frame for lobbyists was principally the 1991/2 Berkele 
' Directory of Public Affairs and Government Relations (Lloyd & Atack) which 
listed 35 commercial lobbyists. Sampling frames in the case of decision- 
makers were the House of Commons and the First Division Association, the 
trade union for senior civil servants. In the case of special advisers, access 
was through recommendations, as it was eventually in larger part with 
officials. 
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Once access was gained, the research design borrowed from grounded 
theory its technique of theoretical sampling. This allowed the researcher to 
go the way of the most promising cases for the development of theory: to be 
continually looking for conceptual linkages and patterns in the researched 
data; and to 'follow' data which appeared to be the most fruitful ground for 
such linkages and patterns (Strauss & Corbin; 177). It further encouraged 
sampling to be driven by developments in the field rather than be pre- 
determined. Kuzel (1992; 33) summed up: 
In qualitative inquiry, sampling is driven by the desire to 
illuminate the questions under study and to increase the scope or 
range of data exposed - to uncover multiple realities. 
Theoretical sampling was also apposite here because the research field 
contained three, essential sub-populations (clients, commercial lobbyists and 
decision-makers) and before field work started, it was not clear which sub- 
population or combination of them would be most productive for relevant 
data. The methodological freedom to follow the green shoots of developing 
patterns was welcome. 
Theoretical sampling is a form of non-probability sampling and Baker (1988; 
157) argued that it could be effectively used to explore ideas in under- 
researched fields. In practice, it proved a fruitful way of interacting with 
respondents once they were identified as representative. 
Sample size for each of the sub-populations was set at ten to twelve per 
population. The systemic constraints of limited research time and money 
pointed to a total of some 30 plus interviews being feasible (38 were done). 
The literature also suggested that this was theoretically viable. Kuzel (1992) 
said that six to eight informants are needed when the sample size is 
homogeneous while 12 to 20 suffice for a heterogeneous sample. Appendix 
Two, 216 sets out the full interview schedule. 
inside each sub-population, individual interviewees were chosen on the basis 
of theoretical sampling described above after their receipt of the research 
brief summary (Appendix One, 215) and in most cases a telephone 
conversation about their reaction to it. 
The interviews done with the three sub-populations amounted to a 
triangular and validating comparison of data derived from different but 
related role players in commercial lobbying. 
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Principal mode of data collection: interviews 
Interviews were face-to-face and of a focused, semi-structured nature. They 
began with a statement of the topic in the form of Appendix One and fol- 
lowed with general open-ended questions, the answers to which gave point- 
ers to more follow-up questions of increasing specificity. Questions were 
asked until nothing new was added. Patton (1990; 280) offered the above 
approach as one of three approaches to questioning at interview, calling it 
the general interview guide approach. It involves outlining a set of issues 
that are to be explored with each respondent before interviewing begins. He 
said: 
The interview guide presumes that there is common information 
that should be obtained from each person interviewed, but that no 
set of standardized questions are written in advance. The 
interviewer is thus required to adapt both the wording and the 
sequence of questions to specific respondents in the context of the 
actual interview. 
In the fieldwork, no respondent vetoed any area of questioning or refused to 
consider any question. There were no instances of a refusal to consider a 
question or of no comment. But it was evident from observation that some 
questions were answered less comfortably by some respondents, as 
explained in the following section on observation. 
But generally, the general interview guide approach respects the self-image 
of the groups being interviewed and hopefully, therefore, encourages co- 
operation through negotiation. Hoffmann (Shafer, Stebbins & Turowetz, 
1980; 45), in her study of the board of directors of a hospital, wrote about 
interviews as social encounters and the difficulties of getting full information 
from socially powerful groups. She developed the term 'front work' for 
sanitised public statements in contradistinction to fuller responses to known 
people of insider status. This research tried to pass beyond 'front work' in 
the ways outlined below. 
Interviews are analogous to a tug-of-war. With the brief summary as an 
agreed starting point, those for this research were steered by the interviewee 
so long as the responses were considered broadly relevant by the researcher. 
Because the interviewees were very accustomed to working in a political 
atmosphere and to defending and attacking positions, their social handling 
required sensitive handling by the interviewer. Developing Wiseman and 
Aron (1972; 46), this handling requires a balance amongst three factors: 
agreeing a broad agenda at the start; giving the interviewee freedom to 
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develop his/her own responses; and the researcher intervening with 
questions as new, promising material was revealed or as irrelevant material 
was introduced. 
The interview strategy adopted was iterative in the following ways. At 
individual interviews theoretically interesting topics were the focus of 
several questions. Later, it was significant to note that among interviews 
within the same sub-population, some topics repeatedly came up. Finally, 
some topics were common to more than one sub-population and were thus 
covered from three social positions. It became clear from this triple-layering 
of iteration that patterns and linkages in the data were discernible and could 
sustain substantial analysis. Topics treated in this way include client access 
to decision-makers; influence of commercial lobbyists on client policy; and 
how decision-makers perceived hired lobbyists. 
Confidentiality 
Two other factors make for the success of an interview strategy: rapport and 
confidentialilty. Rapport needs to be acquired and sustained at a level that 
maintains interest, attention and even pleasure for the informant. This is 
particularly important with groups such as senior managers and political 
and administrative decision-makers, used to be being heeded. 
Rapport can be influenced by offers and, if needed, assurances of confidenti- 
ality. However, understandings about the meaning of confidentiality vary as 
Simons (1981; 32) noted when discussing research in education. 
This research sought in the first instance on-the-record interviews. If these 
were refused, interviewees were given a guarantee that the data from their 
interview would be used unattributably in this thesis and possibly other 
academic publications; that their names would not be published, and would 
be known only to the researcher and his three supervisors - and only if the 
latter asked. Out of 41 people approached for interviews, only three refused 
to give one. Of the 38 who agreed, all except one agreed to meet. The 
exceptional person said time was lacking for a meeting yet the telephone 
interview was 20 minutes. The note of the call was transcribed within two 
hours. 
Of 11 client interviews, all were attributable except one. Of the 13 lobbyist 
respondents, one was anonymous while another let his name be listed as a 
participant but his views not attributed. The four pilot fieldwork interviews 
were with lobbyists and recorded and transcribed on an attributable basis. 
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Of the ten respondents in the decision-maker category, seven were fully 
attributed. Two were anonymous and one let her name be listed but her 
views not attributed to her. 
The sensitive nature of the interviews could have prohibited the use of a tape 
recorder. Agreement to use one was sought in 34 interviews (the exceptions 
were three pilot fieldwork interviews and one lobbyist interview) and in no 
case refused. Of these 34,33 were taped, including four anonymous or 
unattributable respondents. (One anonymous interview was not taped as the 
researcher could not get the tape recorder to work). Each recorded interview 
was fully transcribed as a first draft within seventy two hours to aid accurate 
transcription. The initial transcript was then aurally checked against the 
tape. The aim was the "thick' description characteristic of ethnographic 
research. 
Interviews are sensitive research instruments and opportunities to have them 
limited: pressure on diaries did not offer early second chances. To hone 
skills the reseacher carried out four pilot interviews with lobbyists and 
reviewed his behaviour after each interview to see how it could be adjusted 
to release more data. For example, it became clear that the best start to the 
interview was to discuss the research brief summary and not to take out the 
tape recorder until that conservation was finished; and that shorter questions 
encouraged longer responses; and that more sensitive questions were asked 
later rather than earlier. These pilots were what Americans have called the 
"soaking and poking' phase of a research programme. 
Secondary modes of data collection: documents 
Patton (1990; 233) reminded that "all programs leave a trail of paper' and it 
was therefore important,, right at the beginning of any fieldwork relationship, 
to negotiate access to relevant documents. This research used documents in 
the way that Patton saw them - as sources of basic information and as 
sources of questions for the interview stage of the fieldwork. 
What documents were got? They were public and semi-public documents 
such as brochures and annual reports. They were not offered and had to be 
asked for. What was not offered were documents setting out the business 
relationship between the lobbyist and the client; and secondly documents of 
the client and the decision-makers commenting on the lobby. 
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The explanation is confidentiality. Documents of the latter kind are not 
handed over to an unknown third party at first meeting. Long term 
participation with the parties is the way to unlock them and this method was 
not available to this research. The literature review indicated that these 
documents have not been available either to other researchers and even those 
lobbyists turned writers have not brought them into the public domain. 
Secondly, comments and reflections about how business and professional 
relationships are affected by these sensitive issues are likely to be verbal and 
only rarely to be written. And when they are written, wording may be 
constructed to disguise reality as much as illuminate it. 
But despite this limitation, document analysis was useful for the research. It 
revealed data on ownership, directors, staff employed, lists of clients and on 
public titles used by lobbyists. This latter threw light on self-image, private 
vocabulary, perceptions of public relations and on the range of services 
offered to clients. These issues are addressed in the fieldwork Chapters. 
Seconda1y modes of data collection: observation 
As a research method here, observation of the respondents at interview was 
important. Lobbyists are role players operating in a competitive 
environment with two critical audiences to win over to their side - clients 
and decision-makers. In the actual interviews when the topic was positive, 
they welcomed the observation of their successful plays. They were ready to 
talk and their body language showed it. Even when the topic was negative, a 
build-up of rapport with lobbyists, even in a short time, and their desire to 
explore their own behaviour, allowed some access to unsuccessful practice. 
But observation of visible behaviour in response to questions suggested that 
some topics were more sensitive than others. Some clients suddenly had a 
vehemence they previously lacked when asked whether they do or did 
actually hire lobbyists: the change could be put down to two possible factors 
- bad experience of hiring and/or a realisation that hired lobbyists were 
competitors doing work that the clients themselves could do and could be 
told to do by their boards. Some lobbyists reversed their loquaciousness 
when the questions were about fee levels; success fees; client names and their 
issues; dubious practice by other lobbyists. These behaviourial changes 
affected the flow and direction of the interview and were later markers 
sensitising the reseacher when writing up. 
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Coding and Categorising the Data. 
Interviews, document analysis and observation produce large amounts of 
raw data in research such as this: it is a major strength of the qualitative 
approach. The 33 taped interviews lasted between 20 and 45 minutes and 
generated between seven and 14 pages of transcripts. The other five 
interviews were of similar length and three of them produced transcripts of 
the same order. Burnard (1991), Corbin (1986) and Riley (1990) are among 
the many who, in the manner of the qualitative school, offer methods for 
structuring this heap of interview data. These three authors offer approaches 
which attempt to combine routines for data collection with development of 
creative insights. They involve at one level the numbering of page lines and 
the colour-coding of significant words and at the other, the expression of 
theoretical statements written up as draft notes. 
This research borrowed from the above and developed the following 
approach to coding and analysing interview data. The fieldwork on the 
client sub-population started on March 1,1993 and the 11th and final 
interview was done on August 6. The lobbyist fieldwork started on June 22 
and the 13th and final interview was done on October 11. The decision- 
maker fieldwork started on November 22,1993 and the tenth and final 
interview was finished on April 20,1994. (See Appendix Two, 216 for the 
interview schedule. ) It was clear from the four pilot interviews that the 
fieldwork would generate a great mass of data and that a definite plan had to 
be in place from the start to manipulate the mass into coherence. 
Transcriptions were prefaced with observations by the interviewer on the 
location and atmosphere of the interview and on the impression created by 
the interviewee. 
Each transcription was read through as a whole at least twice and a marking 
made against quotations which touched on expected and unexpected topics 
in either a verbally mundane or striking way. For example, it became clear 
that some clients had strong opinions about hiring, putting their views 
expressively and that they bought in a wide range of lobbying services from 
administrative support to policy advice. Also, there was a sense of 
competition amongst lobbyists and a degree of search for more work which 
were not expected. Decision-makers were often frank in their perceptions of 
lobbyists. 
These markings were given a page line number as a reference and in some 
instances a short headline title. This was coding. 
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After reading three or four scripts, the references could be grouped on the 
basis of similarity or of contrast under topic heads. At this stage, a schema 
was drawn up which grouped together all the page line references and any 
headline titles to a topic: thus after the last interview in a sub-population, all 
references to all identified topics in the set of interviews could be seen at a 
glance. This was categorising. 
After reading three or four scripts, continuities and contrasts were emerging 
and patterns were becoming manifest. It was at this stage that writing up 
began. 
Validity claims in lobbying research. 
The definition here of validity follows Riley (1990; 16) and Baker (1988; 43) as 
a measure of the extent to which the data collected records the situation in 
the field. This is called population validity by Gill & Johnson. (121) 
Claiming reliability through another researcher replicating the research 
results with the same data is difficult in social research because of the 
interpretative and self-reflexive nature of social action. Instead, it is 
population validity which is claimed here through consistent application of a 
coherent research approach (induction using a grounded theory approach) 
and through the techniques of iteration and triangulation. For example, the 
data on access, influence on policy and making representations was gained 
from interviews with clients, lobbyists and decision-makers. Data on titles 
used by lobbyists was derived from document analysis and interviews. This 
approach follows Loveridge (1990; 18) in that triangulation 'refers to the use 
of multiple methods in research in order to capture a sense of reality. ' 
This research is posited on nominalist assumptions (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; 
28-32). It tried to avoid what Ricci (1984; 294) has called 'descriptive 
empiricism' which reveals little about the meanings and motives of social 
actors and yet hides this paucity under a great heap of data. Instead it is 
argued that both researchers and respondents are social beings with 
ideologies (in the non-Marxist sense of a set of beliefs and values) that are 
characteristic of the culture, group or class to which they belong. Thus, 
researchers can no more be value-less than can those whose situation and 
actions are being investigated. Pearson (1992) put this general pre- 
supposition as follows when he argues in the particular about historians: 
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It is seen as more realistic to view knowledge as interpretation 
rather than representation. Once interpretation replaces 
representation as the dominant metaphor for how we know, then 
the data of experience are less well described as an experience of 
things as they are than as an experience of meaning. For one 
cannot properly be said to interpret a thing; rather one interprets 
what the thing means. (113) 
Hence the meanings which are assigned to data collected from clients, 
lobbyists and decision-makers by the researcher are social constructs. 
Statements about commercial lobbying are not separable from the 
interpretions which these social actors, plus the researcher, put upon them. 
Thus this research does not seek the 'meaning' of commercial lobbying: 
rather it seeks to interpret what the subject means to its role players in an 
interaction with the researcher. 
This research also follows Eagleton (1991; 3) in that it rests on a pre- 
understanding, in the Heidegger sense, that there is no such thing as pre- 
suppositionless thought; that the existence of reflexivity in social action 
expresses this and that the use of reason as a tool for analysis by social actors 
underpins an interpretative and inter-subjective understanding. It further 
agrees with Eagleton (xiv) and puts a 'fundamental trust in the moderately 
rational nature of human beings. ' Loveridge (20) asserts a similar position 
when he argues that it is impossible to do research 'without some element of 
positivistic imposition' of the researcher's own prior ideas or hypotheses 
about the topic. 
The search for an understanding of the words and behaviours of hired 
lobbyists which is consistent with the highest common level of interpretation 
between the social actors involved (clients, lobbyists, decision-makers and 
the researcher) and which is consistent with rational understanding is the 
fundamental challenge facing the research methods employed in this thesis. 
Conclusion and summaly of research design 
This Chapter has sought to set out - in a critical manner and through 
reference to recent research -a method for researching 'for hire' lobbying. It 
has built up a qualitative methodology based on induction and progressed in 
the fieldwork through grounded theory procedures. 
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The critical application of the 'empty box" approach to the literature review 
identified the 'for hire' aspects of commercial lobbyists as a new area of 
study in the UK. This subject involves relatively small numbers of people 
grouped into three sub-populations in central London. The review suggests 
that their relationships are characterised by a mixture of the following social 
features: secrecy; discretion; implied rewards and threats; negotiation; 
response to pressure; compromise; ambiguity and publicity. These 
characteristics point this research in the direction of ethnography, with 
focused, semi-structured interviews among representative samples of the 
three sub-populations being the favoured fieldwork method. Inside the 
interviews, the conversation was driven largely by theoretical sampling: the 
prospect of productive theoretical questions and statements steering the 
interviews through masses of data. This approach was borrowed from 
grounded theory technique: another borrowing was the coding and 
categorisation of data whereby the latter was matched, compared and 
contrasted in the search for population validity and supporting theoretical 
statements. 
The research design can be represented as a sequence: 
1) follow the qualitative/ ethnographic paradigm and develop an induction- 
led design, using features of grounded theory. 
2) the literature review discovered an 'empty box' in the typologies of 
lobbying - the 'for hire' aspects of commercial lobbying. 
3) in the pilot fieldwork stage, unstructured interviews with four lobbyists 
strengthened the assumption that these 'for hire' aspects had not been 
explored and that they could not be researched through survey techniques. 
Interview format and skills refined. 
4) analysis of the knowledge and data generated by 2) and 3) was used to 
develop a framework for focused, semi-structured interviews with actors 
from each of the three social role groups who make commercial lobbying 
happen; choice of individual interviewees guided mainly by representative 
sampling frames; content of interviews guided by theoretical sampling in 
context of a research briefing. 
5) coding and categorisation of the 'thick' interview data to identify patterns 
of attitude and behaviour; commonalities and contrasts to be sought across 
role groups; development of any tentative models or types. 
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6) statement of any new empirical findings or theoretical insights by this 
research with pointers for the next round of research. 
Four fieldwork Chapters follow: part of their introduction is the operational 
account of the above research design in action. 
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Chapter Four 
Lobbyists for hire: clients and their perceptions 
Introduction 
This Chapter is the first of four which describe and analyse the separate 
pieces of primary research done for this research. The subject here is the 
client, represented by a frequent employer of commercial lobbyists - the 
government relations and public affairs managers of large companies. It is 
thought that this is the first time their views on hiring lobbyists have been 
published extensively in a UK research work. 
Research QarticiQants 
Eleven interviews were carried out with the following corporate managers of 
private sector companies. Moore (1991,27) found individual firms to be of 
'overwhelming importance' in his monograph of the lobbying firm GJW and 
Grant (1987; 109) has commented on large companies hiring lobbyists. One 
interview was on an unattributable basis. The full titles of the respondents 
(informants is used as an alternative), the location and date of interviews are 
in Appendix Two, 216. 
The following were interviewed: the former government relations manager 
of a UK based energy company (unattributable interview); Charles Lewis of 
British Steel; Frances Elliott of Thorn-EMI; Martin Knight of IBM UK; David 
Ramsden of Kingfisher; Anthony Weale of ICI; Keith Lockwood of Vauxhall 
and General Motors in the UK; Brian Millner of Pilkington; Christopher 
Leaver of J. Sainsbury; Tessa Marston of Grand Metropolitan, and Chrissie 
Kimmons of Glaxo Pharmaceuticals UK. 
This sample was chosen in the way outlined in Chapter Three, 57-58. Those 
who responded to the research summary (Appendix One, 215) in an 
intellectually fruitful way - i. e. they had views whether negative or positive 
on hired lobbyists - were then interviewed face-to-face in the way set out in 
the previous Chapter. 
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Staff officers to the Board 
The most striking observation common to all the interviews was the sense of 
closeness to the centres of business corporate power. These managers were 
attending the inner sanctum of that power. Anthony Weale was late for the 
interview because he was briefing the Chairman of ICI about the political 
consequences of the death of Christchurch MP Robert Adley. For the ICI 
man and for the anonymous manager from the energy group, their function 
was board support: staff officers working for the controllers of two of 
Britain's largest companies. Lunch with Charles Lewis was in the dining 
annexe to the British Steel boardroom from where came applause for a 
retiring chairman. Lewis worked with a director who was a sitting MP and a 
former Minister and who could telephone direct to colleagues in the 
Government. 
Martin Knight talked about IBM being a fundamental part of the UK 
economy and therefore Government listened. The Glaxo respondent, 
Chrissie Kimmons, talked of her industry having daily contact with several 
Government departments. Keith Lockwood of Vauxhall offered lunch in the 
Reform Club while at the other end of Pall Mall, tea was served by Pilkington 
in their office next to St. James's Palace. In nearby St. James's Square, Tessa 
Marston wanted to know the policy thinking of London, Brussels and 
Strasbourg policy-makers in half-a-dozen areas. As with several of her peers, 
matters European, especially regulation, were very much on the corporate 
agenda. The Sainsbury respondent confirmed that they had a general policy 
of lobbying directly themselves: two members of the Sainsbury family were 
in the House of Lords. All the companies visited were among the 100 largest 
UK companies listed in The Times Top 1000 1991-2. 
Issues lobbied on included energy policy in the 1970s; out-of-town 
supermarket development in the late 1980s and TV franchises in 1991. More 
recently there was copyright policy; building regulations for steel and 
concrete; computer equipment in defence helicopters; European policy on 
computer software; electricity pricing; competition policy; integrated 
pollution control; European work councils; taxes on the emission of noxious 
gases; the level of regulation concerning building materials; the food chain; 
transport and employment policy; taxation policy; public health issues; 
monopoly and mergers policy; changes in accountancy conventions; the 
packaging of goods; science and technology policy and drug prices. The 
anonymous respondent and those for IBM, ICI, Vauxhall, Pilkington and 
Grand Metropolitan talked of lobbying Brussels as well as London. 
69 
All except one manager were ready to talk on an attributed basis and only 
two - Sainsbury and Glaxo - showed hesitancy on using the word 'lobby": the 
former preferring 'communicate' and the latter finding 'lobbying' an 
inadequate descriptor for a day-to-day functional relationship with 
Government. The Glaxo informant did not use an alternative generic but in 
reply to the question 'Do you influence Government? ', the reply was: 'I very 
much hope so. We're partners with Government ... It's not a question of 
lobbying: it's a question of we are providing a public service to the public 
sector ... " 
It was clear that these corporate staff officers were used to political and 
public discourse in both the party political/ Governmental sense, and also in 
the organisational culture sense. They were always courteous, cautious at 
the start and as they warmed to the theme - which in part involved them in 
assessing their own role - they mostly appeared to be candid. But it was the 
restrained candour offered to the interested and attentive outsider, a candour 
that revealed no impurities in the inner sanctum they served: it was 
impersonal, rarely criticising named individuals or institutions and never 
offering a critique of their own organisations. 
The 12attern of involvement 
In response to similar questions, patterns of converging and diverging 
opinion and behaviour appeared amongst the sample. By the fourth and 
fifth interviews, these patterns (set out in this Chapter) were suggesting a 
confirmation of the sampling assumption that the group was a homogeneous 
one. 
The first question was whether to hire or not. Others were: how is access to 
decision-makers gained; do intermediaries represent clients to decision- 
makers; do lobbyists advise on client policy; do they give administrative 
support? The analysis also examined lobbyists' fees; value for money; 
lobbyists as salespeople for themselves, and their reputation. 
What were the arguments for hiring or not hiring? Respondents could see 
both sides. None argued that hiring was essential or not-essential under all 
circumstances: rather it was internal and external circumstance which 
decided whether or not to hire. Circumstance then influenced the use to 
which commercial lobbyists were put. 
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No respondent absolutely ruled out hiring. Four of the respondents (anon, 
Thorn-EMI, ICI, Pilkington) had a policy of not hiring a commercial lobbyist, 
except for document monitoring (the scrutiny of official, media and research 
texts for company references). That was also the general policy of Sainsbury 
but exceptionally they were hiring the lobbying firm GJW to arrange 
receptions for MPs over the Sunday trading issue, while they did their 
document monitoring in-house. Two respondents (British Steel, IBM) hired 
commercial lobbyists on a project-by-project basis. (The British Steel 
informant had hired lobbyists previously on the same basis at Tesco and 
HTV). Four respondents (Vauxhall, Kingfisher, Grand Metropolitan and 
Glaxo) had on-going, multiple relationships. 
Document monitoring: is it lobbying? 
Nine out of eleven respondents (unnamed; British Steel; Thorn-EMI; IBM; 
Kingfisher; ICI; Vauxhall; Pilkington; Glaxo) used outside firms for 
document monitoring. Sainsbury and Grand Metropolitan used internal 
services. 
One respondent did not regard such monitoring as lobbying. Thorn-EMI 
used two agencies: 
who provide us with information ... on issues which we watch . .. 
we chose them because they are very definitely not lobbyists ... to 
me lobbying means using information towards a particular end. 
Providing basic information isn't lobbying: it's monitoring. 
Others saw document monitoring as the minimal lobbying act. ICI had a 
general policy of self-reliance in lobbying but the respondent did "qualify 
that very slightly by having a monitoring company for document search and 
early warning on Parliamentary Questions. ' Pilkington also followed a self- 
reliant policy but used a lobbying firm for what the respondent called "a sort 
of mechanistic side of things, that is to say they scan Hansard for me every 
day. .. ' The anonymous respondent used an external 
document monitor 
and said'... it was very much if you like a minimal basis for employing 
lobbyists, merely as an arm, a convenience... ' ForIBM, itsuseofan 
external monitor did not 'add any value to the information; so it is really just 
information coming from them to us to interpret. ' For the Glaxo respondent, 
her monitors 'can literally get a speech or a press notice or ... an 
announcement in the House and fax it through to me within ... fifteen, 
twenty minutes. ' 
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This research follows the argument set out above (Chapter One, 26) by 
Wedgewood that lobbying can be divided into an intelligence role (including 
monitoring) and an operational role. Casey, too, has included (1991; 2) 
monitoring as one of a 'range of services' offered to clients. For definitional 
purposes in this research, hiring a monitoring service or doing the work 
internally is therefore an act of lobbying, albeit a first, minimal step on the 
lobbying ladder. 
The 12rol2ensiiy to hire lobbyists 
On the basis above, all the client respondents hired lobbyists and showed a 
range of engagement with them: whether in a minimal or light way or in a 
more involved or heavy way; whether by hiring in more or less of the 
services on offer; whether continuously or intermittently. The data can 
therefore be represented as a propensity to hire scale with three graduations. 
It is a quantitative scale about client behaviour rather than a qualitative one 
for it would be highly problematic to rank their intensity of need for 
lobbyists' services. Nevertheless, the data suggests that there is generally a 
positive correlation between amounts of services hired and intensity of need 
for them by the client. 
1. The light hirers: 'you don't launch unguided missiles. ' 
The anonymous international energy company did not hire a lobbyist for 
more than document monitoring 'because we could do it ourselves. ' The 
respondent expanded that his former company was, because of its size, "in a 
way unfairly privileged" with access to decision-makers and was staffed up 
to lobby on its own. This self-reliant policy was re-inforced by a negative 
experience when the company was once represented by a lobbyist to a Select 
Committee Chairman and: 
he [the Chairman] got very cross that he'd been approached by a 
intermediary and not by [name of the company] - too proud to 
speak to me that was what he said and he tooks us and our 
lobbyist to the cleaners through two columns of Hansard under 
Parliamentary privilege ... 
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The respondent added: 
This is the sort of situation that arises and that taught me ... you 
don't launch unguided missiles through third parties without 
knowing exactly what is happening and you do try to remember 
always that people want to hear from the most relevant person. 
The Thom-EMI respondent said: 
... I myself wouldn"t employ a third party to speak about 
anything which is important to this company. 
ICI was also generally self-reliant: 
... it's our constant belief that a consultant can do nothing for us 
because we believe that if we've got a message to get across to 
Government ... we have to be capable of giving it ourselves. So it's 
up to us to understand what they want and to know who to give it 
to and have the relationships in place to do it. 
Pilkington had the same policy: 
I don't use them [commercial lobbyists], never have and whereas 
never is a long time, I can't think that I would particularly use 
them to put Pilkington's views over ... 
For Sainsbury the same policy applied but with some flexibility. 
... we have traditionally taken direct access to Government, both 
at Minister level and at civil servants. Just recently, we have 
involved GJW as part of the Sunday shopping campaign, but 
that's the only intermediary we've used before. 
This was said in the context of a review of its communications needs for the 
next five years and of two members of the Sainsbury family sitting in the 
House of Lords. 
The use of lobbyists by Glaxo has to be seen against the pharmaceutical 
industry's relationship with Government. This was described by the 
informant as: 'The whole industry ... is legally required to have a day-to- 
day relationship with Government. ' Against this background, she hired in 
lobbyists for document monitoring, presentational advice and contact advice. 
Otherwise, Glaxo was self-reliant: 
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Glaxo speaks to Goverrunent from Glaxo by fully employed, paid 
Glaxo executives at all times and exclusively. How can any 
commercial lobbyist, political lobbyist tell Glaxo or a 
pharmaceutical company its business ... when we're in day-to- 
day functional contact with officials across the full spectrum of our 
business? How can a commercial lobbyist tells us about policy 
developments? We've got the information; we're got the 
knowledge about our business; we've got the skills; we've got the 
expertise. 
2. The intermittent hirers: 'a project basis'. 
IBM UK and British Steel were in this category. The IBM respondent said: 
Where ... we use lobbyists in an overall term [other than for 
monitoring] is on a project basis where there's a specific objective 
in mind and it tends therefore to have a start and a finish date to 
something we want to achieve with Government and most 
recently we have used lobbyists to support particular marketing 
campaigns which we have sensed potentially becoming very 
political ... 
British Steel gave the example of its tinplate business (steel for food and 
drink packaging) taking the project approach; its strip products for buildings 
taking both the project and on-going approach while British Steel plc hired a 
lobbyist on an on-going basis for Parliamentary contact. (In) 
3. The heavy hirers: I use them as eyes and ears'. 
Those with on-going relationships were Vauxhall, Kingfisher and Grand 
Metropolitan. 
The Vauxhall respondent said: 
I employ a company which is a public affairs company. I use them 
as eyes and ears. I use them -I can only be in one place at once - if 
I need to contact someone. 
Kingfisher had an on-going relationship with Ian Greer Associates (IGA) to 
/provide us with a strategy for political contact. ' The same informant was 
also executive vice-chairman of the Shopping Hours Reform Council and had 
a similar relationship with lobbying firm GJW in that they were used by the 
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Council in a 'strategic role. " He saw commercial lobbyists as essential, not 
wanting to 'head up a political unit in any corporation without the help, 
support and advice of the Parliamentary lobbyist. ' 
The Grand Metropolitan respondent made the most hirings. She employed 
five lobbyists, one from a large firm and four from smaller ones. (The Glaxo 
respondent hired two. ) 
These three graduations can be grouped into clusters and represented as a 
scale, ranked by quantity and continuity of services hired in: 
light hirers 













Background to positions on the 12ropensity to hire scale. 
The factors which account for a company's position on the scale are set out 
below. But a company's position could change. None of the light users, for 
example, ruled out more usage. Pilkington was careful not to use the word 
"never' while the ICI informant noted that he might reconsider the position in 
extremis - if there was a predatory takeover bid - and 'one might say "I can 
do with more legs, I could do with more hands for a period of time". The 
Thorn-EMI respondent would reconsider 'if there was an issue which was so 
large that I needed extra resources to do the preparatory back-up work. ' 
75 
The light hirers: 
The anonymous respondent worked for what was then the UK's largest 
company and if they invited someone '. -. to come and hear your point of 
view ... they would almost always come. ' Access was not a problem. 
The company culture also did not favour outsiders being privy to 
important and sensitive decisions and operations ... even if I had 
wanted to, I don't think the system would have permitted me to 
bring in an outsider [lobbyist] of that kind. 
For the Thorn-EMI respondent, the light usage flowed from previous 
background. 
... when I was in the civil service myself and from my knowledge 
of Ministers, if there was an important issue, they preferred to 
speak direct to the people involved with those issues, direct to the 
the experts. So I myself wouldn't employ a third party to speak 
about anything which was important to this company. 
For ICI, the explanation was the in-house arrangements. These were based 
on the local works of ICI in which 106 MPs have a constituency interest and 
where local managers have responsibility for relations with Mps, local 
councillors and officials, and MEPs. The respondent said: 
... we reckon that our ability to get information across or our 
ability to form relationships with Government must be based on 
the coal face ... 
At the Millbank headquarters, there was another set of relationships aimed at 
central Government and this followed from an emphasis associated with the 
first ICI chairman, Sir Alfred Mond, himself an MP: "there was an acute 
awareness in ICI of the significance of our legislature. ' The respondent said: 
So my Chairman regularly sees members of the Cabinet. He 
regularly sees MPs whether they be our own MPs or MPs with a 
particular interest in something which will affect ICL He, on a 
sort of quite frequent basis, goes into the House of Commons to 
give, not opinions, but to talk to backbench committees, for 
instance, about whatever they want to talk about. He sees a lot of 
senior civil servants and his Board do too... 
The respondent himself sometimes briefed Ministers but, to use a Biblical 
simile, he did this in a John The Baptist mode of preparation. 
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Because, ultimately, particularly Ministers but most people in 
Government want to talk to boards and it's a very important 
message as far as I'm concerned because you then know not in 
terms of detailed issues but in terms of corporate strategy they're 
talking to the horse's mouth. 
Another layer of ICI lobbying is the Chairman and Board meeting Permanent 
Secretaries: in the case of the Chairman/ 
'. .. he would see most of the important Permanent Secretaries 
several times a year. ' 
The respondent continued: 
... directors would see senior civil servants in the departments in 
which they have an interest. For example, our environmental 
board man: I suppose he goes into the Department of the 
Environment or they come here at senior level at least once a 
month 
Behind senior management - and sometimes overlapping - were 160 
/monitors' - the internal jargon for issue experts. 
That expert ... it's no good him sitting in an ivory tower. He's got 
to be able to go to talk to the civil service, talk to Government, talk 
to Mps.... As a source of knowledge, he is really vital in the 
briefing process of Government because they want to hear people 
from the coal face. 
Pilkington followed the same self-reliance path because it also believed that 
the decision-makers want to talk directly to the 'coal face. ' 
I can't think that I would particularly use them [lobbyists] to put 
Pilkington's views over because it's very much my view and it's 
been formed on the back of opinions expressed to me by Cabinet 
Ministers and ex-Cabinet Ministers and various other citizens. In 
the end, if a company wants to express a view, that comes better 
from the company than from somebody hired to do it, however 
much more elegant the mouthpiece might be. 
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At Sainsbury, 'direct access to Government' was done by directors and the 
company secretary. But the respondent said the company is 'very pragmatic/ 
and with a resources-for-tasks approach and a communications audit coming 
up, the hiring of commercial lobbyists was not ruled out. 
The pharmaceutical industry's close statutory and structural relationship 
with Government was the pre-determining factor making for limited hire by 
Glaxo. For example, legislation required Home Office licencing and 
inspection of animal experimentation. Chrissie Kimmons said: 
We are not allowed to sell a medicine unless and until the 
Government has granted us a product licence... Profitability and 
prices are determined by the Government. Contrary to public 
perception, this is an industry where Government sets our profits 
and there's day-to-day negotiations with the Department of 
Health ... So the law puts us into contact with different 
Government departments. 
She added: 
The main reason we work with Government is that we have no 
choice. Government is our customer because it buys all our 
products and it's our regulator. We must work in partnership 
with Government. 
The intermittent hirers 
IBM policy was project-by-project hiring and like the light hirers, it used its 
own people in meetings with Westminster and Whitehall and its own 
notepaper in written communications. The respondent said: 'I think we've 
always had a philosophy, certainly in IBM in the UK, ... that anybody who 
lobbies the Government under the IBM name should be employed by IBM. ' 
From this starting point, the contribution of lobbyists would be 'much more 
advice and guidance and listening; understanding the mood of the moment 
from what is going on in Whitehall, what is going on in Westminster. ' 
The following example of a lobbying project was given. In 1991, the Merlin 
programme to build anti-submarine helicopters for the Ministry of Defence 
was announced. IBM UK headed one bid while British Aerospace and GEC 
led a rival one. IBM UK were worried that the theme 'you cannot let this 
very sensitive defence contract go to this nasty big American company' 
would be brought into play against it. 
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In these circumstances the respondent felt he lacked the internal resources to 
counter any intense lobbying from the other bidders: 
So with limited resources ... I would feel that I never have 
enough resources as to what the mood is and what is being said in 
the corridors of power. So we would use an outside company to 
give us advice on 'maybe IBM you should think of going to see so 
and so. How is this decision going to be made. There are all sorts 
of outside influences; what about going to that department and 
calling on X, Y, Z. ' So it was very much advice and guidance. 
The respondent saw this involvement with hired lobbyists as an exercise in 
mapping the 'political geography. ' The simile also indicated in a more 
generalised sense an expected behaviour from the commercial: 
... the way we tended to run those sorts of project is that we 
would probably review with them (commercial lobbyists) on a 
two weekly basis progress. We'd map out during the course of 
the campaign ... what we needed to do and what research they 
were going to do for us. They would certainly explain the political 
geography and we would then construct a plan to go and make 
. calls and representations. 
British Steel also saw the benefit of hired lobbyists as extra resource when 
there was a pressing task. The respondent said that they represent: 
extra pairs of hands and extra brains and if you're running a fairly 
small department and you're concentrating on some other fairly 
serious issues at the same time, it's quite a useful additional 
member of a team that you're talking about. 
The heavy hirers 
Vauxhall were susceptible to the resource argument as well. Their 
respondent noted that many potential clients of lobbyists 'may be hit with 
the most dreadful crisis which means they suddenly need an additional 
input. ' Another version of the resource argument also applied to Vauxhall: 
hiring lobbyists was less expensive than employing staff. 
Kingfisher and Grand Metropolitan were the heaviest hirers of lobbyists. 
The Kingfisher respondent employed IGA directly and, wearing his Sunday 
trading hat, used the services of GJW 'for planning how the Sunday trading 
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campaign is going to be moved forward. " (GJW was also hired by Sainsbury 
on the same campaign). One possible explanation for his heavy usage lay in 
the nature of the policy debate about Sunday trading. It was an issue which, 
as the respondent said, had 'now gone past the civil servant level ... it is a 
purely political issue. ' The Government allowed a free Commons vote in 
autumn 1993 with a choice of three policy options. This made the support of 
MPs crucial: and IGA 'have come up with a target hit list of Members of 
Parliament that we Kingfisher should be looking at in respect of Sunday 
trading. ' Thus the Sunday trading issue was one amenable to the sustained 
lobbying of all MPs. This was the context in which the respondent said "a 
good lobbyist is somebody who has to understand the Parliamentary 
process. ' 
Grand Metropolitan was a multiple hirer and the respondent said she hired: 
... a variety of different organisations for a variety of purposes in 
a number of different styles. Some companies I know go for one 
big agency and channel all their business through them. I have, 
over a period of three years, gradually, rather slowly, accumulated 
a small portfolio of rather small, specialist agencies. 
Tessa Marston deployed her lobbyists in London, Brussels, Strasbourg and 
individual European capitals. A major need was monitoring in the sense of 
knowing the development of public policy. The respondent described this: 
It's much more a question of being aware early on that an official 
in the Commission is thinking of a directive on such and such a 
subject. So I need people who have got access to that kind of 
information rather than public information that's already on the 
record which we can pick up by other methods. What I don't 
want and what a lot of big companies offer is a rather expensive 
press cuttings service. 
The analysis above has focused on explanations offered by respondents 
about their degree of hiring - up from the minimal level of document 
monitoring. Now the argument explores what needs lay behind these 
explanations. These needs can be grouped under the following headings: the 
need of clients for the supply of access to decision-makers; the supply of 
representations to decision-makers; the supply of advice to themsIves on 
policy, and the supply of administrative support. Lobbyists can be 
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characterised as supplying services to meet these client needs. Individual 
respondents took a range of negative and positive positions about these 
needs/services. 
Lobbyists as sul2l2liers of access to decision-makers 
It can be argued (2n) that commercial lobbyists are selling to their clients 
access to decision-makers. The payment to some 35 MPs by lobbyists 
(Hollingsworth, 1991) suggested that hired lobbyists are keen to be in a 
position to offer to clients access to Members and by implication indirect 
access to the Westminster and Whitehall contacts of these MPs. 
What is offered to clients is access through a third party, the lobbyists 
themselves. Respondent Charles Lewis talked about his hiring of Geoffrey 
Tucker: 
He's a former Conservative publicity man and he's got his own 
small business. He's in St. James's St. Geoffrey actually does 
know personally all the important Conservatives of his day ... if 
you are involved with Geoffrey and you get invited to his 
birthday party - which is usually a fairly lively affair at Brooks or 
somewhere like that - you will actually meet Lilley, Hurd, Heath, 
etc, etc,, etc. 
The IBM respondent recounted an approach from a commercial looking for 
business who offered: 'Let us help you get to William Waldegrave. ` 
Such offers of access must be put in context: access to decision-makers and 
lobbying are self-evidently inseparable; and most, if not all, who lobby want 
access. A group cannot make representations unless it knows whom to 
address and where that individual(s) is located. The targeted receiver of 
their representations can then be accessed in person or on paper. It is clear 
from the context of client remarks on access and from what was offered by 
lobbyists that access in person was preferred. For example, the Pilkington 
respondent, an active in-house lobbyist, differentiated his own role of 
government relations from that of public relations in the following way: 
David [a public relations colleague] is involved in mega-phone 
diplomacy... I'm about speaking to people one-to-one, giving 
them a written brief... 
81 
Thus it is unexceptionable that commercial lobbyists are offering access in 
person for that is a goal sought by the general category of lobbyist. Another 
respondent Anthony Weale, an in-house lobbyist par excellence, whose 
company ICI practise a very developed policy of self-reliance, was proud of 
his personal contacts with decision-makers: 
... I may not have as wide contacts as any group of consultants 
whose whole life is to build contacts. Nevertheless, --. I reckon I 
know well about 120 MPs and on good friend terms. I know as 
acquaintances at least another 150; so I'm up to a very large 
number of MPs. I know dozens of civil servants in all the 
departments that matter to us, at both senior and drafting level. 
There was a similar comment on the need for access from Brian Millner of 
Pilkington whose company also followed a policy of lobbying self-reliance. 
He talked of the attempted hostile take-over of Pilkington by the BTR group 
in 1987: 
... I spent most of that two months and a bit within or very 
adjacent to the Palace of Westminster and I orchestrated the efforts 
of our constituency MPs and many others and I'm quite proud to 
say that during that couple of months a 150 MPs went in to bat for 
me in one way or another. 
The opportunity of access by hiring lobbyists was sought by respondent 
Charles Lewis at British Steel when he worked previously for Tesco and 
HTV. Sunday trading was the policy issue facing Tesco but the 
supermarket's lobbying lacked 'any real co-ordination. ' Lobbyists Charles 
Barker were employed and Charles Lewis described them as 'a sort of 
facilitating device' and a 'very useful supplementary part of my armoury': 
They would arrange meetings with people where we didn't 
already have any real relationship or ... where we didn't have the 
ability to open the door. 
At HTV, he employed the lobbyist Geoffrey Tucker who arranged access to 
Ministers as described above: 
You'll be able to talk to them [current Ministers] and have your 
few seconds to say something which you hope will be 
remembered. It's very much a chance thing. 
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Tucker also arranged contact with a key civil servant on the issue which was 
agitating HTV. Charles Lewis said: 
The Permanent Secretary at the Home Office was a key figure in 
advising us and guiding us over the franchise round because that 
was the most appalling sort of cock-up. We did find that Geoffrey 
Tucker was able to arrange some very useful contacts for us with 
Clive Whitmore, the Permanent Secretary and Lord Whitelaw who 
was heavily involved in setting up Channel 4. 
The crucial issue facing Kingfisher and the SHRC (Shopping Hours Reform 
Council) was Sunday trading and on this issue, the Kingfisher respondent 
said: 
IGA [commercial lobbyists Ian Greer Associates] have come up 
with a target hit list of Members of Parliament that we Kingfisher 
should be looking at ... That is their job to come up with that list 
.. where there isn't personal knowledge to facilitate the meeting of 
the target Member of Parliament or the target Minister and people 
within the group. 
On the issue of access generally, he said: 
The key for anybody working on the political scene is over a 
period of time to build up your contacts and the art is to spot the 
rising star. Because if you can get to that person when he's an 
Under-Secretary of State or even a PPS, then you'll likely be able 
to build friendships which are going to be extremely useful when 
the guy gets into the Cabinet because he will know you and he 
will be able to trust you. So if these people are known to us then, 
we simply talk to their offices and fix up a meeting. 
He added: 
If it's a Minister of whom we have no particular knowledge, then 
we would use our lobbying organisation to organise a meeting. 
He added that 'we would make life slightly more difficult for ourselves in 
trying to get to know people that we don't know. ' Access was a quality 
being hired: 
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Bearing in mind that we're using two of the larger [lobbying] 
companies ... Now these are people who are known in 
Government and have been known for some time and are trusted. 
And if you have a situation where GJW phone a Minister's office 
on behalf of a client, they are likely to be able to gain access. 
As argued above, commercial lobbyists are not the sole suppliers of access. 
Access is a sine qua non of lobbying and lobbying happens without hired 
lobbyists. It is also a quality of the UK political system framed in the setting 
of the constitutional right to petition. The Vauxhall respondent referred to 
this: 'So the entitlement is there and thank God we have democracy. I have, 
over the years, worked for companies where they also feel they have a right 
to lobby, as anyone else does ... 
As described above, Glaxo have built-in access to decision-makers: but they 
take advice on the background of individuals to be lobbied. The informant 
said if the company was asked to give evidence to a Select committee: 'We 
will ask someone (a commercial lobbyist) "who's the Chairman of that 
Committee, who are the members of that Committee. "' 
Direct access by clients 
The data also shows that clients perceive access to be a mutual activity 
between decision-makers and themselves. Lindblom (1977), Jordan and 
Richardson (1987) argue that access is wanted by government to influential 
outside interests as much as it is sought by interests to government. Thus 
access is a two-way street with government at times wanting entry to the 
decision-making rooms of powerful, private policymakers in the economy. 
In contradistinction to the brokered access via a third party (the hired 
lobbyist) described in the section above, this can be described as direct access 
by self-propulsion through open doors. 
The ICI lobbying operation described above implies this. The respondent 
put its relations with Governments into the context that there are: 
very few pieces of legislation going through here or in Europe ... 
or in the United States that don't have some effect on ICI. 
Therefore the power of government to help or hinder us is quite 
considerable; it's incumbent on ICI to make sure that if there is 
any way we can influence the process to the benefit of the 
company and the shareholder, so much the better. 
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IBM noted that. .. being part of the fabric of the UK economy is 
fundamental [to access] and of course Government departments have to 
listen to you if you are an important part of the economy. ' The same stance 
was adopted by the anonymous interviewee of what was then the UK's 
largest company: ". .. if you invited someone to come and hear your point of 
view at ..., they would almost always come. ' 
The Glaxo respondent expected to be consulted by Government and reported 
that 'nine times out of ten ... Glaxo was approached rather than the other 
way round ... ' 
She said: 
If Government is about to change the law relating to the supply of 
medicines in this country ... it is an extremely arrogant 
Government that says 'we won't ask anybody who knows what 
they are talking about 'cos they're bound to be biased'. .. I would 
expect Government for this industry or any other to say 'we're 
considering a policy that will affect your industry. Is it realistic? Is 
it practical? We don't have expert knowledge on your industry 
.' Government must consult interested, affected and relevant 
expert parties before it can reach a conclusion. 
In an example of Glaxo's involvement in public policy-making, she told of 
the inter-departmental working party on pharmaceutical prices -'the scheme 
whereby Government controls the profitability of the pharmaceutical 
industry .. .' Her comment: 'Glaxo's on that negotiating team. ' 
The Pilkington respondent said of the company chairman, Sir Anthony 
Pilkington: 
... he does move, and several of his peers do, in the world where 
they will, as a matter of routine, sit down for dinner two or three 
nights a week with people who may be their equivalent numbers 
in other national or international companies or who may well 
include Cabinet Minsters or junior Ministers and so on. 
Pilkington is the largest flat and safety glass manufacturer in the world with 
two thirds of its operations overseas. In the UK, its plants are in 21 
Westminster and seven European constituencies. The respondent said: 
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So for a start, I cultivate our relationships with the Members of 
Parliament and the Members of the European Parliament who 
represent those constituencies. I believe they have a right to know 
what we do in their patch: equally I require and indeed demand 
right of access to them. 
The Thorn-EMI respondent, a former civil servant, had direct access: '. --I 
know how the system works. ' The Sainsbury respondent described the 
company as 'clearly a high impact company' and noted that 'we've got our 
own Peer group here. We've got two Lord Sainsburys ---" 
The Grand Metropolitan respondent, Tessa Marston, also a former civil 
servant, equally took the view that direct access by self-propulsion through 
open doors was on offer: 
... actually access isn't difficult. If you're a big company like us 
and you ring a civil servant anywhere and say 'we need to talk to 
you because this is important' as long as you don't insult people 
down the phone, they'll see you. So I don't actually see 
democracy as a problem. I think in open democracy that's as it 
should be. 
What is the relationship between levels of direct, self-propelled access and 
levels of hiring lobbyists? It could be argued that a high level of direct, self- 
propelled access implied low levels of hiring. Indeed, of the companies with 
high, direct, self-propelled access, ICI, Pilkington, Sainsbury and the 
unnamed firm were light hirers. 
But IBM had high, direct, self-propelled access and yet it was an intermittent 
user of commercial lobbyists. British Steel was in the same category with 
high, direct access and intermittent usage. The British Steel respondent 
noted about them: 
They're not necessarily doing anything that we couldn't do for 
ourselves but they are in position because they can help open 
doors ... 
But British Steel also had direct, self-propelled access. Sir Giles Shaw MP 
was a board member and a former Minister of State in the DTI. The 
respondent said: 
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... he's here on our board: he"s not just here for that reason but 
that's an added bonus because he can open doors more easily than 
a lobby company can. 
Grand Metropolitan was at the heavy end of the hiring scale with five 
lobbyists hired: yet access to decision-makers was not seen as problematic. 
Vauxhall and Kingfisher were at the heavy end also and used commercial 
lobbyists to augment the direct access they have. The Vauxhall respondent 
talked of his lobbyists helping to make contact when he was engaged on 
other tasks. The Kingfisher informant had direct access: 
I have upwards of a 100 MPs that I can write to or speak to at any 
time and simply say 'Hey it's David' and expect to a) get through 
to them and b) talk to them. 
Thus the data from the field suggests a range of positive and negative 
correlations between hiring levels and direct, self-propelled access. ICL 
Pilkington, Sainsbury and the unattributable respondent have light levels of 
hiring and have high direct access. IBM UK and British Steel are intermittent 
hirers and have direct access while Vauxhall and Grand Metropolitan are 
heavy hirers and have direct access. Kingfisher have direct access yet they 
hire lobbyists to widen it to decision-makers not known to them. 
The ability to walk through the open door to Ministers, MPs and civil 
servants is only a weak indicator that commercial lobbyists are not hired: it is 
not a strong indicator. Generally hired lobbyists augment the supply of 
access available to clients rather than create it. 
But finally a note of caution on access and a reminder that it is a means and 
not an end of policy development. Charles Lewis previously worked for the 
television station HTV at the time of the1989/90 bid for the commercial 
television franchises under a system mainly driven by the principle of award 
to highest tender. He hired lobbyist Geoffrey Tucker who arranged meetings 
with a permanent secretary and two Ministers. 
Charles Lewis commented: 
... whether any of these meetings really helped is a matter of 
debate. We certainly had them. We appeared to get some quite 
useful steers from them but the whole of that exercise [bidding for 
a franchise] was to do with money. 
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Here access had been gained through the lobbyist to major policy 
influencers at the highest level but the crucial factor to influence HTV's 
fortune was a factor (the tender principle) not susceptible to manipulation 
through access. 
Lobbyists as suppliers of representations to decision -makers. 
Once clients are before decision-makers, do they use a hired lobbyists to 
make their case? The data suggests not. The light hirers were emphatic that 
they did not need a third party to represent them. 
Self-representation was also the policy of IBM, an intermittent hirer. For 
British Steel, its recently nationalised past meant that contact 'tended to be at 
a very high level between individuals. ' (2n) They also had a former Minister 
on the Board who 'can open doors more easily than a lobby company can. ' 
For the heavy hirers, the Vauxhall respondent kept the 'more senior contact 
to myself and the Chairman. ' On occasion he asked his lobbyists to arrange 
meetings but 'I rarely ask them to represent me. ' 
For the Kingfisher respondent it was 'inevitable' that the lobbyists did some 
third party representation when arranging access to Ministers not known to 
the company. He added: '. .. but there is within the Kingfisher group a bank 
of personal contact' and as an individual he knew 100 plus MPs, as well as 
Ministers. 
For Tessa Marston of Grand Metropolitan, there was 'not a completely 
categoric no but on the whole I take the view that the company should 
represent itself. ' Her preference was to appear with a manager 'so that they 
[the decision-makers] can actually feel the operational reality of whatever it 
is that we're talking about. ' 
The sample, therefore, strongly suggests that hired lobbyists as third party 
representatives are allocated the subsidiary role of secondary spokesperson, 
if they are allocated any such role at all. 
LobbyiSts as suggliers of 12olicy advice to clients 
Of the heavy hirers of lobbyists, two - the Kingfisher/ Shopping Hours 
Reform Council and Grand Metropolitan respondents - explicitly attributed 
to the lobbyist a clear role of advising on policy, defined here as a 
contribution of opinions and/or proposed actions on matters of strategic 
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concern to the client. A putative advisory role can be inferred from the 
statements of four other respondents (Charles Lewis talking of his Tesco 
experience, IBM, Vauxhall and Glaxo) but its extent is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to explicate. With the anonymous informant, the lobbyists failed 
to adequately advise. 
David Ramsden of Kingfisher, in his role as deputy chairman of the 
Shopping Hours Reform Council, explicitly gave a policy advice role to his 
lobbyists. He hired GJW: 
... and they are used in a strategic role. They are not used to 
provide the normal, run-of-the-mill Parliamentary programme but 
simply to be part of the management and the strategic team ... 
planning how the Sunday trading campaign is going to be moved 
forward. 
Indeed, the client does the implementation. He expanded: 
GJW are used to agree with us a strategy that is necessary to 
ensure currently that the issue of Sunday trading and the 
Government's declared intention of introducing a Bill actually 
happens and that the announcement of that Bill is contained in the 
Queen's speech in November this year (1993). 
The strategy was set and 'then largely we the Shopping Hours Reform 
Council get on with the job. ' 
Tessa Marston, the Grand Metropolitan respondent, also involved her 
lobbyists as policy advisers. This was a nearly inevitable consequence of 
using them as gatherers of policy intelligence. She wanted, via her hirings, to 
be 'aware early on, that an official in the (European) Commission is thinking 
of a directive on such and such a subject. ' 
Then, with this policy intelligence, she said: 'I will often have a strategy 
session with one of these people' and: 
... one of the most useful things that I get 
from them is 
brainstorming. Two heads are always better than one if you've 
got a knotty problem. You have your intelligence; you have your 
business scenario; you want to know how to use the one to help 
the other. I can sit here and think great thoughts but the jamming 
with somebody else who is familiar with the scene is very helpful. 
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But policy advice by lobbyists was more difficult to explicate in the following 
circumstances. Charles Lewis of British Steel had previously worked for 
Tesco which was then developing its policy on out-of-town superstores. A 
firm of lobbyists were hired and: 
I think the main contribution was to relieve me of part of my day- 
to-day burden... A type of activity which I don't have time to 
attend to fully is ... planning who we should invite to what and 
how we should address a particular group of people - in fact 
writing the words for a position paper on an issue which we were 
feeling strongly about and getting the right sort of style and the 
right design organised. So the lobbying company did a lot of day- 
to-day spade work and even printing the certain bits and pieces 
and letters and so on. 
This section of the Lewis interview was an example of the difficulty of 
identifying the source and extent of policy advice when a shared policy 
development process with the client is not explicity flagged up. It can be 
argued that Lewis's statement 'writing the words for a position paper on an 
issue which we were feeling strongly about' is either an act of amanuensis or 
the act of policy creation in the first instance. If the former is claimed, the 
question arises why were such expensive secretaries employed. If the latter 
is claimed, it is almost impossible to imagine that the lobbyists developed 
policy ideas in a context which was not influenced by the extant policy of 
clients. Most policy-making is reflexive and incremental. 
There is also the question of lobbyist self-image and survival instinct: even a 
half-way competent lobbyist could hardly fail to respond with policy ideas if 
his client said he was 'feeling strongly' on an issue. Finally to add to these 
difficulties of identification, there is the question of own role perception by 
the client and by the lobbyists: dominant and subordinate social roles 
flowing from the principal/agent relationship can get involved. The client 
may not welcome advice in a key area such as policy by a hired agent while 
the lobbyist may introduce ideas in a covert way to save embarrassing the 
principal. There is also the question of memory: can the source of ideas and 
initiative be accurately recalled. 
The text also illustrates the multiplicity of roles open to the lobbyist and how 
difficult it is to separate them out, here, in particular, the contribution of 
policy advice. The Lewis text above portrays the lobbyist as an aide to the 
client in organising events; drawing up invitation lists; writing in the right 
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'tone of voice; getting documents designed, and even physically produced. 
Another example came from the Glaxo data. The respondent hired a 
lobbying firm for advice 'on tone mostly' but 'never' for strategic advice. She 
sent them drafts of documents going to Government because '. .. we are not 
professional politicans and I ... use an agency to look at what I have written 
and advise me on its drafting: how its written; how it's structured. ' 
She added that, in reply, they will say: 'Don't be daft, you'll really turn them 
off. Don't talk about your profits: profits are a dirty word; couch it in terms 
of patients ... why haven't you picked up this point ... you've got one 
paragraph on this but as a politician that's what my eyes were drawn to 
because that's politically important and you haven't expanded that point. "' 
But these roles above are matters of process which influence policy content. 
For example, the length of time allowed at an event for policy statement 
affects the amount of policy which can be declared and the lobbyist can 
influence both the time and the words. Expanding time or text can influence 
meaning and change emphasis. 
The Vauxhall respondent, Keith Lockwood, also used his hired lobbyists to 
write the first draft of briefing papers. The difficulties mentioned above in 
the Tesco and Glaxo cases re-appear here as they do in the case of IBM who 
had a project-by-project relationship with lobbyists. The latter's respondent 
described the role of his lobbyists as not being representatives: 'it's much 
more advice and guidance and listening, understanding... " 
How to interpret these inputs by lobbyists? They could extend from the 
retailing of political gossip which had strategic significance to the recounting 
of a policy development which was in fact over-dressed and inaccurate 
speculation. 
Not all lobbyists succeed in policy advice, as the witness of the unnamed 
respondent showed. Government policy impinged strongly on his employer, 
an international energy company. He was faced with the need in the 1970s 
for 'finding a modus vivendi with a very pro-active Government' and then in 
the 1980s with a Government 'which then wished to privatise, particularly in 
the energy sector which traditionally had been very largely a public sector 
industry in the UK. ' These 'political factors' created the need to lobby, 
mostly, as analysed above, in the self-reliant mode. 
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But a firm was hired for monitoring in 'the hope that because they dealt with 
other clients in other sectors that ... there would be external wisdom that 
could rub off ... ' The respondent hoped that hiring lobbyists would bring 
contact with 'somebody who had walked over that ground a bit already. ' 
But the lobbyists had "walked on the whole rather superficially because ... 
they had only done work in depth for quite a small number of clients ---" 
Lobbyists as sugl2liers of administrative sul2port 
The data suggests that there is another category of service to clients: the role 
of administrative support. Document monitoring comes under this head and 
nine of the respondents used lobbyists for that task. It may sound a dull, 
routine activity but its importance was noted by Heinz et al. (1993; 379): 
We found that interest groups devote considerable resources 
simply to monitoring the Washington scene. Contrary to the 
conventional image of representation as consisting primarily of 
advocacy, our sample of clients reported that they most often used 
representatives to keep track of developments and maintain 
contacts with allied organisations. 
They wrote about the difficulty of predicting events in Washington and 
lobbyists 'reviewing vast amounts of information' (389). 
The anonymous respondent talked of document monitoring as'... a minimal 
basis for employing lobbyists, merely as an arm, a convenience. .. " He 
agreed that they were low level doers 'in the way that we used them yes; but 
they were bright people. ' 
Pilkington hired a lobbying firm 'in a very limited way, i. e. on the minimal 
basis of document monitoring. The British Steel informant Charles Lewis 
needed relief from 'part of my day-to-day burden' and the lobbying 
company 'did a lot of day-to-day spadework. ' But the analysis in the 
previous section suggests caution in accepting this self-attribution of 
/spadework' to the category of administrative support: such "spadework' 
could or could not fit into other categories of service supplied. 
The data from the Thorn-EMI respondent appears easier to assign. She did 
not hire lobbyists but she would consider it "if there was an issue which was 
so large' that she needed supportive staff work. She said: 
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I'm not suggesting that they would write papers to go to Ministers 
but they can do the basic research. Some of it may not be solely 
related to this company and this company's performance but they 
can perhaps get in touch with competitors who on this issue feel 
there was a joint ... mutual interest. They could go to trade 
associations. They could pull things together from a variety of 
sources. 
The Vauxhall respondent was a heavy hirer of a public affairs company and 
his description of the relationship pointed towards a reconnaissance support 
role: 'I use them as eyes and ears. ' More data for this support role can be 
adduced from Keith Lockwood's comments in the section below on value for 
money. 
Sainsbury was active on the Sunday trading issue and hired lobbyists 
'because we've had to talk direct to MPs. ' And in execution of this, 'What 
they did was to arrange some receptions for MPs ... and advise directly on 
where particular MPs were coming from on the issues. ' Again the words 
'advise directly' are problematical for they could carry meanings ranging 
from a report of names to an interpretation of views. 
Lobbyists as fee chargers 
Commercial lobbyists hire their services out to interests and, as described in 
the theoretical perspectives Chapter Two, 38-39, are a hyphen in the policy 
formation process: on their left is the client and on their right is the decision- 
maker. But their left side relationship can also be seen under the heading of 
business: the hiring of a lobbyist means the payment of a fee by the client and 
the delivery of services by the lobbyist. This commercial relationship brings 
into the picture questions of the effectiveness of the lobbyist and the value 
gained by the client. 
As discussed in the literature review (Chapter One, 30-32), assessing the 
effectiveness of lobbying involves difficult judgements. The best that can be 
achieved is an approximate judgement about effectiveness. One approach to 
approximate judgement is developed here. It is for clients to measure the 
outcomes of lobbying against fees paid and where the clients perceive those 
outcomes to be worth at least the value of the fees paid, there exists the state 
of 'value for money. ' Where there is value for money, there is effectiveness - 
at least for the client. 
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Such an estimate involves reference to opportunity cost: what other value 
could the money have earned and what outcome would have happened 
without lobbying. The problem with this approach is imperfect knowledge 
about alternative uses of the fee money and about alternative outcomes. A 
variant of this approach is to set a pre-fixed lobbying outcome (usually but 
not necessarily a policy outcome) against a fee. The problem here for both 
client and lobbyist is again imperfect knowledge: how to track in a causal 
way the linkages between the outcome and the lobbyist's actions. Below is 
an analysis of the data on fees and value for money statements made by 
clients with reference to the equations above. 
The Glaxo informant reported that document monitoring cost between "five 
and six thousand a year' and the 'tone of voice' service 'over fifty thousand' 
pounds because 'we have probably put in the last six months a dozen 
submissions to different Government departments or Parliamentary 
committees'. She thought 'we have always had outstanding value for 
money' and she reported that her Board had never challenged the 
expenditure. On the monitoring service, value could be reflected in the 
quantity of material sent to her. About 'tone of voice': 
How do you quantify the value of the right tone? ... I send them 
something I have drafted and they come back saying 
'incomprehensible twaddle; full of corporate jargon; I didn't 
understand a word of it'. 
The anonymous respondent paid in the 1980s an annual retainer of about 
E10,000 which was annually adjusted for inflation - and 'sometimes a bit less 
than inflation to keep them on their toes! For extra and unusual loads of 
work, an additional hourly rate was paid. Value for money was assessed by 
'taking the views of three or four of us who regularly used their services' at 
corporate headquarters and the views of users in operating companies! 
But I think on the whole they didn't find them [the lobbyists] as 
useful as we did because I think they probably ... didn't know 
what it was they wanted from them. 
This data illustrates the problem of opportunity costs. The clients had no 
clear idea of what their budgets would otherwise have been spent on and 
what in probability would have happened without the lobbyists. 
Nevertheless, a judgement had to be made: the lobbyists were on an annual 
contract ('we weren't talking about very large sums of money') and they 
were retained for ten years. Value for money? 
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The anonymous informant said: 
... I don't think there were many graduations on that scale. One 
would have said: 'are they still doing the jobT Broadly speaking if 
so, no problem... They didn't bother us or upset us touting for 
business that they would have liked to do for [name of company] 
... I totally trusted the chap in charge which is a very wonderful 
asset.... Certainly... I was not myself ever put back to the wall 
and required to justify it (the fee). 
Perhaps the safest conclusion here is that a judgement about value was 
avoided: substituted was a judgement that not much value for money was in 
play and that 'trust' in people obviated the need to make a judgement. 
Charles Lewis of British Steel explored his previous experience of hiring 
lobbyists to talk about value for money. When the television company HTV 
was bidding for a franchise in 1989/90, the commercial lobbyist's fee was an 
annual retainer of E20,000 plus expenses. Value for money was assessed as 
follows: 
Basically, I don't know ... whether you can say that you have got 
value for money if the lobbying company didn't actually deliver 
the result you wanted. They may have done all the work and they 
have done everything very thoroughly and very diligently but if 
the decision on that issue went against you, your Board would 
probably say 'well, that wasn't much use: we haven't had much 
value for money there'. .. I think in the main, in the companies 
I've been with, we have always got what we felt we should get in 
broad terms from the lobbying company. You don't have any 
great sort of ... high flying expectation when you take on a 
lobbying company. You just hope that there will be some sort of 
benefit for your organisation and its objectives as a result of doing 
that. 
The initial Lewis reference above was to a fixed target that the lobbyist had to 
achieve and it was significant that the ultimate corporate policy arbiter and 
paymaster - the corporate board - would take such an approach: they were 
responsible for outcomes. The rest of the Lewis statement suggests an 
approach close to the unnamed respondent quoted earlier -a suspension of 
judgement and an act of professional faith. 
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The IBM respondent told of hiring a commercial for a project at the rate of 
E3,000 a month. On a later contract,, the same firm - "maybe they did 
themselves down last time' - charged f: 4,, 000 to E5,000 a month. 
So we asked the question "why have you changed from E3,000 a 
month to fifty per cent more than thaff -.. they have actually 
come back and said 'well if you're not happy with that, let us 
charge you E3,500 a month flat fee and we'll keep showing you 
our time sheets and anything more than that, we'll put in a bucket. 
And at the end of the project, if we have been successful or if you 
IBM have been successful in winning the project ... we'll add up 
the hours and we'll say to you: look, we actually did these 
amounts of hours extra. What would you like to do about iff I 
mean they're opening the door to saying that we can say "bad 
value, we're not going to pay you any more' or we could be so 
delighted we've won this enormous contract and all the 
wonderful help they gave us, we'll pay them for the extra hours or 
we'll do some extra deal on it. 
This amounted to a 'success fee' (payment dependent on pre-agreed 
outcomes) which was not an acceptable method of payment if the lobbyist is 
a member of the PRCA (The Public Relations Consultants' Association), a 
voluntary professional association. 
The length of the aforementioned IBM contracts with lobbyists was 12 
months in the case of the Merlin project above (78) and six months in the case 
of another. Such contracts illustrate the difficulty of fixing fees: 
We're about to embark on another one for about six months. It's 
hard to judge... these Government tenders with the best will in 
the world. They say it's going to be on a six month process. Very 
often it does slip in timescale and so we would go on employing 
them (lobbyists) as long as we feel we need to. 
The Kingfisher respondent said that the company paid out 'more than 
E60,000 a year and less than E100,000 a year' for all lobbying activity in the 
UK and Europe. The Grand Metropolitan respondent had two lobbyists on 
retainer and the others were hired on "a daily basis of piece work. ' In the 
market overall, she said '... there are people who would charge E250 a day 
and people who would charge E250 an hour. ' 
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At Vauxhall, the lobbying bill was 'perhaps just into six figures' when the 
respondent joined the company in 1990 but the figure was 'just over; C20,000' 
in 1993. Keith Lockwood saw the cost in these terms: 
It's quite low in terms of consultancy fees ... If you think of the 
overheads, frankly I'm getting the work of two people plus a 
secretary; for E25,000 a year, it's actually quite good value, because 
if you think I had to employ these people ... the rule of thumb on 
employment is something like two and a half times your salary is 
your overhead. If you look at it in those terms, there are occasions 
when consultants can be quite good value, particularly within a 
company where the headcount is under constant perusal and it's 
getting tougher. 
On value for money, he started with the premise -one would accept that 
lobbyists are running businesses. ' He said that they operated a policy of 
market pricing - selling at the fee level the client will bear. He recalled his 
own time as a commercial when making these judgements as a client: 
Sometimes, I think it's important to say: 'do I want that bolt-on 
goody: do I really need that? Okay, you said you did five hours 
for me last week. What were you actually doing for those five 
hours. ' It"s actually quite tough to do that with a consultant ... 
and I know very well that I should and must question those hours. 
The above data from Vauxhall raises two issues. Firstly, the opportunity cost 
of hiring lobbyists is couched in terms of administrative outcomes and not in 
terms of policy outcomes. This refers back to the notion above that hired 
lobbyists supply a range of services to clients,, strategic and non-strategic, 
which are often difficult to disentangle. Secondly, commercial lobbyists are 
businesses seeking maximum fee advantage from clients as well as political/ 
constitutional hyphens seeking policy advantage for clients. 
Lobbyists as sellers of services to clients 
Most businesses have to put effort into finding new selling outlets. In the 
case of commercial lobbyists, this effort takes different forms. 
The Thorn-EMI respondent reported that 'once or twice a month" she got 
literature through the post and" ... we reply turning down the approach. ' 
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If I wanted to employ somebody to help I know from my own 
contacts those people who are effective; who-ve helped contacts of 
mine in other businesses... I would go by recommendation rather 
than ... a cold call. 
The IBM respondent received 'a fair number' of soliciting letters and 
telephone calls. Some of the latter are from people who: 
... can be quite aggressive and quite honestly do not do 
themselves much good because they don't understand the way we 
operate and they don't understand in fact that we've really got 
quite a good network already. Others are much more sensible 
about the approach, maybe approaching by letter as well. 
He recalled an 'aggressive sales pitch' in which a lobbyist offered help in 
meeting William Waldegrave but coincidently did so just two days after IBM 
had the Lord President of the Council (William Waldegrave) to 'a very 
successful lunch: 
And you can imagine how well that went down. I don't want help 
in getting in front of anybody. I might like advice on who to get in 
front of at any particular time but we can do that ourselves. And 
I think my view is that if we have aggressive third parties doing 
things or trying to do things on our behalf, perhaps not the way 
we like to do things, then they're actually going to do damage 
potentially. 
For the Grand Metropolitan informant, there was 'ordeal by lunch for a 
couple of months' by the larger lobbying firms when she arrived in post. 
Eventually her choice, with one exception, was for smaller firms, hiring' a 
combination of skills and expertise in a small sort of boutique organisation 
that backs those people up. ' These were chosen after a process of networking 
among non-competitive peers doing Government relations work. 
Lobbyists and client 12ercel2tion of confidentiality and of conflict of 
interest 
No respondent reported a failure by lobbyists to maintain confidentiality on 
client information. Grand Metropolitan had a confidentiality clause in its 
hiring contract. Charles Lewis, the British Steel respondent, who has 
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previous experience at Tesco and HTV, reported that it was 'never' a 
problem. Perhaps one of the reasons for its maintainence by lobbyists is 
enlightened self-interest. This was broached by the IBM respondent: 
... on confidentiality ... these people have to behave the right 
way; if there was going to be a lack of confidentiality, then they 
know that they are going to lose their job. We've had no instance 
of that sort of thing going on. It has to be a partnership and 
you've got to trust each other and the important thing is to work 
very, very closely with these people. Their approach, certainly the 
people we use, is 'Tell us all your concerns, your warts and all, 
because at least if we understand, then perhaps we will be able to 
give you much better advice. ' So we do leave ourselves open to 
our weaknesses which these lobbyists will understand but I 
believe that it's the only way of working satisfactorily with them 
because then they can help us perhaps combat that. 
Self-revelation, especially of weaknesses, about the client's business position 
could, if revealed, reduce corporate advantage in the marketplace. Therefore 
it may be that clients grade information in terms of its confidentiality - i. e. 
power to reduce competitive advantage - and only release task-specific 
information to their lobbyists. This is a policy of information by need-to- 
know. The views of the anonymous respondent offered support for this. His 
company was involved publicly with a major corporate acquisition. He had 
a good and permanent relationship with lobbyists but '... both for 
confidentiality and all other reasons we didn't use external political 
consultants for that... ' Heexpanded: 
... even if I had wanted to, I don't think that the system would 
have permitted me to bring in an outsider of that kind but there's 
no reason why a good senior lobbyist should be less reliable than a 
merchant banker. Quite frankly, the strength of the corporate 
finance culture was rather stronger than the strength of the 
corporate Parliamentary culture and therefore one wouldn't have 
chanced one's arm. I think one tried to take very, very few risks 
indeed. I had total confidence in the head of the firm, you know, 
who was a good man and formerly been a general and one had 
reasonable grounds for thinking he was ethically straight up and 
down and I never doubted him for a moment. Even then though, 
an honest man can trip you up if he doesn't know that he is doing 
it. So there's always a risk. 
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Another aspect of confidential information release by the client is a prior 
understanding that its receipt by a lobbyist does not create for him a conflict 
of interests. This avoids situations where a lobbyist could be arguing before 
a decision-maker the opposing sides of an issue or be arguing the same issue 
for competing clients. 
Clients need this prior understanding before hiring. IBM asked for client 
lists. Respondent Charles Lewis said that he checked for conflicts of interest 
between a lobbyist's clients 'but never found any major problem. ' 
Lobbyists and client Derception of their rel2utation 
Whatever their use of lobbyists, clients are concerned about the reputation of 
those they have hired with the decision-makers and with their own peer 
group of government relations managers. On this aspect, the data revealed a 
wide variety of opinions and attitudes. 
Charles Lewis sought views among decision-makers and got 'very mixed' 
and 'varied' answers. Among MPs: 
Very mixed. Some people are ... perfectly happy to be open and 
frank about these things; other people are a little different. The 
fact of the matter is ... a lot of MPs are members of lobbying 
companies themselves and they have to tread a fairly careful line. 
Among Ministers and civil servants: 
They varied. If I asked somebody I had met what he thought of a 
particular lobbying company, he would say something like 'very 
effective; do their homework; very thorough; will present your 
case in a very sensible and full way. ' But it's usually bound to get 
back down to personalities and there are lobbyists who everybody 
knows and nobody particularly trusts. 
He said that criticism was usually cast in the words 'can't trust them' : 
Something usually reasonably mild like that; nothing particularly 
serious unless the company had been involved in some notorious 
case or affair of some kind. 
For the IBM respondent, there were two checks on reputation. Firstly he 
noted that lobbying companies carried out their own surveys and the people 
he hired 'have been very quick to tell us that they come out the most 
100 
favoured amongst other Parliamentary service organisations. " His second 
approach was 'to ask some of my peers in other companies ... We talk to 
each other a lot, certainly those of us who aren't in competition with each 
other. ' 
Checks with non-competitive peers were also done by Grand Metropolitan. 
So informant Tessa Marston said she 'gradually developed a feel from my 
contemporaries as to whom it was worth talking to and to whom it wasn't. ' 
As regards their reputation with decision-makers, she said that 'many 
politicians in particular have a prejudice against lobbyists ... sometimes 
unreasonably ... ' This limited the direct representation lobbyists could do 
for a client. A former civil servant, she said: J suspect I would have been 
rather sniffy about dealing with a lobbyist. At that stage, I would have 
thought this was kind of offside in some way. ' 
The view from Thorn-EMI was that lobbyists 'varied hugely in effectiveness 
and cost. ' The ICI respondent noted that 'there are a large number of MPs 
who know commercial lobbyists or consultant lobbyists very well. ' An MP 
would 'in my experience prefer a good brief to a good lunch any day. ' He 
noted that many lobbyists were ex-MPs or had worked closely with 
Parliament for political party central organisations. Lobbyists with civil 
servant backgrounds were less numerous. These varying backgrounds made 
lobbyists more or less effective on behalf of clients, depending on the nature 
of the task to be achieved. So about reputation, 'there's a bit of horses for 
courses in it. ' The anonymous respondent said the same. 
The Vauxhall respondent noted that incompetence could also apply to 
clients: there were 'good and bad lobbyists and there are good and bad in- 
house people as well. ' About the former, he thought: I'm afraid that 
there are a lot of clumsy lobbyists around. ' 
The Kingfisher informant believed: 
The Parliamentary lobbyist in this country has on occasion got a 
bad name. I don't think that that name is totally deserved because 
I think that reputation has to a large degree been imported from 
America ... I believe that the best do a very good job indeed ... 
For the Pilkington respondent, there was great variety of performance and 
reputation. In his experience, he thought the attitude of civil servants 
towards commercial lobbyists was 'a bit sniffy. ' He added: 'They tend to 
regard them as ... 
hacks 
... whose services are for hire to the highest 
bidder. ' T 77-1 0 
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He expanded: 
I think there are people who have got excellent expertise ... it's a 
moving scenario... it's quite fashionable for people who've either 
taken early retirement, courtesy of their electorate perhaps, from 
the House of Commons or European Parliament or something, to 
set up a consultancy. And there are some sharks; there are some 
charlatans but they there are also some very good professional 
people who are very close to the ground. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has analysed the data from a representative sample of company 
clients of commercial lobbyists and has constructed a quantitative scale of 
propensity to hire lobbyists. Lobbying was defined to include document 
monitoring and therefore all the respondents hired or had hired a 
commercial lobbyist, building up from this minimal act of lobbying. The 
propensity measures the amount of need the client has for supply of certain 
functions: the supply of access to decision-makers; the supply of third party 
representation in front of decision-makers; the supply of policy advice, and 
of administrative support. The need of individual respondents for any or all 
of these functions ranged from a negative to a strong positive. The need to 
hire and which services to hire in was influenced by the client's previous 
personal experience of the the public policy-making process and their 
existing contacts; in-house lobbying capacity; company culture about outside 
consultants and whether they insisted on representing themselves; the 
regulatory regime they faced; current Government policy towards the 
industry sector involved; the need for an outside sounding board on policy 
matters; business contracts to be won; whether Parliament was heavily 
involved in their agenda; the degree of European involvment and 
Government's desire to consult industry. These needs could change for it 
was noted by respondents that they were dependent on internal and external 
circumstance. Although the propensity scale was constructed as a 
quantitative measure, it can be used with caution as a general guide to the 
intensity of need for lobbyists' services. 
The fees for lobbyists varied greatly from piece work rates of f: 250 a day via 
monthly charges of between E4,000 and E5,000 to annual bills of E20,000. 
Clients found it difficult to make judgements about value for money and 
none declared that they worked to any discrete method for sizing up this 
factor. 
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Some clients were subjected to marketing approaches by lobbyists seeking 
work but no client said that any of these approaches alone led to a hiring. 
Instead, respondents relied on peer group networking for opinion about 
lobbyists to hire. The sample reported no operational problems about 
confidentiality of company information in the hands of lobbyists nor were 
clients concerned about any actual conflict of interests involving themselves. 
Respondents reported that there were effective and ineffective lobbyists 
offering themselves for hire and that they had different skills to offer. They 
also reported the views of decision-makers as being in the range neutral to 
mildly critical. 
Notes 
The information about tinplate was given in a letter of July 2,1993 from 
Charles Lewis to the author. The former noted British Steel's previous 
status as a nationalised industry: 'Remember, until the end of 1988 
British Steel was nationalised and contact up to that time and since has 
tended to be at a very high level between individuals. ' The information 
about strip products and the plc was given in a telephone conversation 
of October 3,1994. 
2. The Political Editor of The Times, Peter Riddell, argued (June 19,1993; 
4) about the Asil Nadir affair and lobbyists that: 'public affairs firms can 
use long-standing political and personal contacts with Ministers and the 




Lobbyists for hire: a profile 
(part one) 
Introduction 
This Chapter is the second of four which describe and analyse the separate 
pieces of primary research conducted for this thesis. The subject here and in 
Chapter Six is the commercial lobbyist. The subject of the previous chapter 
was the client: the focus now turns from the hirer to the hired. The interview 
data builds up a more detailed and operational analysis of how hired 
lobbyists go about their work than has hitherto been published in the UK 
This Chapter looks at lobbyists and clients by sector and client preference; 
business getting; fees, and titles. 
Research 12articiDants and their status. 
Thirteen interviews were carried out with the following lobbyists. Their 
titles,, locations and dates of interviews are to be found in Appendix Two, 
216. 
Fred Morgan of Westminster Advisers; Peter Moore of Market Access 
International; Michael Burrell of Westminster Strategy; Dr. Martin Smith of 
Government Policy Consultants (GPQ David Perchard of David Perchard 
Associates; Simon Nayyar of Westminster Communications; Tim Rycroft of 
Good Relations; Charles Miller of The Public Policy Unit (PPU); Evie Soames 
of Charles Barker; an anonymous 'senior consultant' for a London public 
relations consultancy; Tessa Devlin of College Hill Associates; Tom McNally 
of Shandwick, and Patrick Robertson of Taskforce Communications. 
As noted in Chapter Three on methodology, these respondents were drawn 
principally (ten) in a random fashion from the 1991/92 Berkeley Directo 
Public Affairs and Government Relations by Lloyd & Atack. Peter Moore of 
Market Access is the author of the paper A Market in Influence? referenced 
in Chapters One and Four above and in this Chapter. 
There were three exceptions to sourcing from the Directory. Westminster 
Advisers was a relatively new firm of some two years operation at the time 
of the fieldwork (summer 1993) and it was staffed by two experienced 
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lobbyists, Douglas Smith and Fred Morgan. The long experience of Douglas 
Smith was expressed in a pilot interview which helped set the structure and 
the agenda for the main fieldwork. 
Fred Morgan was interviewed because of his relatively long experience and 
because he was a Labour Party member. Political affiliation has been 
thought significant because there is an assumption that most lobbyists are 
Conservative in their personal politics because of their largely private sector 
clientele and because commercial lobbying came to the public"s attention 
mostly during the Thatcher administrations. This suggested in the words of 
Moore (1991; 26) that the political right 'may be attracted by the 
entrepreneurial character of an industry which apparently rose with the 
"enterprise" culture of the 1980s. -' But Moore went on to note in his profile of 
GJW staff that, of the politically active staff, 53% were either Labour or 
Liberal Democrat and that of this figure, the Labour component was 29%. 
There was also some evidence of a lack of enthusiasm for commercial 
lobbyists from Labour MPs: a 1992 poll by Access Opinions Ltd showed that 
33% of Labour MPs found such lobbyists very helpful or helpful compared 
with 54% Conservative MPs. Another 1992 poll, this time by Mori (1n), also 
reflected an anti-lobbyist bias by Labour MPs: all MPs in the sample ranked 
TR consultants' as the 11th most helpful source of information out of 18 but 
30% Conservatives described them as most helpful against 18% Labour 
members. It was considered worthwhile, in the light of the assumption of a 
right-leaning personnel and of these figures, to interview a declared Labour 
supporting lobbyist. 
However, the data from the interview with Fred Morgan did not show any 
differential lobbying behaviour which could be attributed to political 
affiliation. Another lobbying firm had two London Labour councillors as 
directors and it was suggested (2n) that matching Labour supporting 
lobbyists with Labour controlled local authorities helped when waste 
management contracts were put to competitive tender. The unnamed 
lobbyist said that he was an active Labour Party member and that in his 
judgement some 15% of lobbyists were Labour activists (3n). Sometimes 
political affiliation does lead to party political action: Shandwick reported in 
its 1992 accounts that two staff were seconded to the Conservative Party for 
the general election campaign (4n). 
The second exceptional sourcing was respondent David Perchard who was 
included as an exemplar of a lobbyist specialising in one subject and one 
based outside London. The third was Taskforce Communications who were 
105 
established after the Lloyd and Atack Directory was published and who 
were recommended by a civil servant because of the political connections of 
their personnel. Their respondent Patrick Robertson did not want his views 
attributed. 
Only one lobbyist, Ian Greer of Ian Greer Associates,, turned down the 
invitation to be interviewed and he maintained his refusal after a second 
request (5n). Only two respondents refused to answer a question and the 
question in both cases was about fee levels. The anonymous respondent 
chose silence because he was the substitute for his managing director and did 
not want his views to be regarded as the official position of his employer. 
Five of the respondents had offices in the 'division bell area' of Westminster; 
three were in the City of London; one was in Mayfair. There were two 
women respondents. 
In all cases except three, the interviews were with the individuals initially 
approached. The exceptions were the unnamed above, Westminster 
Communications and Good Relations. 
The lobbyists interviewed had varying lengths of personal experience of the 
activity. The range included eight; two; seven; six; four; three; eight; twenty- 
one; four; one; seven and six years. 
just before the start of the fieldwork amongst lobbyists, PR Week (1993, 
April) published a league table of 1992 fee income of the largest 150 public 
relations consultancies in the UK. Lobbying firms were either indirectly 
included where they were part of PR groups or they were mentioned in their 
own right as independents. The Shandwick group was first with E23,400,000 
and Lowe Bell Communications, owners of Good Relations, were second 
with E15,008,000. Countrywide Communications, part owners of 
Government Policy Consultants, was sixth with E8,187,978 and seventh was 
The Grayling Group, owners of Westminster Strategy with E6,008,212. 
College Hill Associates had turnover of E1,728,989 and were placed 28th. 
Westminster Advisers were 147 with a turnover of E166,889. 
Lobbvists and their clients by secto 
What is the balance of clients by public, private and voluntary sector? 
Westminster Advisers had 12 clients spread over all three sectors while 
Market Access estimated private companies were 60% of clients; public 
bodies 12% and charities eight per cent in 1991. Their respondent judged 
that since then numbers of 'charity pressure groups have died out 
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somewhat. ' In the transport specialism of Market Access, 30% of clients were 
in the public sector and the rest in the private but 'they're not necessarily big 
businesses ... thirty, forty, fifty people. " All of College Hill Associates' 60 
clients were in the private sector: the majority were 'blue chip' publicly 
quoted companies and there was one trade association. Tom McNally said 
his current employer Shandwick and former employer Hill and Knowlton 
'tended to have mainly commercial clients. ' He thought growth areas were 
contracted-out parts of the civil service, local government and 'foreign public 
bodies including foreign governments. ' 
The client list of Westminster Strategy stood at 52 in August 1993. The 
following is a breakdown by inspection of title. Sixteen could be identified as 
public or private companies (e. g. AEA Technology and National 
Westminster Bank), another five were trade associations and professional 
associations were three. Local authorities numbered 16; nationalised and 
public sector organisations one each. There were three charities /pressure 
groups (e. g. Amnesty International); one common interest group (e. g. 
Business in Sport and Leisure) and one trade union (e. g. Police Federation). 
Six were put in the miscellaneous category (e. g. Chartex) following 
difficulties of title identification. 
The Westminster Strategy respondent estimated an equality of private and 
public sector clients. He said: 
We work for the Association of County Councils and a large 
number of individual county councils. We work for several 
London boroughs. We've done quite a lot of work in the health 
service and we do quite a lot of work for quangos of one sort or 
another... quite a lot of work for trade associations ... probably 
our largest trade association client is the Japanese electronics 
industry ... a lot of work for companies relating to privatisation. 
So we do quite a lot of work for companies that were once in the 
public sector but are no longer. 
and: 
There has been a trend in our business: local government has 
become a much more important part of our business than it was 
two years ago. 
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Michael Burrell added that'on occasion" they turned down clients. Conflict 
of interest was one reason and he gave the example of regional electricity 
companies with differing policies: here the potential client could be given 
recommendations which could be in conflict with advice to other regionals. 
Unease about the client's operation meant that 'once or twice we have turned 
down clients because we simply felt extremely uncomfortable with the 
subject area. ' Internally staff were given the 'right' not to work on some 
accounts for reasons of conscience. 
He also noted that sometimes commercial lobbyists were likened to barristers 
in that both accepted a changing series of cases. But he rejected the 
comparison in that the legal system imposed a prior obligation to ensure that 
all were offered representation,, an obligation which did not apply to 
lobbyists. Secondly: 
in practice you cannot give really good advice to clients to whom 
you feel hostile: so it makes sense not to try to work for clients 
you're totally out of sympathy with. 
Government Policy Consultants (GPQ employed seven people in the UK 
and seven in Brussels. A partial list of their 1992 clients broke down into the 
following categories: five companies; two trade associations and three public 
sector organisations (e. g. London Zoo) and three which could not be securely 
identified by title. Individual clients included (summer 1993) South 
Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive, the Bingo Association of Great 
Britain, and the Association of Plastics Manufacturers in Europe. At the time 
of interview, respondent Martin Smith said their balance of clients was 
significantly in the private sector and: 
We currently don't do any work for the voluntary or non- 
commercial sector. The budgets available to most clients in the 
voluntary sector are fairly small and at this stage in our company's 
development I want to concentrate on developing the commercial 
momentum of the business here. 
At Westminster Communications, there were 47 clients listed in summer 
1993 serviced by 12 staff. An inspection of titles yielded the following. 
Twelve were public or private companies (e. g. London Underground Ltd. 
[Development Directorate] and Standard Life Assurance) and 11 trade 
associations. There was a healthcare organisation (Denplan) and three 
professional assocations (e. g. Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy). There were two nationalised industries (e. g. British Railways 
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Board); five local authorities and five other public sector organisations (e. g. 
Civil Aviation Authority). Common interest groups such as Royal 
Automobile Club numbered two; and six clients fell under the miscellaneous 
heading because of difficulty of title identification. 
David Perchard Associates had all their clients in the private sector bar one - 
the Department of Trade and Industry. The Charles Barker respondent had 
'very little' clientele in the public sector. She said that there had been more in 
the 1980s, such as the British Airports Authority, when the bulk of the 
privatisation programme was passing into legislation. In the future, the Next 
Step programme of hybrid public/private state agencies for the civil service 
might produce more. Private sector clients were split equally between 
individual companies and trade associations. One charity had been on the 
books for 20 years. 
For the Good Relations respondent there was a: 
broad balance between large private sector companies and the 
public sector and quasi-public sector organisations, such as local 
authorities and recently privatised former Government bodies. 
There is not a great deal of representation from the voluntary 
sector but as between the other two, I would say its a fairly even 
balance, probably sixty: forty in favour of the private sector. 
Private sector clients were "predominately individual companies. " He 
worked on between five and 12 clients with one other colleague, the latter 
concentrating on product-related issues, such as food safety for the client 
NutraSweet. 
For the unnamed respondent, probably sixty or seventy per cent (maybe 
even higher) of clients were in the private sector and 'by and large they're big 
business -.. ' Another view expected that the client list would always very 
largely be big business. 
Charles Miller said about his client list that... predominantly, it will be big 
business. ' 
That will be two hundred companies or consortia who come 
together to work on a particular issue... trade associations ... 
they may be 20% of our turnover each month. Non-UK 
companies ... about 15%. Local authorities and local authority 
109 
related bodies, perhaps ten per cent ... But certainly the bulk, a 
good 60%. will be individual big organisations, ... we don't 
currently work for any voluntary organisations. 
Of public sector clients, there were "a lot of them on our books' in summer 
1993. 
These are people like British Rail; local authorities, quangos like 
the Sports Council, English Heritage and the National Heritage 
Memorial Fund and so on. Recently privatised public sector 
bodies also form a large part of our client list. 
He added that public sector bodies had become 'somewhat more confident' 
about using lobbyists. But: 
They have to run the gauntlet of the National Audit Office. We 
certainly have one public body who still for all sorts of reasons ... 
have us down on their books as something like interior decorators. 
Most of the others are quite frank about it but they will not call us 
lobbyists. They will say we are political consultants; we're local 
government advisers; we're policy advisers, advisers on 
consultation. Anything but using the L word because that implies 
that public money is being spent to lobby the provider of public 
money. 
The data has revealed a greater diversity of clients in terms of sector than has 
been published before. Public regulatory and funding bodies such as The 
Takeover Panel, the Civil Aviation Authority, English Heritage, the Sports 
Council have hired lobbyists, along with bodies about to be privatised or 
recently so - British Rail and British Gas p1c. Two lobbying firms represented 
some 20 local authority bodies. These bodies made up ten per cent of the 
clients of a third and 30 per cent of a fourth lobbying firm. 
But despite this diversity, it is clear that the private sector provides the bulk 
of clients and that the clients from other sectors are a dilution of a great 
predominance. Moore (1991; 27) had reported 'the overwhelming 
importance of individual firms' in the composition of one lobbying firm's 
client list. Grantham and Seymour-Ure (1990) had also previously found 
evidence for this strong bias towards the private sector. Out of 83 examples 
they gave of current or former clients of 16 lobbying firms, only 18 were in 
the public sector (as identified by title). But it should be noted that some of 
the latter have been clients for a long time. Grantham and Seymour-Ure 
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listed The Takeover Panel as a client of Westminster Strategy in 1987/8 and it 
was still so in summer 1993: the same applied for British Rail Board and its 
InterCity division as clients of Westminster Communications. 
The predominance of the private sector is likely always to exist and is, in 
part, a consequence of the ability to pay for a professional service. But the 
degree of predominance fluctuates over time as the analysis above suggests. 
Ironically, public sector bodies appeared to be a larger proportion of client 
lists even at a time (mid-1993) when that sector was shrinking. 
The impact of Government policy on the public sector is the proximate cause 
for the proportion of public sector clients. It is a reasonable assumption that 
the local authorities who have hired lobbyists at a time when the Local 
Government Commission is reviewing their functions are reflecting a 
defensive reaction to what could be a negative outcome for them. Support 
for this assumption is implied in The Independent newspaper report (6n) of 
August 24,1993 that the Audit Commission was unhappy about such 
hirings. The same variable of Government policy accounts for the presence 
of ex-nationalised industries on client lists. Here the agitating factor is often 
active regulatory regimes. For example, in August 1993, the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission recommended a partial break-up of British Gas p1c, a 
move welcomed by the company's regulator Ofgas. British Gas was a client 
of Westminster Communications (as was the Audit Commission summer 
1993). 
Theoretically this "governmental agenda for change' factor has links to the 
disequilibrium concept (see Chapter Two, 44) set out by Holtzman but 
challenges it in that the cause of the disturbance in the pattern of 
relationships of an interest is not another interest but government. 
Thg ggod client 
The section above looked at the lobbyist/client relationship from the 
technical aspect of client ownership: another, more personal perspective on 
that relationship is the lobbyist's preference for certain client behaviour. 
What is a good client for a lobbyist? Data generated by this question offered 
insights into optimum relationships as defined by one side in the supply of a 
professional service: it suggested that lobbyists prefer working to clients who 
bring forward a matter of substance, who have some understanding of the 
political system and who allow their advisers autonomy. 
III 
For Westminster Advisers' respondent 'a good client is a) one that has a good 
case; b) one that listens to you and c) one that can afford to pay you. For 
Westminster Strategy, there was also an economic specification: 
A good client is a client who pays the bills ... we are a business 
and that's the fundamental ... is a client who has something 
interesting to offer the Governmental process in term of 
knowledge, expertise in a subject area and one who understands 
the value of advice and is willing to listen with an open mind and 
be prepared to change their minds. Theres not really much point 
in hiring consultants if you think you know how to do it. So it's 
that quality of humility really that says 'I'm not a specialist in 
lobbying: you are. This is my problem: give me some advice on 
how to handle it. ' Inevitably, it's all about personal relationships 
and trust and so you seek to develop a rapport with each client. 
Evie Soames, the Charles Barker informant, also listed an economic 
dimension: a good client is 'one that sticks with us year after year and 
doesn't complain, pays their bills on time. ' 
The Westminster Communications respondent echoed the attraction of '---a 
client who has a substantive policy issue to address' for 'it is very difficult to 
do anything for a client who doesn't actually have anything useful to say. ' 
Tom McNally of Shandwick also talked about substance: 'A good client is 
someone with a big problem but with a real willingness to use what we have 
to offer and build us into the management and planning structure. ' He noted 
how 'a resentful in-house department' of public affairs could hamper the 
lobbyist's performance and then block access to directors. 
He characterised the 'worst' client as saying ' "here's a bundle of money: go 
and get this for me" which isn't how it happens and isn't how it should 
happen. ' 
David Perchard preferred working for companies rather than trade 
associations 'because they have a clear idea of what they want, make quicker 
decisions and all in all you generally see more results of your labours. ' The 
good client had clear objectives; was decisive; had an agreed division of 
responsibility with the lobbyist and did what she said she would. 
A good client is actually interested in what we do; not simply 
retaining us as a sort of security blanket. They make their own 
contribution. And they tell us what they're up to. 
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Clarity of mission by a client appealed to the Good Relations informant: '-.. 
a clear idea of what they wanted to achieve. Other qualities were: ability to 
take advice; act on it within the agreed order of priorities; 'enthusiasm to 
want to drive the project forward. ' 
Tim Rycroft said empathy for the lobbyist was also appreciated: 
A good client understands that the area in which we work can be 
maddeningly vague. Sometimes private sector companies can 
find it irritating, I think, trying to get results in this arena because 
it doesn't seem to work to any sort of logical process: which I 
suppose is why they come to us in the first place. But I don't think 
that necessarily makes it any easier for them to cope with what 
seems like a completely arbitrary way of doing things, which it 
often is of course. 
Understanding the political process was also a feature of the good client for 
the College Hill Associates' respondent: 'People who expect something to 
happen because you buy them lunch are nightmare clients because it just 
doesn't happen. ' 
She added: 
A good client is someone who doesn't give up and who isn't of the 
disposition that you have to be with the Tory Party to succeed ... 
you need a client that's interested and recognises that change can 
come about but it's not as a result of one meeting or of three 
meetings but of a continual programme 
For the Public Policy Unit informant, Charles Miller, the good client gave the 
lobbyist some measure of autonomy -let the dog bark' - and has 
understanding of how decision-making works, and is responsive: "there's 
nothing worse when you have a case which requires very, very urgent 
decisions being made than a client who's never there. ' 
swe're a distress purchase': the business of getting clients 
Commercial lobbyists are professional advisers running businesses. Some of 
these businesses are substantial: Westminster Strategy employed 35 people 
and had a f2m turnover in the summer of 1993. Westminster 
Communication had 47 clients and 19 staff below board level. Shandwick plc 
says about itself in its brochure Global Reach-Local Focus that it "is both the 
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leading and the largest organisation in the world, solely dedicated to public 
relations consultancy. ' How do they recruit clients? How do they engage in 
business development? 
For the Westminster Strategy respondent: 
Mostly by word of mouth., reputation. The main source of new 
business is existing clients either in the sense that they ask you to 
do more and more or in the sense that they recommend you to 
other people ... you get some clients from advertising in specialist 
publications like Vacher's, thats not really significant. You get 
some clients from what one might call marketing activities ... I do 
quite a lot of speaking at conferences about lobbying and that 
quite often leads to new clients but it's mostly word of mouth. 
The formula was similar for College Hill Associates. Tessa Devlin said 'good 
work means referral... If you work on a competition issue ... and it's 
successful, word will get round town that these are the chaps to employ for a 
competition issue, for a MMC inquiry. ' Cold calling (an uninvited approach 
on potential clients seeking work) was 'not often successful but often we will 
see something in the paper and write a letter on that basis. . .' 
Business development was similar for the Westminster Communication 
respondent: 'Principally I suppose they come to us on strength of our 
reputation and I stress that they come to us rather than us going out cold 
calling .. .' Other routes included winning competitive tenders; references 
from existing clients and from sister company Citigate Communications. 
The process is similar for Good Relations, now part of the Lowe Bell group 
which according to its 1993 brochure had an income of E16m. Tim Rycroft 
listed three ways: 
The ideal is to be referred from one happy client to another. 
Frequently, we're involved in beauty parades in which we 
competitively pitch against the other organisations in our field. 
And sometimes existing clients who may be using us for other 
areas of work discover that they have a need for public affairs 
work and the brief expands to include that. 
For the Shandwick informant there was no one single way of getting clients 
('There's self-publicity, advertising, networking, cold call letters') and it was 
an activity that took up a third of his time. The comparison was with 
/running up the down staircase because in many ways we're a distress 
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purchase. ' He thought 'companies tend to hire us because they've got a 
particular problem and as that problem recedes, they either downgrade our 
activity or drop us altogether. ' 
"Clients have come to us mainly by word . 'said Charles Miller of the PPU 
which listed 16 lobbying staff. 
Very rarely have we found clients generated by publicity ... 
they're not generated by impersonal contact. It is very much 
personal contact, catching people at the right time. We now have 
a chairman who's had a recently high public profile and who's 
done a lot of marketing for us and that has made a big difference. 
Respondent Martin Smith of GPC which employs seven people thought that 
the 'best way to get clients is by word of mouth and personal reference. ' 
GPC has been trading since January 1993 and previously operated as 
Countrywide Political Communications from 1989. He said that'... a lot of 
business does change hands'. He gave examples of referrals - introduction to 
new clients from a third party - in the following circumstances: referral from 
a competitor because of conflict of interest; referral by a large law firm, and 
by a Government department. In addition, a promotional brochure was 
mailed out, occasional booklets and speeches published and 'direct telephone 
selling' done on a trial basis. He summarised his approach as 'conventional 
marketing techniques and private networks' which took up between ten and 
30 per cent of the firm's time, depending on the state of the client list. 
Westminster Advisers had been in existence for two/ three years and for Fred 
Morgan, clients 'come to us almost entirely. We don't do any advertising at 
all. People ring us up or write to us or meet us and ask us to do some work 
for them. ' He said: 
I think this is the result a) of being fairly well known in the 
industry; b) Doulgas [Smith] in particular writes articles for 
magazines and newspapers and appears occasionally on 
television, and c) he and I ... speak at meetings ... which attract 
potential clients. 
Westminster Advisers had between ten and 12 clients (summer 1993) and 
operated an element of client selection: 
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... people talk to us about their problems and ninety nine times 
out of a hundred we will want to continue that discussion and 
want to accept them as clients. But after discussion ... we might 
feel 'well this really isn't for us or quite frankly between you and 
me we don't like this bloke' and in that case we won't proceed - 
Peter Moore, who had worked for GJW, said many clients went to them 
through referrals. There was also the identification of political problems in 
newspapers or on the professional 'grapevine' and 'then you make your 
approach, explain who you are, what you can dof how you think you can 
help. ' 
He worked (summer 1993) for the newly established transport section of 
Market Access. Getting clients was a large part of his work: 'you've 
obviously got to be quite aggressive about it to get this unit off the ground 
- it's a new commitment on the part of the group to develop the specialism in 
transport policy. ' 
Cold calling, such as direct telephone selling, was a 'less successful route but 
sometimes it works" for Charles Barker. Referrals and competitive 
presentations against other lobbyists were the majority sources of new 
clients, along with shared business with the other two divisions in the larger 
Charles Barker group. 
The data above suggests that lobbyists seek clients and that they do so along 
a passive/active continuum from reliance on referrals of potential clients by 
satisfied clients to competitive tendering and cold calling on the telephone. 
Firstly, it is noteworthy that this search for clients mirrors the search for 
effective lobbyists found in the data from clients. For example, the IBM 
respondent referred to a "network of government relations people ... we will 
compare notes' and the Grand Metropolitan respondent 'asked about 
amongst my peers -. .' The Thorn-EMI respondent said that 'if I wanted to 
employ someone to help, I know from my own contacts those people who 
are effective .- .' 
Secondly, the balance of the data suggests that most business development is 
at the passive end of the continuum and that this distribution forbids the use 
of a pro-active term such as 'client search. ' But this balance reflects a 
particular stage in business development by most of the sample. They are 
mostly older or larger businesses with a track record. 
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It is therefore significant to note who was specially active in getting clients. 
Martin Smith of GPC and Peter Moore of Market Access were building 
businesses, as was Tom McNally who had been at Shandwick for six months 
and was establishing himself (summer 1993) in a job which had two previous 
occupants in 18 months. 
Above all, wherever these lobbying businesses stand in the passive/active 
continuum, they all want more clients. The interview question was "How do 
you get clients? ': none said that the question was inappropriate. 
Lobbyists and fees 
Lobbyist charge fees. They work in a marketplace which matches the 
suppliers of advice to those looking for it. The business development 
described above is an expression of that market as are the advertisments by 
lobbying firms in periodic supplements in PR Week magazine. Lobbyists 
seek a profit either as independent firms or as part of a larger private or 
public business. But one respondent asserted that lobbyists do not sell their 
services to the highest bidder because they do not have perfect knowledge of 
what the fee levels are of their competitors: largely they are tendering blind. 
Tom McNally of Shandwick plc described the market circumstances of 
summer 1993: 
... I think fees have levelled off in the last two or three years as 
recession has bitten. It hasn't stopped the flow of public affairs 
work but certainly in the heady days of the eighties fees were 
tending to creep up whereas they have levelled off as ... company 
budgets have come under stress and competition has intensified. 
But there is a point beyond which you can't go without going out 
of business ... 
The ways in which fees are calculated and their levels show variety. For 
Westminster Advisers, the first step is a reconnaissance of the work to be 
done and the result may be that 'we could quite easily do some work for 
somebody for two or three thousand pounds. ' A basic feature of fee 
charging that runs through the data is the length of contracted work 
measured in time: this can be sub-divided into two categories. Fred Morgan 
described them: 
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One does things either on a project basis: they say "we want this 
done ... we think it ought to take three months' and so we spend 
three months. Or we are asked to do a much wider job for which 
we might charge an annual fee. Annual fees are getting now 
much less usual. 
Another organising principle for fee charging is range of service bought. 
Peter Moore said: 
... you can have the stand alone monitoring account which would 
usually be on a retainer. Speaking for the whole industry, I 
suspect ... somewhere between; C500 andfl, 000 a month for that. 
More common is to combine that with a consultancy service ... 
Fees can either be a monthly retainer ... figures between E2,000 
and E5,000 a month are probably common though ... some 
companies do specialise more in larger accounts which may have 
some degree of exclusivity in terms of other companies in the 
same sector ... You'd be bound to the one company which could 
be up to or around E10,000 a month quite easily. 
He said exclusive workingwas probably less common now than in the ... 
eighties when there were things like take-overs and ... and there was a lot 
more money flying around. ' 
For Westminster Strategy the fee structure had developed pragmatically. 
Michael Burrell said: 'the way one has built the business is instinctive' and 
later 'you try to reach a fee agreement that suits both parties. ' 
... maybe 60% of clients are on annual retainers and they will 
vary from in our case; E5OO a month to currently a maximum of 
about; C11,000 a month. But the average monthly retainer would 
be E3,000 or E4,000. Then project fees which you try and base on 
how much work is involved. Occasionally we charge people on 
the hourly rate basis and that will vary depending on the seniority 
of the person involved but we are very flexible. 
Flexible fee structures were also a feature for GPC. Martin Smith said: '. .. 
there are virtually no two clients who work on exactly the same basis. ' 
We prefer to work on a retainer basis, not just for the obvious 
financial reasons but also because we generally believe that's the 
best way to work with clients because one isn't then always 
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engaged in firefighting ... We also have project clients ... Any 
variation on these two themes is ultimately obtainable through 
negotiation. 
In the previous 18 months, GPC had done projects from E500 to E26,000, the 
former accepted on a loss leader basis. The latter client was a Canadian 
utility and the work involved 45 interviews with individuals in German 
industry, government and the media 'on a very precise set of environmental 
policy issues in relation to power generation. ' 
Client uncertainty about hiring a public affairs consultancy was a key feature 
in the fee charging policy of David Perchard Associates. From 1987 until the 
beginning of 1992, most of his clients had not hired a consultancy before. 
David Perchard explained: 
They were not convinced they needed public affairs consultants: 
maybe their trade association could do the job for them perfectly 
well. So it was necessary to demonstrate that there was a finite 
kind of fee there: so we went for flat annual fees. And the trouble 
with that is that the more enthusiastic you are, the more likely you 
are to be reducing your hourly return by over-servicing the client. 
Certainly we did that and we have gradually moved over to an 
hourly rate and we set a very small retainer ... 
The retainer varied between E2,000 and E5,000 'but in general we prefer to 
work with an hourly rate and we top off our time in quarter of an hour 
segments and bill accordingly. ' 
Westminster Communications also used hourly and part thereof rates: 
charge time is broken down into six minute segments within an agreed 
monthly total and timesheets kept by all 'up to joint managing directors and 
the Parliamentary and non-executive directors, ' said Simon Nayyar. Hourly 
rates are combined with a fixed monthly retainer 'previously agreed ... ' 
Tom McNally reported variety of practice on fees. His previous employer 
Hill and Knowlton was 'almost entirely time sheet based' while Shandwick 
/are much more annual retainer. ' He thought that the trend was towards 
time sheets. There was also a cycle in the political year and fees reflected 
that. 'So it's not ... five Ka month. It may be one K one month and eight K 
another. ' Another factor making for uneven payments was the appearance 
of a threat to the client which called for work of '12 or13 K' a month. In these 
circumstances "-.. obviously if the issue merits it, companies will say "never 
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mind, get the result. " ' In normal circumstances, companies would say 'look, 
we want to be kept up to speed on what's happening but we don't want that 
to cost us more than two,, three Ka month. ' In circumstances perceived as 
dire for the client, such as a reference to the Monopolies Commission, fees 
could amount to: E250,000. 'That's probably the top end of anything I've 
earned. ' With an 'average distress' facing a client, he thought the fee would 
be around E10,000 a month. 'Bread and butter' clients paid about E30,000 a 
year. 
Good Relations charged monthly retainers as well as for project work 
'whereby a brief is agreed for a certain amount of activity which may be 
defined in terms of time or by set objective for a fixed fee. -' They also charged 
by hourly rate. The majority of fee was earned by retainer; a 'large minority' 
by project work and "a very small minority' by the hour, with a preference 
not to work by that latter method. Retainers ranged from E1,000 to 'several 
tens of thousands a month. ' 
At the PPU, the fee range was similarly wide. Charles Miller said about a 
recent month that the lowest fee charged was E325 and the highest E28,000. 
Work was either on a retained basis or an ad hoc one. He said '. .. high fees 
are always charged on ad hoc work. That's when you have a Monopolies 
Commission inquiry or a take-over ... and you have to throw people at work 
all hours of the day and night. A lot of writing, a lot of telephoning. That's 
where it clocks up. ' 
The fee charging model operated by PPU was the law firm. The fee rates 
were equivalent to lawyers. 
We have a bulk of people in this company who because of the 
policy of our recruitment would be ranked as junior partner level 
and above in a law firm and they are charged accordingly. And 
we have another tier who would be called researchers or junior 
consultants charged at another level. 
Hourly rates were used. Charles Miller explained: 'All our thinking is done 
by the hour or by quarter of an hour units. Everybody keeps a timesheet... 
We bill our clients monthly as I think all lobbyists do or very occasionally on 
completion of a project. / 
College Hill Associates had a preference for retainer fees 'for commercial 
reasons' and the majority of clients paid on that basis. Tessa Devlin said: 
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Our recommendation in almost all cases would be 'if we are 
retained, then we will constantly be looking out on your behalf .. .' 
Project-based clients are often those that have a specific problem: 
perhaps they're being investigated by the OFT; they're trying to 
avoid being referred ... 
Fees were time based. She explained: 'We certainly keep time sheets and 
client reports ... someone will say "'what on earth did you do that week" and 
you will go "this is exactly what we've done". ' Annual fees for 'a straight 
monitoring account' were E15,000 to E20,000 but 'if it's something with an 
issue that is current and big and is part of somebody's platform, then that 
could reasonably double. But fees are always calculated: it's not something 
that is pulled out of the sky ... We know what our time is worth. We can 
judge by looking at a problem or an issue how much time that will need a 
week. ' 
Another view was critical of the charges made for monitoring, judging them 
to be excessive for the supply of information already in the public domain. 
The same view indicated fees of between; C5,000 and E8,000 for policy advice 
and high level political access. 
Charles Barker was flexible in its fee structure. Evie Soames said: 'We work 
on all those bases - retainer basis; project basis; man hours basis; monthly 
basis; retainer plus man hours during a campaign. All kinds of different 
arrangements because it's an uncertain political life so we can't plan exactly 
our programme and our fees like my colleagues in other disciplines. -- .' But 
the majority of clients were on retainers to which might be added an ad hoc 
project during the Parliamentary session. Fee levels were at the same level as 
those for public relations. 
Another charging principle is success fees. These were a matter of some 
sensitivity inside and outside lobbying circles for it makes an explicit link 
between public policy-making and making money for one of the participants. 
One named respondent said that they worked 'occasionally with a success 
fee attached' but did not want that statement to be attributed. A 
representative body for some lobbyists, the Public Relations Consultants" 
Association (PRCA), bans such fees in its Code of Conduct but respondent 
Peter Moore believed that they are charged 'throughout the industry. ' Evie 
Soames said: 'I know lots of people do. I'm not very keen to do so but I may 
be persuaded to change my mind. ' She reported about opposition to these 
fees that 'a great many of the great and the good are saying that this is 
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perhaps rather a blinkered, old fashioned attitude. ' She would not accept a 
'no foal, no fee" basis of payment: 'I might accept an add-on sweetener but I 
don't think I would try and change minds for nothing. " The PPU respondent 
had 'no compunction at all' about charging success fees but added' --- clients 
rarely want them. ' Tom McNally said that Shandwick do charge them but 
that Hill and Knowlton had not. 
Tessa Devlin added that she was against success fees : 'because it doesn't 
make commercial sense. Does that mean you work for a year towards a goal, 
you take them ... a long way forward and the end result is the Government 
still puts an amendment into a Bill and you don't get paidT 
For Westminster Strategy, Michael Burrell said we don't have success 
fees. ' 
We would not agree to an arrangement whereby we were paid in 
the event of success and not in the event of failure or paid more in 
the event of success because I think there is just a small risk that 
perhaps, particularly younger, junior people might be tempted to 
go beyond what would be appropriate because of the financial 
incentive and I think it's very important to guard against that. 
Fees for lobbyists have been touched on in previous UK academic literature 
on commercial lobbyists but not as extensively as in this thesis. The previous 
references have been indirectly reported as industry averages and not 
attributed to individuals or described as the operating practice of individual 
companies. The data on fee structure above is an extension to the literature. 
The use of success fees also raises a question of appropriateness: is it a matter 
of concern that a player in the public policy process should have a personal 
monetary interest in the outcome of that process? The Westminster Strategy 
respondent raised the question and ruled out success fees as a consequence. 
None of the other informants talking about success fees raised the question. 
Lobbvists: nomenclature and self -perceptions 
The literature review showed (Chapter One, 16-18) a sensitivity by some 
lobbyists if their work was described publicly as public relations or lobbying. 
This sensitivity is reflected in the fieldwork. 
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The most negative reaction to the public relations description was given in a 
non-attributable conversation after an on-the-record interview: 'If you 
describe me as being in public relations, I'll issue a writ. ' It was not clear 
from the context whether irony was being employed. 
But for Fred Morgan of Westminster Advisers "lobbying is very much like 
public relations in the sense that the area is very, very wide. ' For Michael 
Burrell of Westminster Strategy, the question 'are you in public relations' 
was /an extremely arid, pointless debate' with a partial case to be made for 
inclusion and exclusion. For Evie Soames of Charles Barker the 'arid' debate 
was over. 
I used to mind. I used to spend hours in the seventies and the 
early eighties saying 'we're completely different. We must have 
nothing to do with the PRCA. We must have nothing to do with 
the IPR (Institute of Public Relations). We are a completely 
different profession. ' But I think that was all a waste of time. 
We're in the communications business ... I do quite a bit of press 
relations when it's necessary as part of our campaigns. 
The Westminster Communications respondent talked exclusively of the 'role 
of public affairs consultants. ' 
For David Perchard, lobbying was related to and overlapped 'a little bit' with 
public relations. 
We're always very keen not to be described as public relations 
consultants because it implies presentation rather than substance 
and what we're doing involves analysis and a fair amount of 
intellectual contribution. 
David Perchard used the self-descriptor lobbyist 'sometimes but not often. ' 
I don't say that I'm a lobbyist; I say that I am a public affairs 
consultant. However lobbying is one of a number of activities we 
perform as public affairs consultants ... I am a lobbyist in the 
same way that I'm a car driver. It is one of the things that I do. 
Tom McNally of Shandwick was 'most certainly' in public relations and in a 
"specialist part' of it but recognised that some colleagues saw themselves as 
/political counsel. ' He did not object to being called a lobbyist: 'I do not 
spend all my time lobbying. It is one of a number of options open when one 
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advises a client. ' He gave the following example of non-lobbying work: 
telling a client that legislation was inevitable and that it could not be resisted 
or amended. 
The Good Relations respondent gave a qualified answer to the question of 
relationships with public relations: 'yes but again public relations is a slightly 
unsatifactory label for what we do. ' 
He hesitated to call himself a lobbyist and did so 'only when I can't think of 
anything better. ' He thought of himself 'as being a political advocate' but 
recognised one perception of that title as 'a bit pompous. ' The public affairs 
and government relations titles were not 'really entirely satisfactory' either. 
For Martin Smith of GPC, the title 'public policy consultant and government 
relations consultant' is not satisfactory but lobbyist is a term people will 
understand "but it will also have extremely negative connotations. ' 
Charles Miller of the PPU did not call himself a public affairs consultant 
'because I don't know what it means' and was relaxed about calling himself a 
lobbyist ('I don't mind ... I have no pride). He was not in public relations 
but it overlapped: '. .. all lobbying firms that I know use PR. The question is 
whether it's the servant or the master ... PR can be part of lobbying but 
lobbying isn't part of PR. ' 
The brochures issued by the lobbyists for promotional and business 
development purposes were much more coy about using the word 'lobby', if 
they used it at all. There was a wide resort to semi-technical, semi-jargon 
descriptors such as 'public affairs' and 'government relations. ' 
Westminster Advisers was 'a partnership of senior consultants 
specialising in public affairs and government relations work' and bound by 
the Code of Professional Conduct of the IPR. 
'Market Access helped companies do business with Government' in a 
folder entitled The Market Access Public Affairs Group. 
... Westminster 
Strategy is one of Britain's leading specialist 
government, political and media relations firms. ' It also benefited 'from its 
membership of the Grayling Group, one of the United Kingdom's top ten 
public relations organisations. ' 
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'Government Policy Consultants (GPQ is a specialist public affairs 
consultancy' and 'GPC takes public policy and government relations 
consulting seriously as a business. ' Among its services are 'government 
relations advice and assistance including lobbying the UK Goverru-nent and 
(sic) European Community institutions. ' 
Westminster Communications Group had 'Public Affairs and (sic) 
European Community divisions; '. .. all the consultancy specialises in 
integrated public affairs and public relations campaigns. ' 
Good Relations was 'The Leader in British Public Relations for over 25 
years'. It is part of the Lowe Bell Group: 'We specialise in consultancy, 
public relations, government relations, design and advertising. ' 
The Public Policy Unit were 'Political and Regulatory Advisers. ' 
Charles Barker's Public Affairs Groups provides ... consultancy and 
information services on legislation and policies ... ' 
'Shandwick Public Affairs is a specialist company within Shandwick, 
the world's largest public relations consultancy. ' 
Taskforce Communications are 'Consultants in public affairs' and they 
note the 'strong interdependency' between public affairs, public relations 
and media services. 
The print publicity references above clearly indicate a reluctance to ascribe 
the titles 'lobbyist' or 'lobbying' to the work of individuals or of corporate 
bodies in a public way. This hesitation reflects the negative or at least 
ambiguous connotations discussed in the literature. These connotations are 
in common usage (7n) and lead to hesitation by individuals and corporate 
organisations to use titles which would put at risk their social prestige. But 
individuals are content to use 'lobbying' and 'lobbyist' in discussion as 
generic descriptors of their work and of the general field. All respondents in 
the client and lobbyist fieldwork received the research briefing note 
(Appendix One, 215) which only used the descriptor 'lobbying' and none 
queried it. The interview questions were framed in the same way and only 
one respondent refused to discuss her work in its terms; one declared a 
preference for the word 'communicate', and another talked of lobbyists 'to 
use a term which I really don't like very much. ' 
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Conclusion 
This Chapter is part one of an analysis of data from a representative sample 
of individual lobbyists working in London and environs. Their clients were 
mostly in the private sector; usually large plc companies but trade 
associations were also represented. The number of public sector clients was 
largely determined by Government policy towards the sector, especially in 
regard to privatisation, regulation and competition policies. The proportion 
of public sector clients on lobbyists' lists was therefore a fluctuating quantity 
and appeared to be a higher rather than lower quantity at the time of the 
fieldwork (mid-1993), largely because of the local government review. 
Voluntary sector clients were very few. 
Lobbyists preferred clients who bring a substantial matter forward; who 
understand that the political process is unlike business, and who allow their 
agents autonomy. Keeping and getting clients concerned all lobbyists, with 
some lobbyists more active in this business development work than others. 
Those establishing new businesses or re-establishing old ones spent much 
time on this work - up to a third. A variety of business getting techniques 
were used, with referral by satisfied clients to new clients being a favoured 
one. 
There was also variety of fee levels and of fee types in play in the competitive 
market-place for lobbying advice. There was no industry-wide scale and 
lobbyists charged what the market bore. E250,000 had been charged to 
clients facing very threatening circumstances, such as referral to a regulatory 
body: the lowest reported was E325 as a loss leader to get new business. Fees 
were structured by time in year, month, hourly and sub-hourly units; by 
stand-alone project; and by outcome. The latter were known as success fees; 
were fairly widespread and raised a question of propriety: should players in 
the public policy process have a personal monetary interest in the outcome of 
that process. Annual retainers were the favoured fee structure of lobbyists 
but the hourly time sheet was becoming more common. 
Lobbyists had mixed feelings about being called public relations people but 
were nearly always sensitive about being publicly called 'lobbyists'. In print 
they always preferred some other title. They were privately hesitant to self- 
describe themselves with the V word - But they were ready to use it when 
generically and impersonally describing the field. 
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Notes 
The source is Mori, 32 Old Queen St., London, SW1 9HP. Tel: 071222 
0232. 
Non-attributable information given after a recorded interview. 
3. Non-attributable information given after a recorded interview. 
4. The Report states p 14 that the direct cost of their services was; ClOl, 000. 
5. In a letter of October 1,1993 to the author, Mr. Greer said that topics 
covered by this thesis have 'been well covered in many similar projects 
and articles in the past few years. ' In a comment about fees, he added 
that the 'way in which they are agreed is obviously a commercial 
decision on the part of both parties! On October 5, an article appeared 
in the Guardian newspaper on p6 under the headline 'The power and 
prestige of Ian Greer! Its authors were described as profiling 'the 
leading player linking politicans with companies seeking a path to the 
powerful! 
6. The Independent newspaper of August 24,1993, p 4. under the heading 
'Auditors call halt to council campaigns. ' 
7. The editorial on p5 of PR Week, 26 August, 1993 was entitled 'Shed 
light on a shadowy world. It described lobbying as a 'shadowy world' 
and was a call for "greater transparency' in the relationship between 
politicans and lobbyists. It said: 'The word lobbying is rarely seen in 
the press without being preceded by the phrase "shadowy world of. " 
In fact it is taken as read in many quarters that lobbying is, and by its 
very nature will remain, a secretive mechanism by which back door 
deals are constructed. A mythology has been created, with the lobbyist 
as the spider at the centre of a web of whispered intrigue. Yet 
examination of the "abuses" of the system reveal a tiny number of cases 
to cause real concern. ' 
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Chapter Six 
Lobbyists for hire: a profile (part two) 
Introduction 
The focus here remains on the lobbyists but now from the following vantage 
points: what they say they do for clients; a proposed new typology of 
lobbying behaviours; a review of services supplied to clients; self-perceptions 
of relationships with decision-makers, and of giving value for money to 
clients. This is the third of four fieldwork chapters. 
'the cerebral and the arms and legs' -a range of services 
This section examines what lobbyists say they do for clients. The interviews 
offer a detailed, information-rich, 'thick' description of their daily operations. 
This fullness of data has confirmed that there are many discrete activities 
bunched together under the single label lobbying. The literature has stated 
that lobbying can be broken down into separate but linked activities and data 
confirms that disaggregation. 
Chapter Four broke down lobbyists' work into services supplied in response 
to client needs. Another breakdown is suggested by the data in this section: 
the categories lobbying process and lobbying content. As regards process, all 
the respondents said they did a range of separate but linked activities 
(monitoring; gaining access; making representations; policy analysis; support 
work, and media relations) which are grouped here under the single 
descriptor lobbying. None claimed to do an activity which was not done by 
another lobbyist and all demonstrated that they did a range of activities 
common to lobbying. Also there were, in the language of marketing, 'unique 
selling propositions' on offer from individual lobbyists: claims were made of 
presentation expertise, skilled policy analysis, inside knowledge of the 
decision-making system. 
As regards lobbying content (issues and policy), two respondents (David 
Perchard and Charles Miller) claimed pre-client specialist knowledge of these 
and one (Martin Smith) said it was fostered by client demand. The majority 
tendency among respondents was that lobbyists seek clients first and not 
issues and then principally service their process needs. Few commercial 
lobbyists claim to be issue and policy experts 
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Before looking at what the lobbyists say they do, it is worth reviewing the 
issues lobbied about. The overwhelming impression is of a great spread of 
public policies. Included are UK building regulations; deregulation of civil 
aviation in Europe from the point of view of English regional airports; EU 
policy on packaging and on environmental issues; the deregulation of bingo 
advertising; food safety; profile raising for a public sector body likely to be 
privatised; getting nuclear submarine refitting work for Devonport 
Dockyard; working for Plymouth City Council on changes to Parliamentary 
boundaries; local government reform; maintenance of the direct flight 
between Plymouth and Heathrow; running the National Lottery; reform of 
the Sports Council and of the Civil Aviation Authority; British airports 
policy; building a new airport; European aviation policy; planning issues 
involving science parks; rail link to the Channel Tunnel and to Heathrow; 
clearance for food additives (In); the reference of fragrances and of CDs to 
the Monopolies Commission; access to the gas distribution market; de- 
regulation of London buses; the use of 44 ton lorries for access to railheads or 
on all UK roads; Sunday trading options; the future of milk marketing; the 
case for computer game manufacturers in a reference to the Office of Fair 
Trading; photo-sensitive epilepsy and any links with computer games; 
Group Four, their handling of remand prisoners and prison privatisation; 
Crown Estates and consumer matters; a television company explaining the 
impact of new technology; Labour Party corporate tax policy and the two 
types of water company. 
This was the issues background to the generalised question: 'what do you do 
for clients? ' 
For Market Access, Peter Moore said: 
... you start off at the basic 
level with providing a monitoring 
service... Some clients come to you: they want to write to a 
Minister with a problem. You may just have to help them draft a 
letter and put it in the appropriate language and the appropriate 
terms and make it the appropriate length. Sometimes the detail 
that is interesting to them might not be interesting to the Minister 
and would not even make it past the officials into his box for the 
weekend ... Prepare briefs for Members of Parliament, Peers, 
officials on a client's particular case; help to arrange meetings with 
officials, Members of Parliament ... You can advise on 
Parliamentary procedure. 
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Later he added: '. .. you often find yourself just advising clients on the phone 
for anything from five minutes to an hour on a whole range of issues, 
depending on how much they've got to talk to you about... ' 
For Michael Burrell of Westminister Strategy, his organisation offers the long 
menu. Westminster Strategy... is a lobbying company which helps people 
put a case to Government. ' He expanded: 
... from one end, basic monitoring through analysis of the 
significance of that information; to advice on what to do with it; to 
helping to fix meetings; to advising clients on how to handle 
meetings; to going to meetings with clients and interpret what's 
being said to them ... 
He believed that' ... there should be no privileged access for one sector or 
one company as against another. ' Rather than contacts, what Westminster 
Strategy offered to clients was: 
an understanding of how the system worked; who are the 
decision-makers; and when is the right time to make 
representations; what is the best tone of voice to make those 
representations in. So it is about understanding the system and 
how to present to it,, not about contacts. 
For Martin Smith of GPC there was a menu on offer and it had a centrepiece: 
... policy analysis is central to it because unless we understand in 
some detail the client's business and how it relates to trends in 
public policy, we don't feel comfortable in doing the job. It is a 
question of wanting to be confident that we can anticipate, deal 
with anything that might come along. We do also engage in 
lobbying in the sense in which that term is generally understood. 
For example, the Private Members' Bill on the de-regulation of 
bingo advertising was entirely done by this office. That is to say 
we did the analysis; we supervised the drafting of the Bill; we 
lobbied on the Bill; we dealt with the Home Office; we dealt with 
the Gaming Board... 
He developed a three boxes image of the services offered: box A is 
monitoring and intelligence; B is policy analysis, and C is 'representation, 
lobbying' and the latter is 'an activity which we do probably only 15 percent 
of the time and for some clients not at all. I 
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Clients choose their own menu of boxes: 
Some clients will only want box A; they want to know what's 
happening. Some want A and B; they want to know what is 
happening and why it's happening; and some want A, B and C to 
understand it all, know it all and get their oar in somewhere. The 
best clients want all three but some unquestionably only want one. 
A client that only wanted boxes A and B (was) Electricite de 
France during the privatization of electricity. They wanted to 
know what was going on; who the players were; where the policy 
fault lines were; but they did not want anybody to say anything to 
anyone about their interest at all. They certainly didn't want to 
represent their views. 
He favoured 'the development of genuine policy specialisms and the policy 
specialisms that we develop follow the clients. It has to be that way round 
because somebody needs to be paying for us to become the world's leading 
expert on the draft directive on the incineration of hazardous waste ---, 
Later, he added: 
I have one or two people in Brussels who know more about the 
politics of waste and waste management than I would guess 
anybody does, because they spend all their time working on those 
subjects. Every draft directive, every policy statement they are 
absolutely familiar with and also on a country-by-country basis 
could tell you precisely how the the position of Lei Amid della 
Terra varies from Les Amis de la Terre or Friends of the Earth, that 
degree of special knowledge. 
David Perchard Associates also described a menu: 
... the 
first thing that we do is keep abreast of developments in 
whatever field it is we're working on and the most important 
thing is to plough through the endless paper; to talk to decision- 
makers before they're making their decisions so we can give 
people advance notice of what's likely to happen: to summarise all 
of this in as much or as little detail as the clients want ... we have 
somebody who spends a lot of time travelling with the European 
Parliament; attends most meetings of the Environment Committee 
... most meetings of the 
Economic Committee and almost every 
plenary session which keeps us up-to-date with developments ... 
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Tom McNally of Shandwick offered clients 'a variety of activity' and 'the 
basic bread and butter is to monitor activity" in London and 'increasingly' in 
Brussels and Strasbourg. Clients could do this themselves 'but the sheer 
volume of material that comes out of Government needs to be filtered if busy 
executives are not to be swamped. ' Next on offer'is analysis and counsel. " 
Simon Nayyar of Westminster Communications, also offered clients variety 
of service: 
a number of discrete activities... First and foremost intelligence 
gathering. You can't hope to influence the decision-making 
process if you don't know what's happening. Secondly profile 
building: unless an issue or a client and its interests are known or 
understood, one cannot make an effective contribution to the 
policy debate. Opinion forming, putting across the key 
substantive policy issues in a way that is easily assimilated by 
decision-makers who, not least because of their own time 
constraints, will have a very short time frame in which to take in 
the information and indeed often fairly low boredom thresholds. 
And then there is the issue of strategic advice; having gone out in 
the corporate decision-making arena establishing a view on the 
way ahead, identifying the objectives and then offering advice 
about how most effectively to meet them. 
For Westminister Advisers, Fred Morgan said: 
Usually there is a specific problem that they (clients) have (i. e. the 
building regulations). And these come up about every four or five 
years. There's a revision of a section and the potential client might 
be concerned about what's going to happen at the next review; 
might be concerned with what's happened in the last review, and 
will want us to influence the development ... in one respect or 
another. 
He elaborated on how they exercised their influence: 
We do it in a number of ways. First of all attempting to influence 
the civil servant and the Minister. If that proves impossible, 
influencing Members of Parliament and getting pressure put on 
the Ministers by Members of Parliament. 
For Good Relations" Tim Rycroft, the centrepiece of their menu of services 
was familiarity with the decision-making system: 
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We sell our knowledge and expertise at finding our way round the 
political process... it breaks down into the cerebral and the arms 
and the legs... Some clients need us to be their arms and legs. So 
today for a client I am attempting to book accommodation and 
security passes for party conference; to book dining rooms; to send 
out invitations... And then that ranges all the way up ... to 
purely advice and guidance. 
He offered to clients that '. .. I do know the political and Parliamentary 
process very well. " A colleague had policy specialism in the area of food 
safety and European regulations on food additives but: 
I think we would all feel that it's best not to get too drawn into a 
speciality because Good Relations sells its public affairs as being 
broad-based. We don't try to sell ourselves as being specialists in 
any particular area and ... one of the tasks of a consultant is to be 
able to assimilate a client's business and to understand it very 
quickly and to deal with it. 
For the PPU's Charles Miller: 
They [clients] want to find out what's going on inside the system 
... Second thing is putting cases together... Third is advice on 
advocacy: in other words how do we go about winning this case 
or actually acting as advocates, negotiating with Whitehall, with 
Members of Parliament. The putting together of cases and the 
negotiation side as distinct from advice on strategy are ... areas 
where we are nearly unique. The common law (of lobbying) is 
that advisers should advise. That's largely grown out of the fact 
that lobbyists ... haven't become experts on particular subject 
areas whereas there are some now in our profession who're real 
experts in aviation, in local government, in energy, whatever; who 
are speaking sense when they advocate a case on a client's behalf. 
Charles Miller argued that all lobbying firms 'would say they have an 
emphasis rather than a speciality. ' He added: 
Our emphasis is away from pure Parliamentary work. It's on 
balance ... getting at the system where the system makes the 
decisions rather than letting the tail wag the dog all the time... 
You go where the problems and the decisions are. 
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Evie Soames of Charles Barker said her work was '. .. a mixture of 
campaigning; lobbying; information; intelligence; advice, contacts; analysis of 
political developments, forthcoming legislation' and split equally between 
London and Brussels. 
For the unnamed respondent, lobbying was 'getting the right message into 
the right ear at the right time and we can advise on that. ' He did not see his 
role as a direct, face-to-face advocate for a company: rather a facilitator. He 
gave the example of a client who was interested in running the National 
Lottery: 
They feel they're best suited to do it so we are involved in 
advising them on the political implications of actions they may 
take, have taken, want to take. Should they be involved meeting 
people other than those they have already seen? What should 
they say to them? And arranging meetings, arranging dinners, 
breakfasts, whatever it happens to be. Writing letters, drafting 
letters to go to Ministers. 
He recounted the work of a colleague who kept a 'watching brief' for a client 
who faced queries about health issues related to children. So that colleague 
'will be writing letters to MPs and countering things said in the press. ' 
For Tessa Devlin of College Hill Associates, her work was also a range: 
If we use as an example the work that I do for this [water related] 
trade association ... in the first instance we keep abreast of 
whatever's happening and that would include keeping in contact 
with the Government ... sponsoring department; with MPs; with 
any political manoeuvring within the political parties; and 
certainly with the regulators. It's maintaining relationships with 
people so when the DOE has a question or a politician has a 
question, they think 'ah, who was that person who helped? ' and 
they come to the water companies for answers. And that positions 
our client as an adviser to Government. 
The above data emphaises the multiplicity and diversity of the activities 
done under the single descriptor lobbying. No respondent ruled out doing 
any of the activities of lobbying: their work is client-led and they will service 
client needs. They let clients 'pick 'n mix' from the range of activities 
offered. They are professional advisers in the sense that they have a 
principal and agent relationship with clients and work to the latter in a 
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structured relationship of query/ advise/ agree action. But most of the data 
suggested work which is focused on lobbying processes rather than on 
content. By and large, commercial lobbyists are not experts on issues and 
policy. 
This emphasis flows from the logic of the market-place in which lobbyists are 
hired. Being businesses, it is sensible - as homo economicus - to offer services 
that appeal to a maximum of potential clients. All clients do not face the 
same issues but they all face the same decision-making process in the UK and 
EU. Lobbyists for hire can therefore maximise their span of potential clients 
through process expertise rather than issue and policy expertise. 
The balance of the data also suggested that most lobbyists worked behind 
their clients as background advisers and not mainly as their public 
representatives. This follows, arguably, from the process emphasis because 
the substance of public representation of a client is issue and policy matters. 
backgrounder and foregrounder types 
The data also suggested another related conclusion: that although lobbyists 
do not rule any type of activity out, they tend to work around a particular 
cluster of activities rather than another. They do not exhibit work 'no-go' 
areas but they do have work preferences. These clusters can be further 
thought of as Weberian ideal types, defined as conceptually pure types of 
rational action (Hughes; 93). No actual lobbyist copies all the behaviours of 
the type but many lobbyists copy a number of them, albeit in somewhat 
degraded form. Lobbyists can also be expected to have behaviours 
recognisable of more than one type. 
Conceptualisation of the data suggests two ideal types of lobbyist. 
the backgrounder type: working as the unseen adviser; monitoring 
corporate and official documents in the passive sense of spotting references 
and issues; giving policy-making sovereignity to the client and offering 
marginal comments on policy; drafting documents which the client will then 
send on to decision-makers: suggesting to the client who the relevant cast of 
decision-makers is; perhaps effecting the introduction of the client but then 
not being present at representations with decision-makers; giving advice that 
is about processes; comfortable with minimal autonomy vis-a-vis the client: 
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the foregrounder type: working as the visible adviser; a policy expert; 
already critically monitoring the external environment as part of their own 
views on public policy; offering their policy expertise as a resource to refine 
or even create client policy; ready to represent the client publicly and alone 
to decision-makers; ready to run public campaigns via the mass media; 
comfortable with maximum autonomy vis-a-vis the client. 
The backgrounder is less visible to participants and observers of the policy- 
making process than the foregrounder: the former is more reactive to clients, 
the latter more proactive. 
It is not implied that one of these types is precedent, more influential or 
superior in any way over the other. Which behaviour a lobbyist employs and 
whether he 'borrows' from both types is contingent on a number of factors to 
do with performance in a particular set of circumstances. This Chapter has 
shown, for example, in the data from Westminster Strategy and the PPU that 
a lobbying exercise can include little advice on policy but strong, pro-active 
advice on presentation; or strong advice on policy but none on mass media 
campaigns. Secondly, commercial lobbyists can propose behaviour but 
clients decide. Also, the social context in which the two types are used as an 
interpretative device is critical. For example, the lobbyist can be very active 
with the client in policy development and thus of the foregrounder type but 
be nearly invisible to the decision-maker. The latter is a combination of 
lobbying behaviour explored in the next Chapter, p 182-186. 
The fieldwork presented in this research offers examples of behaviour which 
fit the two ideal types above and in its totality is the empirical foundation for 
the conceptualisation. Such a conceptualisation hopefully offers a tool for 
more fully understanding the subjective data collected from social actors 
called lobbyists and any added understanding is the reason for the 
conceptual development. But it must be stressed that these ideal types 
cannot be used as benchmarks for counting respondents under the umbrella 
of one or other type. Ideal types are not constructs in the same 
epistemological category as data. Instead, they are conceptual tools which 
offer patterns for discriminating amongst lobbying behaviours described in 
the next two sections in terms of services lobbyists offer. 
Gaining access to and making representations to decision-makers 
Access to decision-makers is defined here as the capacity of clients to reach 
the relevant decision-makers with oral and written messages on public issues 
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affecting them. They can do this independently as the self-reliant clients in 
Chapter Four, 84-88 demonstrated but the focus here is access for clients 
mediated by their lobbyists. Two aspects of access should be singled out: a) 
oral and written messages and b) identifying the right decision-makers in the 
public policy process. It should not be assumed that posting or faxing 
messages is an easier operation than speaking them. In either case, the 
necessary condition for success is transmitting to the right receiver. But the 
general preference by UK decision-makers for an opaque cover over the 
locus of decision-making makes finding both oral and written routes 
somewhat problematical. Nor should it be assumed that a face-to-face 
meeting is more persuasive than a well-drafted sheet of A4. The data below 
illuminates these points. 
Making representations is defined here as the persuasive presentation of a 
client's case in person, by proxy or by document to the relevant decision- 
maker. Again it should not be assumed that representations in person are 
more effective than representations by document. Effectiveness lies in the 
cogency of the represented case in policy and in political terms: the delivery 
vehicle is secondary as the observation above about what goes into a 
Minister's weekend box illustrates (see 129). 
Although conceptually, access and making representations can be separated 
in part (the focus for access is discovering the right recipient for message 
delivery: the focus for representation is delivery of a persuasive case), they 
actually overlap in lobbying practice and are treated jointly here. The 
commonalities can be identified as a shared focus on right message content; 
right form, whether written or spoken and right timing. This section treats 
both commonalites and differences together on the grounds that the data 
shows that the two concepts are often operationally fused into a sequence of 
acts. For example, clients write persuasive letters, drafted by their lobbyist, 
to civil servants identified by their lobbyist; clients walk into the rooms of a 
Minister or of a civil servant identified by their lobbyist and speak a 
persuasive case shaped by their lobbyist; doing both at a time chosen for 
impact. Another example of fusion is when the lobbyist meets the decision- 
maker by chance or socially and speaks for the client. 
The analysis below shows up the access and representations work of hired 
lobbyists and illustrates backgrounder and foregrounder behaviour analysed 
above (135-136). 
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Fred Morgan of Westminster Advisers illustrated access/ representations 
fusion: 
Seeking to influence the Conservative backbench committee, we 
would find out who's who in that committee. We would assess 
how sympathetic or unsympathetic they are. We would have a 
look at the biographies of the members of that committee. We 
would talk to the client about that committee. We would then 
write to the secretary of that committee and seek to persuade them 
to give the client the opportunity to address that committee. 
Would he describe his role as a backroom one? 
I would not say always backroom boys but that's where we would 
prefer to be ... there are different styles. You might go to another 
lobbying company and they tend to be front men. Certainly my 
predeliction is to remain in the background. 
Tim Rycroft of Good Relations shared this backgrounder preference: 
Our approach is always that it is better that the client should do it 
themselves [fix up meetings] even if they do it on the basis of a 
draft that we prepared and told them where to send it; how to 
send it and when to send it. It is a general rule of public affairs 
that people who run the political process prefer to be dealt with 
direct rather than through intermediaries. However, there are 
times when clients want us to do it for them or aren't able to do it 
themselves and in those circumstances we will do it 
He was ambivalent about ease of access: 'It isn't easy; whether that means it 
is hard, I'm not sure. ' He noted that it was easier in the EU to the point that 
the Commission '. .. looks much more favourably on the input which 
lobbyists can give. ' 
The Commission ... will often hold hearings on new policy 
initiatives and invite interested parties along to come and tell 
them what they think and it's much easier to do it that way than 
have to fight one's way through layers of bureaucracy to find the 
decision-makers to make the case to them. So I suppose in that 
sense (of a UK/EU comparison) ... access is difficult ... but it 
isn't a major obstacle because the vast majority of decision-makers 
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in the end would like to make their decisions on the basis of being 
well informed as opposed to being ill-informed. And there is 
usually ... a way to get information to them. 
Another view of access as relatively easy was because Ministers were friends 
in many cases and a former Cabinet Minister was available as a channel for 
the highest level contacts. For Market Access's Peter Moore, access was also 
not a problem: 'access is surprisingly easy really: if you've got a good case; if 
you've a genuine reason to go with it. ' 
Now if we've got a client that doesn't have a legitimate reason to 
approach a Minister or an official, we would tell them 'look, go 
back and do your homework and then come back and then we can 
tell you what to do. ' 
He described some access work as 'preventative medicine stopping them 
(clients) going in at the wrong level or making sure they go in at the right 
level. ' He described a backgrounder scenario: 
... I would say that a huge proportion of our work, does not 
involve going in and seeing a Minister. It might make a Minister 
aware of what you're on about if you're into the Minister with an 
inappropriate message. Then you just find that your work's 
counter-productive; so you either advise against it or you avoid it 
and you only use their time if you judge that it's an appropriate 
and relevant issue for them. 
He said that 'We might arrange [a meeting] if the client wasn't confident to 
do it themselves and didn't have the phone number or something ... just 
because it was easier to do that. ' 
For example, the respondent's managing director was an ex-civil servant: 
so it's just logical, sensible and easier for him to do it ... knowing his way 
round the department and its various ways. ' 
He added that some lobbyists will see Ministers independently of clients: 
a lot of lobbying companies will have occasional dinners or lunches or 
breakfasts ... to which they will invite a Minister along and just go through a 
round robin of issues that they know are going to come up at some point. ' 
For Westminster Strategy, Michael Burrell estimated that 'of our current 
client list, about ten per cent perhaps would not use us for access: so the 
other 90 per cent would. ' He amplified: 
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... clients are very proud and therefore routinely, particularly at 
the beginning of a relationship, they will say 'oh we meet Cabinet 
Ministers everyday of the week: dont need any help on that thank 
you. ' And pretty routinely one discovers that that's a load of old 
codswallop and even it it isn't ... they are meeting the wrong 
people. Fine, by all means have a drink with a Cabinet Minister 
but actually, without going overboard on this subject, it is 
generally the civil servants who are more important or it's maybe 
the junior Ministers who are more important; or maybe it's a 
different department or set of departments from the ones that 
naturally occur to the client. 
Fixing up meetings was a 'routine part of the job', he said. About the 
personnel at these meetings: 
I guess there are three basic possibilities. There's the client going 
in by themselves; there's us going with the clients, or there's us 
going in by ourselves. And the vast majority of cases would be 
the middle one of those ... The client and us going in together: 
the client on the whole making the case; us listening hopefully 
with a degree of sophistication and ready to intervene if - as does 
happen very occasionally - the client completely dries up. There 
are some clients who prefer to go in by themselves. As for us 
going it by ourselves, it really depends what you mean. I think we 
would very rarely have a formal meeting where we were formally 
putting the case on behalf of someone else but we would every 
day of the week bump into contacts and have a chat about things 
and one of the things one would talk about is one's clients. 
He estimated that 60% of his firm's lobbying time was spent with civil 
servants and 40% with politicians: 
It does slightly vary over time. In other words, you might spent 
more time with MPs where the Government has a small majority 
than you would where the Government has a large majority. But 
most of the work we're involved in is detail ... MPs simply don't 
have the time to get to grips with detail even if they have the 
inclination or the interest, so mostly you are dealing with civil 
servants in particular areas... In very many cases the media will 
also be an important part of the equation. 
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This reference to the size of the Government's majority is supportive of the 
'fragile majorities' concept: small majorities imply a concentration of 
lobbying effort on Parliament and increased workloads for lobbyists as 
clients sense that they are more likely to win concessions. 
Getting access was 'relatively easy' for Tessa Devlin of College Hill 
Associates but: 
It's dependent on giving them (decision-makers) enough 
information at the start so that they think that you're not going to 
waste time and it's using a number of different mechanisms and 
possibly phrases when you open the door, so that you're 
comfortable with them and you don't offend them and then you 
work within the protocol or hierarchy that the Civil Service have. 
Who made representations was a matter of judgement but there was clear 
preference for the client to do so: 
I maintain firmly that no one sells the client's issue with client's 
objective as well as the client. I can know the brief backwards and 
I still won't do the same justice because I haven't spent my life 
working on that particular issue. So I always recommend that the 
client is there. There are some occasions like a presentation in 
front of a backbench committee where there are so few committee 
members that I would send in the client alone but ... I would 
have prepared their brief and vetted it and scrutinised what they 
were about to say and wait in the corridor for them. 
She estimated that 60% of representations were client and her together; 30% 
client alone, and ten per cent her alone. She arranged the meetings with 
decision-makers. Contact with Ministers was the least frequent: it was then 
equally split between officials and Parliamentarians, including Peers. But 
how are the relevant decision-makers identified? 
.. the majority, of course, I would 
know by books and by 
reputation. Civil servants that cover areas for which my clients 
are interested I would know personally through the work I've 
done for them. But in all cases, I would say it's not a personal 
connection that carries a client's issue forward. It's a solid 
information: it's getting the person who wants to hear you. Of 
course, if you happen to know Michael Portillo, then great. 
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Tom McNally pointed out the converse: that Government wanted to know 
the thinking of large companies. He said: '. .. I always point out that most 
companies have the right of access simply by their size or their capabilities. 
He saw the amount of access he could arrange as part of his professional 
capital and his firm had a 'rolling programme' of hospitality for Ministers, 
civil servants and senior journalists. When representations were made 'most 
often I would advise clients to go on their own, having being well prepared 
by us. ' Preparation included 'everything from media training ... to 
preparing a chief executive for the kind of fast ball he might receive in front 
of a televised Select Committee. ' He thought that the lobbyist alone making 
the representations caused 'resentment on the part of the recipient. ' 
David Perchard had a more foregrounder approach. It has been described 
above how his staff attend the EU Environment Committee and track 
developments on packaging issues. 'More time is spent speaking to 
legislators on (clients') behalf than arranging meetings. ' These direct 
representations flowed from the firm's specialist knowledge which allowed 
them to say to clients: 'this is what is going on; this is why you should care 
about it and this is what we suggest you do about it. ' This was specialist 
knowledge conferring lobbying power and was in contradistinction to the 
generalist who could only say to the client: 'this is what is going on: isn't it 
interesting. ' 
Access in Brussels and Strasbourg is 'not difficult. ' He explained: '... all 
you've got to do is find out the right telephone numbers and there's endless 
directories to encourage you to do that. .. ' 
But in some circumstances, he introduced clients directly to decision-makers. 
He said: 
We tend to wheel in the clients in two ways. Sometimes we 
organise a guided tour of Brussels, occasionally Strasbourg, so that 
the client can meet a number of people whose work affects them 
and get a first hand feel for what it's about. At other times we will 
want to deliver a particular message at a particular time and it's 
always much more persuasive if it comes out of the client's mouth 
because he's got all the detail and information to hand. Hes got 
the passion for his particular case. 
142 
Charles Miller implied that access for the PPU was not a problem as its 
employees came from Government and that such a background was 'a basic 
pre-requisite for joining the company. ' Something over 50% of 
representations were done by the PPU alone or with the client present. 
Explaining this balance, he said: 
Many [clients] are highly professional and [its] just for you to give 
them the information they need in order to help them to do their 
job better: but an awful lot of them are trained to do other things 
and simply dont have the experience or ability or the confidence 
to put over a case well. 
Both Perchard Associates and PPU claimed policy expertise (a foregrounder 
characteristic) and it is noteworthy that they do significant amounts of direct 
representation themselves with decision-makers. Depth of subject 
knowledge allowed a lobbyist to hold his own vis-a-vis a decision-maker. As 
David Perchard said about lobbyists emphasising a service in access rather 
than in policy knowledge: ". .. once you've delivered the party line, you 
haven't got any supplementary conversation because you don't know 
enough about the business. ' The GPC respondent also claimed policy 
knowledge but did not emphasise representing clients alone. 
For Simon Nayyer of Westminster Communications, access was a "very 
detailed, very sophisticated analysis of not only decision-making processes 
but MPs ... officials and a whole raft of other decision-makers .. .' 
Representation was 'a very flexible combination' of all three variants - client 
alone; lobbyist alone, or both together. But the necessary condition for any 
successful representation was the case: 'unless you have a well founded case 
there is no point going out to talk to decision-makers. It is a waste of their 
time and a waste of your own. ' 
A flexible approach to representations (with both foregrounder and 
backgrounder characteristics) was also the way of Evie Soames of Charles 
Barker: 
No norm, depending upon the relationship of the client or 
depending upon our knowledge of that particular industry and 
depending upon standing. On some subjects, on some industries, 
on some trade associations, we are known as the representative so 
we go and see the officials and the officials will ask to see us. On 
other times, like the big corporate clients ... it might not be 
appropriate for us to be at the meeting. 
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Access was not a problem: more problematic was whom to access and the 
general political balance of power when access was gained. She said: 
If we're trying to reshape a White Paper or heavily involved in the 
consultative process ... it's obviously the officials who are the 
target ... much more time is spent with officials, with the 
departments than with Parliament because Parliamentary 
lobbying is ... not usually productive. But of course 
(Parliamentary lobbying) is a bit more productive now for the 
threat of a rebellion is much more of a powerful weapon than it 
has been for a long time; so we will be doing more in Parliament 
in this next session... (because) if one's hoping to stop a 
department in their tracks over something that one finds is ... 
going to be detrimental to the client interest, ... one more 
productive route now is to go via some MPs so that they might 
flag up some opposition. 
Whom to access was also more problematical for the anonymous informant 
He said: 
rather than approach every MP on an issue, we use knowledge 
that we pick up in our daily reading of Hansard or by using the 
reference books that are available in every library to say 'who 
really has an influence and can bring pressure to bear on this 
issueT And therefore we may target 25 people rather than 250, 
only those with a direct interest. Now because youve already 
filtered out those that are more likely to be interested in the 
subject, youre more likely to have a sympathetic hearing. What's 
also important is the level at which the approach is made. It is 
probably more important for the chairman of a company to see a 
Cabinet Minister than for a senior manager. A board member you 
can argue either way... The big constraint is time and who the 
Ministers are prepared to see and the specific interest they've 
taken on individual issues. 
His backgrounder preference was not to represent the client directly: '. -. we 
feel that the strength of representation is diluted by it coming through a third 
party' and 'we're more likely to mention things in passing rather than act as 
the advocate ourselves. ' He added: 'We will advise and probably go in with 
but we're not the expert. ' 
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Lobbyists. clientý and policy 
The data indicated that 12 of the respondents gave policy-advice to clients, 
advice on either their corporate policy and/or the relevant public policies. 
But how does this square with only three commercial lobbyists claiming 
issue and policy expertise? In reply, several points need to be considered. 
Policy advice is a sensitive activity in that policy is the key variable in 
lobbying, the subject of attention by all players. In an advisory relationship, 
the rewards and risks of giving good or bad advice are high with the explicit 
consequence of work continuing or work diminishing. But commercial 
lobbyists describe themselves as being in the general category of corporate 
advisers; and in terms of their own marketability to clients and their own 
prestige vis-a-vis competitors such as lawyers, they have to offer a policy 
advice service. Yet the data indicated that lobbyists are generally wary of 
giving policy advice, except for a minority who explicitly present themselves 
as policy experts. Generally, the advice they give to clients is more often 
about lobbying processes. Secondly, this bias is added to by the difficulty of 
separating out policy advice and presentational advice -a difficulty also met 
in Chapter Four, 90-92. The foregrounder/backgrounder typology (135-136 
above) helps, however, in understanding the separation. 
The Westminster Strategy informant made the case for separation but 
showed the difficulties: 
There is a very fuzzy line between presentation and policy and it's 
hard to say really when one is advising on one and advising on 
the other. A lot of the time we are asked to draft papers or 
comment on the client's drafts and very often we are asked to help 
on policy in the sense that a client will say 'my objective is' or "my 
preferred point of arrival is' and we will say 'well it maybe that 
that is just politically out of the question; you're not going to get 
that but you might be able to achieve this; now that's not exactly 
what you want but it's quite close to it. ' It tends to be a dialogue 
on policy but they are the experts on their policy and we are the 
experts on presentation and that really is the broad dividing line. 
it would be entirely inappropriate for us to be setting policy for 
major plcs or indeed a range of other institutions but entirely 
appropriate to offer advice on how those policies should be 
presented. 
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Simon Nayyar also noted the inextricable mixture in practice of policy 
analysis and presentation and said their role stretched over both: 
'presentation comes atop the analysis. ' He defined the firm's offering to 
clients as a series of functions including strategic advice where this was 
'having gone out into the political market place ... having identified key 
issues and objectives and having made a significant contribution, hopefully 
in one's own right, to that evolving policy debate. ' The implication is the 
lobbyist influences the client's policy and that influences the public policy 
debate. 
The Market Access respondent implied that his advice to clients could 
amount to a veto on presentation of their policy to decision-makers: "if we've 
got a client that doesn't have a legitimate reason to approach a Minister or an 
official, we would tell them! 
The difficulties of separating out advice on policy and on tactics/ 
presentation were also underlined by the College Hill Associates' informant 
who advised on both. Tessa Devlin said: 
any time that the client would be thinking about putting a 
statement, I would review that statement and say 'if you say this, 
this will be the implication. If we turn it around and phrase it in 
another way or bring in another point, then this will be what you 
accomplish ... Will this rile the Labour Party? Will this actually 
bring them on side and give you a further network to use in 
furthering associationsT 
For her, policy and tactics are: 
so closely entwined it's difficult to differentiate because tactics are 
applied to absolutely every policy decision. So policies can 
change and be tweaked to ensure they carry through the right 
message. And I don't think that is a bastardisation of a company's 
policy. I think it actually helps because often people in an 
industry don't see what they're saying. 
For the GPC respondent, policy analysis was an explicit part of their service 
in the sense of analysis of public policy in areas of client interest. Martin 
Smith (in line with David Perchard) wanted input into client policy and 
looked for clients 'that are keen for us to work with them on policy analysis 
as part of their internal corporate affairs activity! He added: 
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in other words not a bolt-on, not a sort of who-do-we-need-to- 
meet, who-do-we-need-to-send-an-annuaI report-to but very 
much part of their internal long-term planning for the future, 
being part of a team which helps them to form a view ... 
The Good Relations respondent linked monitoring (a lobbying process) to 
policy advice. He went through document cuttings every morning. 'I will 
then fax them to the client or ring up the client and say "there's something 
here that I think is important and this is what I think you ought to do about 
it. " ' The same link between monitoring and advice was made by the PPU- 
Its informant Charles Miller distinguished between monitoring as 'ex-post 
facto summaries" and 'detailed pro-active intelligence gathering' with his 
firm specialising in the latter. Another policy input was via '. .. putting cases 
together: that's anything from vetting the arguments that clients have put 
together to starting de novo, handling economic research, market research. ' 
Charles Barker also linked monitoring, analysis and advice in that reporting 
public policy events to clients involved 'a certain amount of analysis. ' The 
same link was made by the anonymous respondent: ... seeing a paper 
coming out of a think tank helps you know what is going on but it is actually 
monitoring as well. ' 
For Tom McNally of Shandwick, 'analysis and counsel' lay the other side of 
monitoring events for a client and meant 'that you are at a senior level 
influencing the company's response to political and Governmental policy 
and indeed in a quite legitimate way helping to influence that policy" where 
policy could be either the clients' or the Government's. 
'12art of the machinery of government almost' = 
lobbyists' 12ercel2tions of relationshil2s with decision-makers 
It is clear from the data below, which is new in the UK literature, that the 
subject matter under investigation here is plural: there are relations 1s of Wp 
varying quality and these relationships vary because of a number of 
identified factors in the data. Those factors, given by respondents about their 
own behaviour and about their perceptions of decision-makers' behaviour, 
are: inter-personal chemistry; departmental attitudes; length of the 
relationship; frequency of contact; mutual benefit through information 
exchange; perceived competence of the lobbyist; disclosure or not of their 
clients by lobbyists; perceptions of lobbyists' knowledge; the party politics of 
politicans; the perception of lobbyists by decision-makers as closely involved 
with Government; the perception of lobbyists as profiting from information 
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given by officials. These factors appeared in the data with differing 
frequencies but the most recurring (Westminster Strategy; Market Access; 
Perchard; Westminster Communication; Good Relations; Charles Barker; the 
unnamed respondent; College Hill Associates and Shandwick) was the claim 
that lobbying provided mutual benefits to the public policy process. 
The literature review had revealed some work on the perceptions of 
decision-makers about that relationship but there was no picture, only the 
lightest of sketches. Now the data here has painted a picture of variable and 
mixed attitudes and behaviours. 
Fred Morgan found positive responses: 'Certainly as far as Westminster is 
concerned, I personally find that everybody accepts the lobbyist as part of the 
machinery of Government almost and there doesn't appear to be any 
antagonism or concern whatsoever. ' The same smooth passage was 
experienced by Simon Nayyar for the following reasons: 
... we are absolutely transparent about who our clients are and 
what their interests are and I think we serve, certainly MPs, a 
thoroughly useful and helpful role. We can significantly cut down 
on their mailbags and help to shape and model issues into their 
quintessence ... And the point ... helps significantly to reduce the 
amount of time that MPs have to devote to an issue because we 
have already helped a client to focus ... arguments. 
For Peter Moore, the quality of relationship depended on personalities but 
also 'an element of ... departmental psychology comes into it. ' 
There are certain ... departments and areas that 
have a thing 
about lobbying or lobbyists but generally it depends on the 
individual. There are people that you will hear any lobbyist worth 
their salt say 'Oh God, not so and so'... because they have got an 
attitude problem about lobbying 
These attitude problems extended to civil servants and Ministers: about 
numbers, 'you're tempted to say one in fifteen/ twenty people... ' The 
difficulty was exacerbated when the lobbyist was specialising. Then "you'll 
find yourself coming back to the same group of people. So even though 
there might only be one awful person in twenty, he's the awful person who 
have to deal with all the time. ' 
But the majority attitude is 'not a problem". He added: 
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... it"s not an issue even ... so long as Ministers have their code of 
conduct in mind; MPs have their responsibilities to constituents 
and their constitutional responsibilities are minded; as long as 
lobbyists don't overstep the mark in terms of what they do to 
achieve clients' end, then no, it generally isn't an issue. 
He noted that there was 'slightly more doubt on the Labour side because 
it's seen as a big business thing, private sector dominated. ' Overall he 
argued mutual benefit to lobbyists and lobbied: 
when you get plugged in seriously to a particular policy 
community ... there are people to avoid but you also know there 
are an awful lot of people who are lobbyable, open to an approach 
as long as it's a legitimate approach and a relevant approach and 
are perfectly glad, not least MPs. They're more than happy to 
receive briefing or advice and again the messages go both ways. 
Its not just about us trying to get information out of them ... we 
can often pass on useful messages from departments as often 
happens; you know 'tell so and so to cool it on such and such. ' 
And you can do that quite usefully and everybody avoids a nasty 
public mess ... money isnt spent on administrative and other 
arrangements to get to a stage where there's only going to be a 
problem anyway. 
He elaborated the mutual benefits: 
There are clauses mis-drafted in legislation all the time by accident 
or oversight ... that would cripple or seriously 
damage 
commercial or other interests. And it's often a matter of just 
pointing those out ... even if they're going to stick to the 
principle. 
Mutual benefit was also invoked by Michael Burrell. The alliance of client 
policy knowledge and lobbyist presentational skills 'strengthens the quality 
of representations. " If that alliance was effective: 
that should lead to decision-makers receiving presentation either 
oral or written that are clearer, crisper, more to the point, less 
ambiguous, less time-wasting ... 
Evie Soames of Charles Barker detected a party political difference of 
reaction: ". -- there's not much criticism now in the Conservative Party. 
There's still some lingering remnants of the Labour Party who feel that we 
149 
are sort of parasites and that what we are providing for large companies, 
individuals and the voluntary sector can't afford... there is that sort of 
argument that occasionally gets raised but not by all that many people. ' 
She developed the theme of involvement with Government: 
I think most people realise that we're a kind of fact of life and the 
more there is open government and the more there is consultation, 
which are the Government's objectives after all, the more they 
know they're going to need companies, trade associations, 
commercial interests ... like ourselves to help them. 
She thought that civil servants 'on the whole' were as accepting as politicans. 
An anecdote: ' An awfully nice Under-Secretary I spoke to yesterday, I 
couldn't believe how outspoken he was 'cos he wasn't somebody I knew at 
all well beforehand. ' But a problem area for the hired lobbyist could be 
replying to detailed questions: 'It's just occasionally ... you feel you aren't 
the person; that if it's going to become a technical discussion, then they might 
just as well discuss it with a technician. ' 
The anonymous respondent also made a political analysis. About MPs, 'there 
are some who wouldn't touch them [hired lobbyists] with a barge pole. ' 
With civil servants 'there is a range of reactions': 
some civil servants regard lobbyists as stepping on their territory; 
developing policy; trying to make decisions that they should 
properly take. Other civil servants recognise that the lobbyists 
very often can fulfill a vital function. You already filter out those 
interested in an issue, knowing through experience and 
background perhaps what the civil servant wants to see. Not in 
the sense of what is the answer they want: but how can they 
process a piece of information. You can provide that a lot quicker 
and a lot easier. They recognise that companies or individuals 
have a legitimate interest and two pages of well reasoned brief are 
far better than being sent out to seek information ... 
This respondent also noted a departmental dimension to attitudes. As 
between the reaction of politicians and officials, he judged the latter 'more 
favourable but it can depend on the department. ' He said 'the Treasury gets 
many submissions before budgets and probably regards everybody as a 
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pest. ' Stressed elsewhere was an ideological compatibility with decision- 
makers, reinforced by personal friendships and previously established 
working relationships. 
Martin Smith of GPC thought that the perceived competence of lobbyists and 
the disclosure of interests by them influenced the attitudes of decision- 
makers. On the first: ". .. a civil servant will not be as impressed by the 
clients we've got ... but by whether we sound as if we know what we're 
talking about. ' On disclosure, he gave the example of representing a regional 
transport authority to a civil servant while having British Rail as a client and 
not disclosing that fact when the conversation was about funding the 
Channel Tunnel rail link: 'there would be an element of failure to disclose 
there which that civil servant might well be expected to see as material in 
assisting him or her to decide how much to tell us. ' He operated rules of 
disclosure in dealing with decision-makers. 
David Perchard estimated that the three people in his firm were in contact 
with a 'couple of hundred' decision-makers in the UK and in the EU, 
including 10-15 contacts in both the German and French Environment 
Ministries. Attitudes varied. 
The moment you talk to decision-makers for the first time, if they 
don't know you, they don't know the company, they are usually 
suspicious and I would say rightly so. The important thing is to 
demonstrate straightaway that we have knowledge in the subject 
and that we are in the business of information exchange rather 
than a suction pump. As the relationships progress it becomes 
that much easier. We are always very keen to be regarded as 
insiders rather than outsiders. Pat (Perchard staff member) has a 
great and general interest in public policy and she's the one 
person who has a background which is entirely in politics in the 
public sector. And she can take part in the gossip on equal terms 
with them and they know that she is a good source of information 
on packaging policy issues. 
Several MEPs had consulted him over the European Parliament's report on 
the packaging directive and 'we had one MEP who asked us actually to draft 
some proposals for him. " 
The respondent drew a picture of involvement with policy development. 
His firm took part in the UK Government's re-cycling advisory group 1989/ 
1991; and the DTI had been a client of the firm. With the latter, ". -- we. have 
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the kind of relationship with them where they know that if they phone up for 
a bit of insight into the way the industry is thinking or the way things 
happen, then they will get something which is fairly reliable. ' The European 
Parliament had also asked him to make a presentation at a hearing on the 
environment. 
He added about the DTI: 
They also know that if they don't want to make fifty phone calls 
but want to get an idea into circulation, if they tell us then we will 
tell a lot of other people unless we're especially asked not to. So 
that's the kind of relationship that we like. We want to be the oil in 
the wheels of the machine to help Government and industry 
understand each other better. 
Tim Rycroft of Good Relations believed that with decision-makers 'there is a 
general suspicion about intermediaries, which is understandable, which is 
why we advise our clients to do things directly. ' He expanded: 
We always approach these people (decision-makers) from the 
point of view of sayingwell, they have a job to do and how do we 
approach them in a way that will help them get their job done. ' 
For example if a civil servant is putting together a paper for a 
Minister, the civil servant is aware that he or she will have to 
include some information on the other side of the case... Now by 
providing that information in a way that we know is useful to the 
civil servant, we're helping him or her to get the job done. And so 
while youre not always going to be welcomed warmly for what 
you're doing ... if you approach it in the right way, you usually 
get a very businesslike response. 
He asserted that one disadvantage of a lobbyist being a subject specialist was 
dealing with the same group of decision-makers and '. .. it may mean that 
they just get more and more irritated with you constantly phoning up and 
telling them different things. ' 
Tessa Devlin also reported some civil servant hostility but in the context of 
an estimated 90% being 'helpful': 
sometimes you find civil servants who don't want to speak to you 
because they think that you're a consultant and they are giving 
you their intelligence for which you are charging and making a 
profit. I did have one chap on the phone who said 'alright ... so 
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you're going to sell what I tell you and you don't know anything 
about it. ' And my response was 'if you think your job would be 
made better by 35 different people calling and asking this 
question, fine. .. you know that I'm here to try and make things 
quicker and easier and I won't waste your time because I know 
what I want to ask: I know how you work. ' And he was fine after 
that. 
It was "harder to say' about politicians: the helpful majority was "probably 
less than ninety per cent but ... that's just because of the disposition of 
politicians. ' She amplified: 'they're interested in their constituents. They're 
interested in making sure they're re-elected and so that changes their 
perspective. A civil servant is interested in the issue. ' 
Offer an expert helping hand to civil servants was the advice of Shandwick's 
Tom McNally to his clients: ". .. one of the early things that we would advise 
... is to offer to the civil servant in the department concerned as much 
information, ideas that you can, within the realms of commercial confidence, 
make available. Because you'll have a friend then in terms of the job that 
they've got to do. ' Even so, he thought that the increased amount of 
lobbying meant that officials were becoming 'increasingly jealous of their 
time. ' 
6 one of a great many voices in l2lay' - lobbyists and their perceptions 
of value for money to clients 
In their business role, commercial lobbyists have to be concerned that their 
services generate sufficent levels of satisfaction in their clients: if not, they 
will lose fee income. Chapter Four, 93-97 looked at value from the clients' 
stance: here the focus is on lobbyists. 
How does the lobbyist measure the value he generates in exchange for his fee 
income? What is his/her perception of how the client measures the value 
received for fee expenditure? Is measurement possible? Is value for money 
the marketing equivalent of effectiveness, an indicator of goal 
accomplishment? Is there a more subjective "feel good' factor for the client in 
the calculation of value? 
The first point is that hired lobbyists face a situation common to any hired 
adviser: the most important assessment of value is by the client and the 
question therefore becomes "does the client measure my value by advice 
given, work done or by happenings in the external environment? ' The choice 
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of answers available to the client reflects the complexity of the operating 
environment. For example, the advertising campaign may be executed as 
planned but there are unsatisfactory sales: counsel's opinion is persuasive 
but the court case goes against the client. For the lobbyist, the case is well 
constructed and access gained but the policy development is against the 
client because of intervening variables. In the language of the doctor/patient 
relationship, treatment is agreed with the patient and carried out but there is 
no cure. 
The data below shows that lobbyists declared that they were working mostly 
to client definitions of value for money rather than their own. This is no 
more than sound survival sense in a principal/agent relationship. But 
handing over entirely the assessment of value of professional services to 
clients is a high risk strategy for a lobbyist. He can reduce this risk to 
professional survival by influencing the client's choice of assessment criteria 
and, in particular, by urging the client to follow a twin-track approach to 
value assessment: measure observable and attributable goals, e. g. winning a 
tax concession, meeting a Minister; and assess more imponderable goals. e. g. 
awareness creation, shaping opinion. 
Following this twin-track approach to value assessment, the lobbyist 
therefore knows that when his role in external events is being reviewed, in 
one set of cases he can claim any successful outcome as his own: in the other 
set of cases, he can say that he'. .. is one of a great many voices in play 
(Martin Smith). ' This allows a flexible, ambiguous and complex answer to 
the value question. At the level of a business, this duality is a rather 
satisfactory situation for the lobbyist: when the cure works, claim success: 
when the cure does not work, the other voices can be called in to account for 
failure. But in the aftermath of no cure, it is still important that the client 
should have a 'feel good' factor. This is one reason, the data suggests, why 
lobbyists will sometimes introduce clients to a lot of decision-makers, i. e. to 
impress them with the lobbyist's contacts and to try and build up reserves of 
goodwill with the client. There was one strong dissent from this approach, 
one which stressed that the policy outcome of lobbying was the only one 
worthwhile for clients. 
Tom McNally looked at outcomes but saw complications in claiming credit. 
He said about legislation that 'one can look to a whole range of changes 
which we were in part influential in obtaining. ' He gave the examples of the 
Broadcasting Bill and the ITV Association; the Water Act and the Water 
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Services Association, and a reference to regulators which 'doesn't take place 
or is severely muted. ' But even in these relatively clear-cut circumstances, 
lobbyists can never prove 'our input was the decisive factor. ' 
For Fred Morgan, the value question had to be client framed and it may 
include both measurable and imponderable benchmarks, such as awareness 
creation. He said: 
the best value for money is if we achieve all the things that the 
clients desire and certainly if one doesn't achieve anything he 
desired, I don't think that would be value for money. Sometimes 
their requirements are ... perhaps less objective, less hard. For 
instance, they may feel that Government doesn't and Parliament 
doesn't take any notice of their industry and they want to make an 
impact on Parliament or on Ministers not to require any particular 
advantage but to be there when there is a problem. 
David Perchard shared this client-centred definition of value: '. .. what 
really counts is ... not what we think they ought to have but what they think 
they ought to have. ' But events can sometimes show that the client's 
calculation of value was misjudged. He noted' the quality of advice that we 
give ... we can best measure by looking back over the files a year or two 
later' to compare advice given with policy outcomes. He found himself 
saying: 
we said that would happen and it did and I'm afraid too often 
there's an element of 'I told you so' here which we don't always 
communicate to the client ... but one of the hard facts of life in 
business is that public affairs is the sort of thing that operates for a 
Wagnerian timescale. 
He noted that clients in general tended to ignore potential threats until they 
loomed large 'by which time it is much more difficult and expensive to stop. ' 
But there was business advantage in this procrastination '... because if we 
were successful in stamping on every dinosaur while it's still in the egg, then 
the number of hours that we had to work would be rather less'. Clients act 
later rather than earlier 'nine times out of ten. ' 
A client-oriented definition of the value was offered by Tim Rycroft: 'the 
most important measure from our point of view of value for money is if the 
client is happy. ' He described: 
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if the client feels that we're doing the right things for them; things 
they expected us to do or the right level of activity, or delivering 
things that we have undertaken ... then that represents value for 
money. They feel they are getting the service they asked for. 
But he said 'the service" is difficult to define for three reasons. Firstly 
"because very often our work is aimed at preventing things happening rather 
than making things happen and one can never know whether we were 
instrumental in preventing them happening or whether they would have 
been prevented from happening anyway. ' Secondly there was serendipity: 
I could have a chance meeting with somebody who turned out to 
be very important to one client and discover something of 
enormous value to them that they couldn't have found out any 
other way and that thirty second conversation could be worth the 
entire month's fee or the entire year's fee if it comes down to being 
that important to large commercial organisation which some of 
these decisions are. 
The third definitional difficulty was the converse of the above: completing an 
agreed plan of action and not winning the policy argument. Tim Rycroft 
explained: 
on the other hand, one can work as hard as possible; fix up 
meetings with all the right people, make sure that their case is put 
in the most effective way and they might still not get what they're 
looking for. Certainly in the practical sense of us having done the 
work that we'd undertaken to do and done it to the best of our 
abilities, they're getting value for money: but they are not getting 
what they set out to get. 
Charles Miller also thought about client reaction to agreed work not 
producing the desired outcome: 'the important thing is their perception of 
whether they've been given the right professional advice. ' But in the last 
resort, value was getting the required result for the client: the 'most obvious' 
value was ". .. you're after money from Government and you get it. ' He 
added: 
second most obvious is where you're after a very concrete result. 
Get us assisted area status. Get us this tax concession. Get us an 
extension of relief from blah, blah, blah. Well, if you've done most 
of the work, then you can say "well, I've done it'. Often of course 
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you're a member of a team which may include bankers and 
lawyers, the in-house people ... in which case it's very difficult to 
tell. 
He said that value for money was more measurable for lobbyists who 
claimed to resolve problems and who say 'we did it for you' rather than for 
lobbyists who say 'you are now better perceived inside the system'. 
Tessa Devlin confronted the above dichotomy as follows: 
... I suppose it would be very rare for me to devise a programme 
that would end with a yes or no answer because part of the 
relationship with Government is develop a dialogue. It might 
mean that you don't have success on a measure ... but ... you've 
positioned the client as an adviser to Government so that next 
time it comes round youre in a much better position. 
She related the value question to trust between client and lobbyist: 'I believe 
that I give value for money because I'm honest in what we can achieve for 
the clients. I never lead them down the garden path. I give them a really 
direct steer about what is achievable and that means they can trust me and 
trust ... in business is value for money. ' 
For Peter Moore, the client definition of value was also in the forefront: 
'providing the service that the clients want and that places them in a political 
environment where they can best promote their commercial case. ' Market 
Access attempts to gauge its service provision through a 'process of 
consultation with a client': 
it's just good politics. You send out a questionnaire every now 
and then and say 'are you happy with the service; where's it weak; 
where is it strong; where could it be improved; what do you 
think we've done for you; what do you think we have achievedT 
I suspect this is very rare in the industry. I think it's a good thing 
because it is so difficult to say 'well, we did that. ' But there are 
some things when you can say 'I did that. ' 
Martin Smith could have agreed with the latter sentence: for him there were 
satisfactory 'measures of effectiveness' for some lobbying activities. He gave 
the example of the passage of a Private Members Bill on advertising bingo 
steered through by his firm: '. .. we got it onto the statute book. Now there 
you have an outcome which is 100 per cent measurable. ' But he did not 
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claim that this example was representative '. .. because clearly if you are 
working on Government legislation or still more on European legislation, 
then you are one of a great many voices in play. ' 
He gave the example of the European plastics industry, another client, as 'a 
sort of midway point' of effectiveness. He said that the industry: 
... has a highly specific set of interests in relation to proposed 
legislation on packaging and packaging waste and there will be 
very specific outcomes in terms how much the industry will be 
expected to recycle of its product by the year ... ninety eight, two 
thousand, two thousand and five. In other words, what is 
ultimately enshrined in the directive will be able to be placed 
alongside the industry's objectives at the start of this process and 
we will be able to say ' well, it was forty per cent succcessful or 
fifty per cent successful or sixty per cent successful. . .' 
This quantification could not be applied to other work 'where it's very 
difficult to measure effectiveness and I think we have to talk through the 
process with the client beforehand so that this is understood. ' 
Simon Nayyer identified another form of quantification as the 'train spotter 
approach': it is one which could produce the goodwill reserves referred to 
above. He said that in this case some clients: 
.. will assess the successfulness of their work and ours by the 
number of Ministers and the number of Select Committee 
Chairmen they have seen in a month. 
But for other clients, 'the process is rather more sophisticated ... what 
impact one has had on opinion forming and in moving a particular policy 
issue forward. ' 
Evie Soames for Charles Barker put the value question into the context of 
economic recession: '. -- everybody expects us to do more for less. ' In this 
context clients 'are pretty good at ensuring that they get value for money ... 
and so many people are constantly propositioning and canvassing our clients 
... one 
doesn't sign up for a year and sit back and think "that's going to be 
safe as houses. "' Client do ask the value for money question. She described 
/a constant evaluation process' where work is planned and progress gauged 
at monthly meetings; where client and lobbyist review annual programmes 
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after nine months and the former then 'decide whether they want to do more 
or less or anything the following year'; and where 'the question is addressed 
when we re-negotiate the fee or re-negotiate the contract. ' 
Concl ' 
What commercial lobbyists say they do can be typified mainly as lobbying 
process work (monitoring; enhancing policy presentation; arranging access; 
arranging representations and executing media campaigns). They offer 
clients a range of services, presenting lobbying as a set of discrete activities 
which clients can 'pick "n mix' to suit their needs. Lobbyists are client-led 
but they want clients to choose more rather than fewer services. A small 
number of lobbyists claim to be issue and policy experts as well. 
Commercial lobbyists do not refuse to supply any lobbying service if asked 
by clients to provide it but they have their work preferences. These 
preferences are revealed by the field data as clusters of activity around some 
rather than other lobbying services. For example, most lobbyists will fix 
access for clients but some will get clients to do it after advice on whom and 
which departments to access. All commercial lobbyists will advice on how to 
persuasively present a case but most do not want to present it alone. On 
policy, all lobbyists want to improve its presentation and some want to 
amend its content. But generally they prefer to involve themselves with the 
processes of lobbying (access and presentational activities) rather than with 
issue and policy substance. 
These clusters of preferred activity, attracting majority or minority practice 
and participated in by individuals differentially, can be conceptually re- 
grouped into two ideal types of lobbying: backgrounding and 
foregrounding. In themselves, these types cannot be used for counting the 
respondents under two headings but they do allow a better understanding of 
the actual access, representation making and policy influencing practices of 
lobbyists. Conceptually focused definitions of lobbying activity lead to a 
deeper and fuller analysis of lobbying in practice. 
Commercial lobbyists have various relationships with public policy decision- 
makers, with an identified range of personal and structural factors making 
for the variations. The factor most mentioned as making for positive 
relationships was that lobbying brought the mutual benefit of two-way flows 
of expert information to public policy-making. 
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Because they are hired for their services, commercial lobbyists are concerned 
about how the paying client values their services. Ultimately, they are ruled 
by the value judgements of their clients but they respond to the complexity 
of the operating environment by sometimes claiming credit for both 
measurable and imponderable outcomes. 
Notes 
The Independent newspaper, Wednesday, September 8,1993, p. 9 
reported under a headline 'Food dye lobbyists keep best of British" that 
lobbying had prevented the banning of colour additives by the EC in 
the case of certain foods sold in the UK, including canned and mushy 
peas, kippers and cheddar cheese. 
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Chapter Seven 
Lobbyists for hire: the decision-makers 
Introduction 
This Chapter is the fourth to describe and analyse the separate pieces of 
primary research conducted for this thesis. The previous Chapters focused 
on the hirer and the hired: the focus now turns to the objects of their 
attention, those who influence and make public policy, collectively known to 
this research under the title 'decision-makers. ' This is the first time that in- 
depth interview data on the views of UK civil servants and special advisers 
about commercial lobbyists has been published. Haug and Koppang (1993) 
reported that they were working in Norway in the same area. 
Background 
Decision-makers are the third set of actors in the lobbying process after the 
clients and lobbyists. With their inclusion, data about hiring lobbyists can be 
triangulated from three viewpoints. 
Decision-makers can be segmented into four groups - backbench MPs, 
Ministers (current and former), special advisers to Ministers and civil 
servants. MPs and former Ministers are relatively easy to interview via the 
Parliamentary culture of access to the public and this was the case for this 
fieldwork. It was judged that Ministers were unlikely to be interviewed on 
the grounds of workload and of their discretion limiting the quality of the 
data. 
Civil servants are formally easy to access via the Civil Service Year Book. But 
the Book is not likely to lead to effective access for there is the difficulty of 
identifying individual civil servants at the end of the attentions of lobbyists. 
Secondly, individual civil servants, operating in a culture which emphasises 
anonymity and discretion, are likely to refuse to be interviewed by an 
unknown researcher, seeking their views about matters which are often 
politically sensitive. Finer (1966; 141) noted this preference for anonymity 
and wrote of 'the closed relationship, where it exists, between Lobby and 
civil service. ' 
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Ironically in the light of its subject, this research needed a field strategy of 
effective access which would re-assure individual civil servants that their 
views would be anonymous, if necessary, and the data used for academic 
purposes only. This strategy was pursued through a third party, the First 
Division Association (FDA), the trade union which represents civil service 
grades one to seven, the grades of public officials involved with lobbyists. 
(In) But it led to no candidates for interview: perhaps the approach was too 
impersonal. Instead, contact with senior civil servants was made through the 
special adviser network and through the good offices of an individual 
official. But the FDA is in a position of overview about lobbyists and an 
interview was had with Liz Symons, the Secretary General. 
The FDA reported that grades seven (principal) and five (assistant secretary) 
were the officials most frequently to be at the receiving end of 
representations. The principals were likely to head up a sub-section (e. g. 
toxic chemicals) while the assistant secretaries headed up the section (e. g. 
pollution): the principals would field telephone enquiries; the assistant 
secretaries would be at a meeting with clients and/or lobbyists; while the 
under-secretaries (grade three) would be present if the matter had major 
policy ramifications. In the first instance of contact, if there was a need by 
the lobbyist for information, the civil service grade executive officer would 
be the official likely to give it out. 
On access to special advisers, pre-fieldwork discussions were had with 
Jeremy Mayhew (2n), a former DTI special adviser, and with Cliff Grantham 
(3n), a special adviser at the Department for Education (DfE). Mr Mayhew 
said that he had little contact with commercial lobbyists because he had only 
accepted representations on the party political aspects of policy and all other 
representations he had directed to civil servants. But he had not been 
impressed generally by what he had seen. He had noted that some lobbying 
was done in a way to impress clients - for example meeting Ministers - when 
the more effective functional route would have been meeting civil servants. 
Mr Grantham had been a special adviser for three years at the Home Office 
and the DfE: before that he had been a research assistant to MPs; a lobbyist 
who founded his own company Westminster Briefing, and an academic 
author on lobbying (1989; in Rush (ed) 1990, and with Norton, 1986). His 
general impression was that the number of lobbying firms had probably 
peaked; that lobbying effectiveness was difficult to evaluate; that 
concentrating on, in Miller's phrase (1988; 17), the 'dull offices' of Whitehall 
was productive, and that lobbyists should not forget that public campaigns 
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influenced Ministers as well as private representations. Another pre- 
fieldwork briefing was had from Kay Dixon (4n), personal assistant to Cliff 
Grantham above and formerly secretary to the late Robert Adley MP, a 
declared critic of hired lobbyists. Her view was that the latter complicated 
contact between an MP and the interest by requiring extra time and effort to 
fix up meetings through a third party when contact could have been bilateral 
and administratively easier. 
This research started contacting MPs at a time when one of them, Teresa 
Gorman, criticised Members in their role as objects of attention for 
commercial lobbyists. She wrote in PR Week (Oct. 28,1993) that: 
I conclude that our monster plcs and super-quangos have public 
affairs budgets that have to be spent. The lobbying firms merely 
provide a conduit for the allocated sums to be spent regardless of 
results. The number of MPs supplementing their incomes by 
collaborating in the 'influence business' enhances the mirage of 
substance. 
Two days earlier (Oct. 26), the Channel Four programme Checkout 93 (5n) 
estimated that 'consultancy fees' to MPs totalled some El Im a year; reported 
that they were known as "the school fees factor' and that they averaged about 
01,000, with one MP rumoured to earn E60,000. 
Contact with the House was structured as follows: firstly to interview those 
MPs, backbenchers and ex-Ministers, with links, via committees or 
Government experience, to economic areas of decision-making; and secondly 
to interview those MPs whose views on commercial lobbyists were not 
known to this research. The views of those publicly in favour or against 
were avoided: the views of those silent so far and who met the first condition 
above were thought more likely to further understanding. 
John Townend MP, Chairman of the Conservative Backbench Finance 
Committee, declined to be interviewed. Sir Bryan Carsberg, Director General 
of Fair Trading, was the only other prospective interviewee to decline. His 
office wrote (6n) that he 'very rarely' met hired lobbyists and that if 
intermediaries are involved 'in the arranging of meetings, they tend to be 
lawyers representing companies ... " The letter added: 'Circular 
letters from 
lobbying organisations are invariably placed in the waste paper basket. ' 
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Issues lobbied on 
These included routes for new roads; defence contracts on a new tank and 
torpedo; abortion; Sunday trading; local government; fair trading and 
consumer protection; deregulation and reform of the Consumer Credit Act; 
prison privatisation; homosexual age of consent; dangerous dog legislation; 
rail privatisation; tax on Scotch whisky; tax on potato and wheat crisps; Post 
Office Counters' privatisation and the national lottery. 
Research Particil2ants 
Ten interviews were done; nine with current and former decision-makers 
and one with a representative of senior civil servants. Two of the 
interviewees were Under-Secretaries and four were special advisers. The 
interviewees were Kenneth Carlisle MP; Robert Dunn MP; Sir Anthony 
Durant MP; John Mills, Under-Secretary at the Office of Fair Trading (OFT); 
Cliff Grantham, special adviser to the then Secretary of State for Education, 
John Patten; Eleanor Laing, special adviser to the then Secretary of State for 
Transport John MacGregor (her views are reported but not attributed); an 
anonymous former special adviser, now a commercial lobbyist; Bill 
Robinson, former special adviser to Chancellor Lamont; an anonymous 
Under-Secretary administering a major national reform programme, and Liz 
Symons, general secretary of the First Division Association. The full 
interview schedule is in Appendix Two, 216. 
A range of reactions: MPS 
One theme which ran throughout the interviews with lobbyists in the 
preceding chapter was their assertion that commercial lobbying was an 
accepted and valued part of public policy-making. But several clients 
interviewed in Chapter Four, 100-102 reported a range of positive and 
negative views among decision-makers about commercial lobbyists. A range 
of official reactions was also reported in Chapter Six, 147-153 by the lobbyists 
themselves. A range was also found in these interviews with decision- 
makers. Exploring these varying reactions is the major focus for the 
following analysis of the data from MPs. 
_More 
Dositive than negative: '. .. they do oil the system' 
Robert Dunn MP was (November 1993) Chairman of the Conservative 
Backbench Transport Committee. He worked for J. Sainsbury plc before his 
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election in 1979 and was an adviser to them until 1983. His constituency of 
Dartford, Kent, is along the route of the proposed Channel Tunnel rail link to 
London and 'after 1988, because of the rail link issue in my constituency, I 
gave an undertaking that I would take on no commercial interests while I 
was fighting British Rail and that remains the position today. ' 
He noted the growth of hired lobbyists since his election and thought of them 
as 'signposts' for MPs pointing the way towards 'private interests from the 
commercial sector. ' He assigned to them the general role of introduction 
agents: 
I've always seen the positive view that ... they do oil the system. 
.. they bring people together in a way that it might not be so easy 
to do. There's been tremendous growth. I think it's very 
important ... that we do have this ... given the various 
sophisticated rates of change. Sometimes you do need a briefing 
from people who are within the industry concerned ... 
He was lobbied 'in a variety of senses. ' 
Sometimes by organisations such as Life and Keep Sunday Special 
... Transport organisations obviously wish to come see me to 
make their views known and some lobbyists in the private sector 
who have a transport client may ask to see me or give me lunch in 
order to meet them. And I have been lobbied on a regional basis 
too when I've gone to lunches and found most of my colleagues 
from the County of Kent at the same lunch 
At these lunches: 
we have a meal which normally leads to a presentation from the 
chairman of the (host) organisation as to where there are problems 
with his industry, where his industry's going and what the 
Government is doing right or wrong in that industry. 
He said that he had never been approached by a lobbyist personally in the 
House (7n): instead he would get 'two or three' lunch invitations a week and 
would accept 'about one in three. ' An MP had to be 'selective' and he 
accepted that 'there's no such thing as a free lunch. ' He said that' there's 
something in it for someone somewhere. ' He believed that the process "can 
be a two way traffic. He said: 
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There are occasions when I will accept an invitation because I'm 
interested in meeting the people that they're prepared to introduce 
to me. Perhaps in other circumstances that introduction may not 
be so easy to arrange or bring about. Sometimes, it's been 
lobbying for precise things. And sometimes it's come out in the 
conversation that 'it may be helpful if the Government did X, Y, or 
Z" and 'have you realised that this is the effect of Government 
policy. ' ... but it's always up to the MP as to what he or she does 
about that. You say "well, that was a waste of time': you might say 
'that was a good idea and that was useful. ' 
But he noted that he was not aware of any 'follow-up' after such lunch/ 
presentations: 
that's what I find fascinating about it.... the two come together 
and then it might be a question of following up, saying 'well, you 
had the lunch, can you help in any way. ' I'm not aware of that 
happening to me. 
He elaborated on the value of this lobbying: 
my view is that I've gone along to learn and I suppose the 
principal of the (client) company ... feels that they're satisfied that 
they've done their best to persuade legislators that there's a rift 
somewhere in policy. And I suppose the proprietor of the agency 
(the commercial) feels that they've done their job by bringing the 
two interests together. 
He said the role of commercial lobbyists at such lunches was that 'they've 
held the ring. ' 
More negative than Oositive: 'They're just 12aid hacks' 
Kenneth Carlisle MP was Minister of Defence Procurement for two years and 
of Roads for one year and he accepted being lobbied: 'that's part of one's job 
as a Minister. ' But he was lobbied directly by the interests concerned and not 
by hired people. He said: 
as a Minister you're not really lobbied by these groups 
(commercial lobbyists) at all. I never was once. I was lobbied by 
people who built ships or manufactured weapons ... or people 
who had an interest in how we used our land, like English Nature. 
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I was never once approached by a professional lobbyist and 
indeed as a Minister, you wouldn't listen to them. They have no 
right to come and see you. They're just paid hacks. The people 
who come to see you are the people ... to whom the arguments 
mean something. 
If a commercial had come to see him as Minister, he would have said "no: I 
want to see the principal. I don't see someone secondhand. I always see the 
people who are interested in getting some particular result. ' He said that he 
would see an MP or Member of the Lords 'who had some connection with a 
company or movement ... but if there was a material interest they would 
always have to declare it. ' 
He said that 'very few' MPs did this 'but if they did so, they'd have to 
declare their interest and it wouldn't make much difference unless they had 
very good arguments... " 
He added: 
and one always discounted that but ... that was part of one's duty 
to listen to all sides of the argument, to see as many people as 
possible. ' 
He said that he was not known for his views on hired lobbyists: rather 'that 
was the accepted view in Government. And I would have thought that every 
Minister would be exactly the same. It's inconceivable to me that a Minister 
would actually see a lobbyist. ' He thought the same about civil servants: 
it just doesn't happen'; instead they met the clients directly. 
As an MP, commercial lobbyists did not lobby him individually: they wrote 
instead "but I seldom read what they have to say. ' 
Kenneth Carlisle did not think that they were 'particularly effective' but they 
'probably play a useful role in that they do get the issues out. ' For him 
effectiveness lay in knowing whether to approach civil servants or Ministers 
and in constituents using their MPs. He added: 
as a MP, you can get hold of the Minister and therefore there's no 
point in going for a lobbyist if you go direct to the Minister. So the 
lobbyist might get hold of me in order to try and bend my 
thinking so that I can ... take the point of view to the Minister or 
put pressure on Government to change their views. 
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He noted that 'a lot of companies seem to feel that they need someone to 
represent their interests in Parliament ... but I think it's best for them to use 
their MP. ' He ranked a campaign by GEC to buy one of the company's 
torpedos and secondly the campaign for the Challenger 2 tank as two of the 
most effective lobbies he had known. GEC concentrated their lobbying on 
constituencies where they had factories and 'therefore they made ... a very, 
very powerful lobby but they didn't use consultants as far as I know. ' 
More neutral than for or against: 'They're a little heI12: they're no 
hindrance' 
Sir Anthony Durant was Chairman (December, 1993) of the Conservative 
Backbench Environment Committee and was the object of lobbying directly 
by organisations or via hired lobbyists as intermediaries. Generally there has 
been a 'marked increase" in the amount of lobbying and he had no objection 
to the hiring of lobbyists and was not put off by their representing multiple 
clients. He added that 'now the intermediary process is also very much on 
the increase, I suppose I could have lunch every day if I really set out to do 
it. / 
Overall, he assessed their contribution to his work as: 'they're a little help: 
they're no hindrance... they're part of life. ' 
He accepted about two lunches a month and did not find them 'effective' in 
altering his opinion. Instead: 
I would say that they have stimulated my interest ... a subject has 
been on my backburner but they brought it to the front ... It 
doesn't influence what I'm going to do about it. It does at least 
bring it to my attention. So to that extent, they are providing quite 
a useful service. 
He added that 'thirty letters from my constituents on an issue have a bigger 
effect on me than lunch, dinner and tea. ' 
He was ready to be lobbied if the subject interested him personally or as 
Committee Chairman: 'sometimes the persuasiveness of the approach by the 
intermediary has an effect. ' But: 
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I dont think Members of Parliament are as influenced as 
everybody thinks they are. I think they make their own 
judgement. We have only one skill and that is judgement. We 
have no other skill. 
He thought the lunch invitation was the most frequent form of approach and 
most of the clients were businesses. The lobbyists were well briefed and at 
lunch 'they conduct the session. ' Some of them specialised in environmental 
questions. He reported that they did not go to the constituency to stimulate 
interest and that if they did, 'I wouldn't like it' and that MPs could spot a 
standard letter. 
He said lobbyists found it 'always a much more difficult thing for them to get 
to see Ministers but they do. ' He described the process: 
They usually have to couple it with two or three tame MPs who 
take them along. But I would say that (influencing Ministers) is 
more difficult because the Minister is well aware of what they're 
up to and he's surrounded by batteries of civil servants who are 
going to advise him. It's very difficult changing Ministers' minds 
and you can only do it (with) the other aspect of Parliament which 
is important ... the numbers' game. 
He thought that the amount of lobbying by commercial lobbyists was 
'probably near peaking': 
I think there's a boredom factor creeping in with Members of 
Parliament. . they are pretty cynical human beings who are 
dealing with humanity every day of the week and so I think the 
impact these people are having is beginning to diminish by the 
amount of it that takes place. The more it goes on, the more 
Members say 'oh no, not another one. ' 
He reported that the Select Committee of Members' Interests was concerned 
about: 
the intrusive nature of them hanging around this place. I don't 
think they are going to be criticised for taking people out to lunch. 
I think hanging about here; bombarding with paper; weedling 
their way into Committee Rooms and so on: that's the side that is 
causing Members of Parliament concern. 
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A range of reactions: civil servants and sgecial advisers 
The views of MPs have been well aired in the Reports of the Commons' 
Select Committee on Members' Interests; in journalism by MI's themselves; 
by Shaw (1990), and in the introduction by Austen Mitchell MP to Jordan 
(1991). 
But the views of special advisers have not been researched nor those of 
senior civil servants (the only known published exception to the latter group 
was a survey in the Government [1987]); or the views of a body 
representative of senior civil servants, such as the FDA. Hence this chapter is 
structured to separate out the views of these sub-groups from those of MPs. 
The general conclusion of the new data is that a) hired lobbying is a 
recognised part of public policy-making but within limits; and b) some 
lobbying behaviours are preferred over others. 
Special adviser Cliff Grantham believed that commercial lobbyists 'are an 
accepted part of the Parliamentary landscape' and 'now they are drawn upon 
by decision-makers. ' For John Mills at the OFT 'they're perceived as 
fulfilling a function' and 'if they weren't there, theyd probably be invented. ' 
And 'there is this feeling in Whitehall that these things can be useful for the 
civil servants themselves: therefore let's go along with it. ' 
Liz Symons of the FDA reported that her members made 'very little' 
comment about commercial lobbyists and what there was 'has not been 
terribly praiseworthy. ' She said: 
What members do talk about is being lobbied by the Child 
Poverty Action Group, lobbied by Shelter, lobbied by Oxfam. 
They talk to me about being lobbied by people who are genuinely 
committed to the causes for which they're lobbying, rather than 
being lobbied by the professional consultancy which will take all- 
comers for money. And I don't think they cut much ice with 
members ... (who) are far more 
likely to want to talk to the people 
really concerned with the matters in hand. 
The anonymous Under-Secretary noted that the hirers of lobbyists in his 
policy area appeared to believe they were getting value from hired lobbyists: 
but he doubted the value they gave to their clients. As somebody courted by 
them, he saw some usefulness in them because periodically they came up 
with new information. 
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Liz Symons underlined the need for civil servants having good contacts with 
interests: 'there are very close relationships between civil servants and 
pressure groups ... if they are genuinely doing their job, both of them know 
each other. ' Her concern was for 'consultation with those who were 
genuinely committed to the causes for which they were lobbying rather than 
going through an extra stratum. ' 
The anonymous ex-special adviser, now a commercial, gave a more positive 
evaluation: 
those lobbyists who wine and dine the whole time, I don't think 
that is the approach. The approach that I used to find the most 
useful (as special adviser) ... is a sort of professional, well 
researched approach to case making ... It's not twisting people's 
arms and trying to get them to do something they wouldn't 
otherwise ... the best you can do ... is ensure that your case is 
properly heard in the right places. 
He had seen the hired lobbyists as "an extension of the company they were 
hired by' and 'it is a good thing that Whitehall, Westminster is open to the 
outside ... just doesn't sit in an ivory tower. ' 
A similar image was used by Bill Robinson, former special adviser on tax to 
Chancellor Norman Lamont: an open Whitehall with information flowing in. 
He said: 
people sitting in the centre arguably are only as good as the 
information they are given and lobbyists are throwing information 
at them so that's not bad. 
He saw lobbying as 'inevitable' and "at its best it's a useful source of 
information. ' This theme of commercial lobbyists as an information source 
linked all the respondents in this section of the fieldwork and supports the 
Norton and Grantham thesis (1986) that they are a 'hyphen' between public 
policy-makers and private interests. 
While analysing the data below, it is important to be aware that the 
perspective of the respondents vis-a-vis hired lobbyists is similar to that of 
mariners towards icebergs. For both groups, there can be much that is not 
visible. 
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Commercial lobbyists can advise clients on access, presentation and policy 
content behind the scenes and hardly offer any public sighting to the 
decision-maker. It is a behaviour which fits more with the backgrounder 
type developed in Chapter Six, 135-136. Equally much is not seen by 
commercial lobbyists. The value put on the information they pass on is, in 
the nature of things, not usually known. Decision-makers can have an 
incomplete view of lobbyists; lobbyists can have an incomplete view of 
special advisers and civil servants. 
Berry (1993; 346) has elaborated on this phenomenon of Partial sighting. He 
reported that the 'hired gun' type of lobbying with lobbyist and decision- 
maker face-to-face is 'small' in the UK. He estimated that one in ten lobbying 
firms do this head-to-head lobbying while the norm was 'their primary role 
as advisers and policy experts. ' 
'good lobbying is best conducted if it's not so naked' - seeking 
contac 
It is well reported that MPs are lobbied. They are legislators; they are the 
traditional focus for lobbying and they are accessible. For the lobbyist, they 
live in an open field. But the reporting of lobbying of civil servants and 
special advisers is scarce, if not non-existent. For the lobbyist, both these 
groups, in comparison with MPs, have dwelt behind walls of anonymity and 
discretion. The data below suggests that the walls have crumbled in places. 
John Mills spent three and a half years in the Downing St. Policy Unit which 
was a "prime target not just for lobbyists but for everyone with anything to 
sell or to offer ... and part of our 
function at the Policy Unit was to act as a 
conduit for ... ideas from outside the normal channels. 
' 
He made a general distinction in approaches: 
there is a constant intercourse between officials in a whole range 
of jobs and their clients in the particular market place with which 
they are dealing... I would hesitate to call that lobbying ... there 
are elements of lobbying: everyone is trying to pedal their own 
ideas but it's not all lobbying. Some of it is simply ... the conduct 
of business, the development of good relations and so forth. 
But besides this normality, there was something more self-interested: 
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there was plenty of what you might call naked lobbying: people 
with a vested interest or a self-interest who simply wanted to see 
all possible channels to convey their views to people they perceive 
to be in positions of influence ... So I think one does have to draw 
up a kind of scale of lobbying activity from the normal, almost 
routine, day-to-day contact between organisations, institutions 
and Government; and the more set piece lobbying occasions. 
He gave an example of 'naked lobbying' in changes to the scope of the 
Consumer Credit Act as a result of de-regulation: 
we've had many submissions from all sorts of trade associations, 
all making various proposals in their own interest but wrapped up 
in general public policy wrapping paper. Except for one 
submission from the (name of trade association) who simply said: 
'We make no secret of the fact: these regulations are an absolute 
bind and they make it very difficult for our (members) to advertise 
their attractive mortgage offers ... Please would you remove them 
just for us. ' That was a naked lobby and they made no secret of it 
and it was very unsuccessful because it was so naked. And it's 
probably the case that good lobbying is best conducted if it's not 
so naked; if you're not simply perceived as presenting a selfish or 
a vested interest. 
At the OFT, John Mills had been lobbied directly by interests and by hired 
lobbbyists. 'Very senior people in organisations can always lobby on their 
own behalf' and he had seen that at Number Ten. He said 'a lot of lobbying 
goes on concerning competition policy' and: 
some of that comes through these lobbying firms but I would 
hazard a guess that most of it is done at senior company level. 
And I think it is probably easier for a company to do. If it's 
fighting its own corner in a competition investigation, that 
company has got to plough its own furrow and know what it's 
talking about. 
'Naked lobbying' also appeared in the lobbying done to the anonymous 
former special adviser: for him it was 'shameless lobbying. ' He talked of the 
dichotomy between lobbying with a 'public policy dimension' and the 
/shameless' variety. ' He used this distinction in filtering out people and 
issues he would not deal with: 
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If I felt there was a side issue that was relevant to Government 
policy or had an implication for Government policy, then I would 
see them. If it was somebody sayingwell, I'm a company and I 
want for my own interest to achieve xyz', I really couldn't be 
interested because I wasn't paid to represent the interests of a 
particular company. I was paid to ensure that my Minister was 
properly briefed and was able to take informed and wise 
decisions. 
He noted that the public interest and the private could correspond and that 
the 'good lobbyist will identify his own interest with those of public policy. ' 
Bill Robinson, special adviser for two and a half years, talked about ". -- quite 
a lot of people were obviously quite anxious to make my acquaintance, who 
were jolly nice to me ... ' He did not regard the number of lobbies as 
excessive: J certainly did regard it as being one of my jobs to be the conduit 
of outside ideas into the Treasury and so I would see people. I was not 
inaccessible. ' He noted that the Treasury was organised to receive 
representations on budgets: five Ministers,, three special advisers and the 
civil servants in FP division who 'would just start to canvass views. ' 
He elaborated: 
part of the whole budget-making process is about seeing outside 
pressure groups, feeding their ideas into the Treasury and there's 
quite a wide team of people who will field them. I mean The 
Scotch Whisky Association gets to see the Chancellor: not many 
do. But there are five Ministers, anyone of whom is prepared to 
see lobbyists and if they don't make it as far as a Minister,, they get 
fobbed off with a special adviser. 
Cliff Grantham had been lobbied at both the Home Office and the DfE by a 
'combination' of direct approaches from interests and via hired lobbyists. In 
the case of the latter, the 'most effective form of contact" is for the initial 
contact to come from the commercial and then contact to be 'directly with the 
organisation concerned. ' 
He saw his role 'to act as a conduit between Ministers and the world outside, 
particularly from the party perspective but more generally as well. ' He 
would take a dim view of a lobbying firm representing opposing interests 
but had not come across that duplication (nor had the former special 
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adviser). He did not find the contacts 'intrusive because after the initial 
approach I had a high degree of control as to whether I wanted to have a 
meeting. ' 
One respondent reported six approaches a week from hired lobbyists and the 
same number again directly from interests: what was being actively sought 
from the contacts by the respondent was twofold: information which had a 
party political resonance and data which had a significant policy impact but 
which was hitherto unknown. 
'They came in themselves but I think with a hire lobbyist in tow' - how 
the decision-makers are lobbied 
John Mills had contact with between six and eight commercial lobbyists and 
'on the whole they have been people of quite high calibre and they're all 
people who seem to be ambitious. ' How do they make contact? 'They ring 
you up and invite you to lunch ... ' Another respondent favoured the 
contact sequence of telephone call, letter and office meeting, with lunch being 
seen as an inefficient use of time. 
John Mills described the contact strategy: 
they have built up a huge range of contacts among Ministers; 
among MPs; among special advisers; among the politicos whether 
Labour or Tory, among a number of senior civil servants. They 
soon smoke out which civil servants are open; which ones are not. 
They soon smoke out who is really influential in a particular area. 
It's not always the most senior. They're also quite good at 
smoking out who likes a free lunch. And being absolutely blunt 
about it, I think most middling, senior civil servants do like a free 
lunch because there aren't many perks in the civil service and ... a 
free lunch can be quite agreeable. 
But he thought there was a right and a wrong way for the lobbyist to handle 
these lunches. A 'right turn off' was lunch with the 'firm or lobbyist who sits 
you down in a smart restaurant and no sooner have you ordered a bit of grub 
than he starts peddling his wares. ' Instead: 
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if you can establish a good contact, your general impression is to 
come back to the office and say 'here is someone who is quite 
forthcoming, who's got a point of of view, their firm is important 
in the sector or their association ... let's put him on our list of 
contacts .. .' 
He described behaviour at meetings: 
The person from the lobbying firm will take a very low profile. 
They might try and guide their clients towards certain questions 
but the lead in the meeting is from the client. The lobbying firm 
had almost done its work by fixing the meeting; has probably 
briefed the people on the civil service background. So I've found 
in set-piece meetings they've taken a slightly back seat role, rather 
like the officials when Ministers are present: speak when you're 
spoken to. 
John Mills made a distinction between the lobbying approach of 'very senior 
people in organisations who can always lobby on their own account' and' 
middle-ranking people who are a bit diffident about it... ' 
... because they're not quite sure where to aim their fire; they're 
not quite sure who is who; they're not very sure whose telephone 
number is whose; they haven't got a directory, and they feel they 
need the comfort of someone to do it for them ... They are well 
able to present their own case ... but sometimes felt a little ill at 
ease until the ice had been broken. 
He related these needs to his time at Number Ten and to opportunities for 
the lobbyist: 
... the skill, or rather the value, of these 
lobbying firms was in a 
sense breaking that ice for people in [the] private sector or public 
sector authorities who just felt unsure of themselves in Whitehall. 
He developed this point about coming into contact with Whitehall. At that 
stage 'I think there is a feeling of helplessness and someone who can hold 
your hand and help you chart a course is probably not without some value. 
In this context, the contacts of lobbyists are particularly attractive to clients 
newly in contact with Government, a point that Liz Symons believed to be 
part of their attraction to interests 'out on a limb from central Government. ' 
One respondent confirmed this by saying that some lobbyists were 
particularly well known and how this expedited direct representations. 
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Bill Robinson said contact was 'nearly always a telephone call, sometimes a 
letter. ' 
On the whole I would talk to anyone on the phone and if after 
talking to them for a bit, I thought there might be some sort of case 
for what they were putting forward, I would have them in to see 
me. 
He had regarded himself as a special adviser on tax as a fiscal issue rather 
than tax as an issue with political consequences. 
He knew: 
the Chancellor's mindset on these issues quite well, so that if 
someone could show that there was a genuine non-neutrality if 
they could make a prima facie case over the phone ... I would say 
'yes, Im very sympathetic, why don't you come and see and then 
you can provide me with some ammunition. ' I'd be prepared to 
take up those battles inside the system. 
By example, he 'actually fought quite hard' for the trade association of 
manufacturers of potato and wheat crisps, two similar products taxed 
differentially. He recalled the meeting: 'they came in themselves but I think 
with a hired lobbyist in tow who may have been the man who set up the 
meeting. ' 
He sensed that interests contacting Whitehall for the first time were more 
likely to have an internal government affairs officer or to have hired a 
lobbyist. His major perspective was fiscal but he was aware of lobbying in 
the background. 
I became aware of the hired lobbyist, of which Ian Greer 
Associates were the most prominent but just because they were so 
very active in holding little parties actually. That seemed to be 
their main activity. 
He remembered lunches at the Conservative Party conference and drinks 
parties on the lawn of Dean's Court, Westminster. 
The ex-special adviser talked of a contact strategy which was usually 'the 
company chaperoned or shepherded by a professional lobbyist. -' But he 
noted how it worked: 
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in most cases, it was the company themselves who were doing the 
advocacy and no doubt the lobbyist behind the scenes briefed 
them as to what they should say or not say... 
Companies wanted contact with Government for one of three purposes. The 
first centred on a particular message the company wanted to transmit. The 
second was more 'educational' and was a visit to a factory to see equipment 
being made and to meet the company board. This was a welcome variation: 
, (... when you're dealing with papers the whole time... it's very useful to 
actually try and get a concrete handle on something. ' The third purpose in 
his experience was about exporting and the lobbyists wanted '. .. high level 
political help if there was a trade mission somewhere and they wanted to 
ensure that the Minister visiting that country was properly briefed. ' 
Contact by lobbyists was orginally by phone but. .. in the main they wanted 
face-to-face meetings or either to come along and they would talk and then 
leave you with a paper. ' He hardly socialised with them, the exception 
being an annual party by a big lobbying firm which he called 'a political get- 
together and general networking': 
there was very little attempt to transact business... I don't think 
they saw it that way and certainly the people who went to those 
occasions didn't. 
Sometimes lobbyists wanted information from him and 'I'm afraid I got a 
reputation for being singularly unhelpful because ... there was no mileage.. 
. imparting knowledge to them. ' He did not see contact as a 'two-way 
process' and this made me 'very unpopular I think. ' He was "ultra cautious' 
in the release of information to lobbyists in case it could be used against the 
interests he, as special adviser, represented. 
The anonymous Under-Secretary told of two contacts a day from hired 
lobbyists in his area (8n). It was mostly by phone with a follow up-by letter 
where there was some substance to set out. The point of this initial contact 
was to arrange a meeting, mostly over lunch. He accepted mostly on the 
basis of 'personal chemistry' - if he liked or respected the lobbyist, he would 
accept. He did respect some for their policy knowledge but they were few. 
He was aware that lobbyists contacted the special advisers in his Department 
but he judged the latter's influence on Ministers to be weak. He noted that 
Ministers in general said that they did not like hired lobbyists but he also 
noted that Ministers accepted their social invitations and talked about them. 
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He told how Ministers might come in on Monday with 'fun ideas' but 
whether that was the influence of partners, lobbyists or hard thinking was 
unknown. 
Liz Symons reported civil servants saying about contact with hired lobbyists 
that 'they were there' at meetings but her members 'didn't know what they 
were there for and they didn't want to speak to them; they wanted to speak 
to the people paying the bills. ' She reflected that '. .. you could have the 
same thing about lawyers and all sorts of other people but people don't make 
the same (anti) case. ' 
In the experience of Cliff Grantham, the initial approach was usually a letter 
or a telephone call. He then made a judgement 'as to whether I think it is 
going to be in my interest to see and to hear direct from those concerned. ' 
He thought that most lobbyists were 'wise' to the attraction of concise 
briefing material and 'so on the whole, the material that does arrive tends to 
be short and succinct and precise. ' But he was critical of lack of follow-up: 
'so there's a great-to-do at the time of the approach; material's prepared; 
perhaps an introduction to a particular client, but very little sort of 
continuous follow-up. ' 
Why decision-makers let themselves be lobbied: 'the art really lies in 
filtering out naked self interest' 
John Mills said there was no special civil service code of conduct towards 
hired lobbyists and that the general rules about propriety applied. He saw 
contact with them as, in part, a relationship of mutual benefit: 
the civil servant's job is to understand what is going on out there 
and the art really lies in filtering out the naked self-interest in the 
points that are being made because ... that is how policy is 
formulated and how understanding grows. So, it's not entirely a 
one-way process. 
He developed this concept of mutuality: 
it"s wrong to assume that Government or bits of Government 
instantly know their way round the economy, around the public 
life in the UK: they don't. Even less so when it comes to Brussels. 
.. and 
it is a value to a thoughtful civil servant, especially a senior 
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or grade five and above ... to build up contacts so that when a 
problem arises or there's a little issue or sensitivity, you can ring 
up someone 
But there was a limit to mutuality expressed as exchange of information: it 
was appropriate when the subject matter was 
'the general development of public policy' for a sector or for 
overall issues or in relations to Brussels 'where it's a great help to 
know that you've got the private sector or whoever on your side. ' 
Information exchange, however, was inappropriate when the matter was 
specific to a firm: 
if a company rings me up here and refers to the fact that they've 
got their case on the Director General's desk, I would be very 
guarded. And I certainly wouldn't reveal his hand. I would just 
give them what is in our public statement. 
But mutuality also took another form. He gave the example of being phoned 
up by lobbying contacts saying: ' "Look I've got this frightful national 
association on my back and they're paying us good money but they're 
desperately keen to get their point across" and I said "OK, look, half an hour 
next week. "' He added: 
bit of give and take and the lobbying firm appreciates that; doesn't 
try it on all the time but it helps you build a good relationship 
with them so that if there's a sensitive issue, you can say 'look ... 
you're getting nothing from me on that' and so you can keep a 
relationship going. 
But this 'bit of give and take' cannot operate where there is no perception of 
reciprocal value by the official: 
there's nothing worse than being rung up and told 'look we have a 
delegation of widget makers who want to have two days' 
lobbying in London and we're fixing the programme. Can you 
give them half an hourT It's just a complete and utter waste of 
time. But if it's sector specific or if it's a group who you have a 
particular interest in ... then your own antennae suggest that 
these people can be useful to make contact with ... sometimes it 
works and sometimes it doesn't. 
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Another respondent also objected to attending meetings which lobbyists had 
organised largely to impress their clients. And the objection extended to 
them 'pressing their luck' to get access on the basis of acquaintance. 
This theme of being 'used' was also taken up by the anonymous Under- 
Secretary. He let himself be lobbied to get access to previously unknown 
data. But he disliked the process he had to go through to get it. He felt used 
instrumentally by the lunches in the sense that he knew his presence was 
boasted about by lobbyists to their clients. And while he was not puritanical 
about lunch (the interview with him scheduled for 3pm started a little late 
because he had attended a lobbyist's lunch), he felt that he had to "pay' for 
the hospitality with information. 
He noted that the information he gave out was mostly in the public domain 
or was only one enquiry away from it and he was surprised that clients were 
not aware of this. He was often pressed on policy advice but apart from his 
own occasional indiscretion, he never revealed what he told Ministers. He 
regarded that discretion as a constitutional duty. 
Bill Robinson thought the job of hired lobbyists was 'to act as a bridge 
between the political and commercial world. ' Cliff Grantham talked the 
same language of liaison when he said that part of his job was 'to keep eyes 
and ears open and ... to act as a flow, a channel of communication between 
organisations and Ministers. ' He noticed that interests without professional 
lobbying advice had a -rather scatter gun approach and sent voluminous 
material. ' In consequence 'consultants can actually facilitate a process and 
keep the level of paperwork down and that leads to a more efficient system. ' 
Another respondent talked about lobbyists being 'an open line of 
communication' with the outside world and how, like accountants,, they can 
help business make technical issues more understandable to external 
audiences. 
The anonymous former special adviser also saw the value of contact outside 
Government and valued it in part as a counterpoise to advice from the civil 
service: 
it was helpful to me being an individual without massive 
resources to carry out research. One way of finding out whether 
the advice coming up from the civil servants was legitimate or not 
was to get the arguments that were being flung around outside 
and testing those internally to arrive at a view as to whether a 
proposal that was being made was in fact the correct one. 
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Perceived influence and effectiveness 
In the interviews, the perceived influence and effectiveness asked about was 
that of hired lobbyists and not the influence of the interest represented. The 
difficulties in making this distinction were looked at in Chapter Two, 30-32 
and they obtrude here again. In some of the replies, it was clear that the 
distinction between hired and in-house lobbying was elided where 
respondents wanted to make a point common to all lobbying types. This 
theme of effective behaviour for the individual lobbyist is explored 
particularly in the American literature as exercises in attribute listing. 
Appendix Four, 225-227 brings together the attributes nominated by the 
decision-maker respondents in this research. 
John Mills did not think commercial lobbyists were influential in public 
policy-making: 
there are some very good exceptions where well organised 
lobbying really can turn things on their heads but by and large, it 
is in one ear, out the other. You might note one or two points; you 
might reflect on one or two things. You might want to follow up 
one or two points, draw them into a sort of brief for a later date. 
But the times when I think you come away from these meetings 
saying "My God, our policy was completely wrong: these guys are 
right' I would say was very rare. I think that the lobby firms 
know that too. 
But there was a form of effective lobbying. For him, good lobbying generally 
was the antithesis of the 'naked lobbying' he described above and therefore 
'if you are not perceived as presenting a selfish or a vested interest', there is a 
perception of effectiveness: 
what good lobbying is about - and this is where some of these 
private companies come in - is in insuring that officials or 
Ministers or NIPs ... are aware of the concerns, perhaps in a fairly 
general sense, of these organisations. So that when a particular 
crunch point comes, they (officials) say 'better check what they 
think. ' 
Lobbying was effective, he thought, when the civil servant could say: 'whom 
do we want to talk on this: ah I know, I'll ring so and so whom I met last 
month. ' 
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In line with his general proposition that outside contact was essential for 
policy-making, he reiterated that "in most areas of public policy, you can"t 
create policy in a vacuum: 
you have to be in constant communication with interested parties 
and interest groups ... one is often sitting in one's 'ivory tower' 
saying to oneself 'well, who do we talk to about this. ' And if 
you've actually got a ready-made list, you're half way there and I 
think good lobbyists know that. 
Making contact between Whitehall and interests not used to such contact 
was an advantage of hiring lobbyists said Liz Symons: 'if I were lobbying on 
something; a one-off issue from outside all the machinery of Government; 
didn't know the ropes; didn't know where to start, may be it would be worth 
considering (hiring lobyists). ' 
Cliff Grantham said that their role in public policy-making was 'overall not 
significant' and he added: 'they probably can in particular instances play a 
significant role but taken in totality, I would think their influence is more on 
the modest rather than significant scale. ' He developed the theme: 
... there has been undoubtedly some successes on the part of 
consultancy firms influencing particular decisions. I suspect when 
they have influenced decisions, there's probably other factors at 
work as well. It is very difficult to quantify precisely ... very 
often they're pushing at an open gate and then there's a certain 
change of direction taking place anyway and they may come in 
and help move that forward. But I think taken across the board I 
would say their influence on the whole is there but it"s quite 
modest. 
He cited the Financial Services Bill of 1985/86 as an example of modest 
influence when there was a 'small army of consultants' lobbying and 'I'm 
sure that some of the detail of the Bill was amended as a result': 
but these are very often technical drafting points. I think just in 
terms of the broad direction of major policy issues, the ability of 
the firm (of lobbyists) to change the direction of the Government is 
very limited and doesn't happen that often. 
Another respondent made the same point about amending detail: lobbyists 
could effect 'changes at the margin' but changes to the core of a policy were 
not known to him. But it was also pointed out that lobbyists' influence could 
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be great in certain Parliamentary circumstances. The unwhipped vote on the 
Sunday Trading Bill was quoted. Other circumstances were where the 
Government was caught between two competing political imperatives, e. g. 
strong constituency pressure and a legislative obligation from the EU. 
Within this 'change at the margin' paradigm, some 30% of lobbyists were 
thought effective by one respondent. 
The anonymous former special adviser did not think they were influential as 
individuals because '. .. in so far as you're a decision-maker sitting there and 
the people who are doing the talking are the companies ... I suppose you 
don't really think about the lobbyist behind it all. ' Rather ". .. the 
effectiveness of the lobbyist ... is always apparent in how well briefed their 
interests were likely to be. Were they sensitive to what my agenda was likely 
to be? Did they understand the realities of decision-making? ' He recounted 
an example of the crude approach by one lobbyist who "tried to Strong-arm 
me down the phone ... by sort of saying ""this is an issue you should be 
looking at and if you're not looking at it, you're not doing your job 
properly. "' He called this approach 'really very counter-productive. ' 
He reiterated the belief that the effective lobbyist is singled out by 'not 
simply pursuing their own agenda but addressing the Government's agenda 
and is seen to contribute to that agenda. ' 
He continued: 
there is a view that lobbyists are leeches on the body politic and to 
some extent that may be true of some people. But they can also 
fulfill a useful function in that no Government employee or civil 
servant likes to develop policy in a complete vacuum and in so far 
as lobbyists can facilitate an input from outside, then they are 
making a positive contribution. 
Companies did not lobby on their own behalf without hiring, he said, 
because managers are employed 'to look at the bottom line and are very busy 
people. ' It followed: 
it's not time effective for them to spend time thinking about what 
is the right time to go and see somebody; what is the right 
message to take them: and therefore in that sense people who 
either had worked in Government, who knew the way the system 
worked, could actually make the relationship (with Government) 
a lot more productive. 
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The anonymous Under-secretary was currently administering a major reform 
programme and had previously worked in two Ministerial private offices. 
He did not know of lobbyists overturning or amending the central features of 
a major policy(9n): and it was constitutionally appropriate that it was so. He 
gave the example of the poll tax. But lobbyists had overturned particular 
instances of policy and he gave planning decisions and road schemes as 
examples. He introduced 'proportionality" into the evaluation of lobbyist 
effectiveness in the sense that the lesser features and particular consequences 
of policy were open to review but not the pre-suppositions and principles of 
policy. It was proportionate and appropriate that lobbyists could influence 
the former. He noted that this power to amend was susceptible to pressure 
from groups of MPs and to the degree of resolve Ministers showed towards 
their own policies. 
But if lobbyists were unable to change the core of policies, were they effective 
in changing particulars? He believed that some were because of their policy 
knowledge and process understanding but most were not because they gave 
'superficial and presentational advice. ' Lobbyists could advise on whom to 
write to and when and on the draft of a letter, but most had little policy 
advice to give in their own right as subject specialists. He thought there were 
two sources of that advice available to lobbyists who could then pass it on to 
their clients. The first was MPs and the second was the shrewdness of the 
effective lobbyists in 'interpreting my discretion. ' The good lobbyist also 
listened for what was not said and interpreted the silences in the context of 
their own reading of the policy map. 
Bill Robinson judged that lobbyists were influential in so far as they 
introduced issues and cases to policy-makers - i. e. the hyphen function. He 
expanded: 
everybody knows where they are coming from: so in that sense 
their views carry no weight but they do influence affairs to the 
extent that they introduce people who have a genuine case to 
make to the right official quarters where they will get a 
sympathetic hearing. 
He found their performance "quite variable' in their ability to master their 
clients' case but 'it was quite hard to separate out the contribution of the 
client and the contribution of the professional lobbyist. ' 
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The 'ability to master the brief of the client' was important because the 
Treasury 'really hate bullshitters. ' He explained: 'if people come up and 
don't know what they are talking about, they get very impatient and write 
them off very quickly. ' 
He argued that the main task for the lobbyist was getting the client 
introduced to the right decision-makers, followed by selecting the right 
person in the client body to make the representations. In that sequence of 
effectiveness criteria for an individual lobbyist, the ability to completely 
master the brief was highly desirable but not essential. 
Concerns in the relationshipj 
The amount of hospitality to accept; a possible 'americanisation' of UK 
lobbying; the quality of relationships between Whitehall and other, especially 
non-metropolitan, parts of the public sector; and ambitious claims by 
lobbyists of what they could achieve were mentioned as concerns. 
For John Mills, there was a question to be raised about the public sector 
hiring lobbyists and it was: 
because those parts of the public sector, like education, like local 
government, feel they can't otherwise get into Whitehall. I think 
Whitehall's at fault because they ought not to have to go through 
those mechanisms (lobbyists). 
Access to Whitehall by other parts of the public sector was also a concern for 
the anonymous Under-Secretary. His judgement was that many non- 
metropolitan organisations were either or both unconfident/ incompetent in 
their dealings with Whitehall and turned to the London-based lobbyists for 
process guidance and for emotional support. He accepted that in part it was 
caused by central departments showing 'user unfriendliness. ' His response 
in his own case was to sponsor or organise events which brought Whitehall 
and the interests together in direct contact. 
Another concern was the danger of an 'americanisation' of lobbying in the 
UK: the continuous and intrusive hospitality of Washington was, he thought, 
better avoided in London. He noted that while there was no formal Civil 
Service statement of propriety vis-a-vis lobbyists, there was awareness about 
the difficulties of judging the appropriate amount of hospitality to accept. 
Liz Symons of the FDA agreed that there was no official position on 
propriety. 
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Bill Robinson also touched on the example of the USA, where he judged 
lobbying had become excessive. He did not like American practice 'where 
hugh amounts of money are spent and there is an awful lot of junketing ... 
to influence the decision-makers by giving them nice trips. ' 
About the UK, he said 'obviously one is worried about undue influence and 
one's worried about corruption. ' But: 
I must say I didn't see anything in my two and half years inside 
that led me to think there was a slightest whiff of corruption about 
British Government. 
He went on to talk about the 'very well established pattern of taking senior 
civil servants out to Wimbledon and Lords and out to lunch ... of which the 
quid pro quo is that the civil servant in question will spend some of the time 
listening to the reasons why we should or shouldn't cut mortgage interest 
relief or whatever. .. ' 
He continued: 
... civil servants aren't terribly well paid and don't have an 
incredibly enjoyable existence: I think the odd decent lunch and 
visit to Wimbledon is a reasonable perk for the job. And they're 
all immensely upright people who wouldn't allow themselves to 
be persuaded by anything other than a good argument and the 
most they will do for these people is - if there is an argument 
worth hearing - put it down on paper and see it gets to the 
Minister's attention. So I think on the whole ... the system works 
quite well. 
Most lobbying is for business interests, he agreed, but it did not follow that 
the latter had 'undue' influence: 
you could argue that the big battalions are representing more 
people. So the amount of influence, as it were, per person ... I 
don't think is undue. If one pensioner gets the Minister's ear for 
ten minutes, you might say that was undue influence. 
For the anonymous former special adviser, the focus of concern was not the 
lobbyist - "provided that everybody knows where you are coming from 
But: 
there are much more constitutional issues for MPs ... it's 
important for them that they represent their constituents and if 
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they also take on consultancies, it's very important that should be 
known and people can take a view as to why they're pursuing a 
particular course of action. 
Conclusion 
The third and final part of the fieldwork for this research was among 
decision-makers: three MPs, four special advisers (one now a lobbyist) and 
two Under-Secretaries. A representative of senior civil servants was also 
interviewed. The interview data (new in the public domain for civil servants 
and special advisers) extended across a broad range of reaction and such a 
range is in line with the data from clients and from the perceptions of 
lobbyists about themselves in relation to decision-makers. Lobbyists have to 
reckon that they will meet both encouraging and distancing reactions from 
decision-makers. 
But it is clear from the data that overall commercial lobbyists are an accepted 
presence in the public policy-making process. No respondent said they were 
vital and none was totally dismissive. There was concern about their public 
sector clients and what that implied about access to Whitehall; about 
opportunities for the complacent acceptance of excessive hospitality, and 
about their claims to effectiveness. In general, however, hired lobbyists were 
tolerated with varying degrees of enthusiasm, according to the degree of 
perceived advantage they brought to the decision-making process and the 
actors in it. 
It is also clear from the data that lobbyists were points of first contact with 
decision-makers and that their role as face-to-face spokespersons for the 
interests they served was limited. This is in agreement with the data from 
lobbyists themselves and fits the backgrounder type. But any role they had 
for clients as active policy advisers and constructors of the good case - 
foregrounder characteristics - would not be visible to the decision-makers. 
Such a role could be inferred by them but not observed firsthand and it could 
be argued from this that decision-makers have a particular and partial locus 
from which to make judgements about the role of lobbyists. 
This backgrounder behaviour can be further described. Respondents noted 
that personal approaches to them over the telephone backed up by lunch was 
the most common contact method used by lobbyists. The client was 
invariably present at lunch and meetings and the visible role of the lobbyist 
was passive, limited to a support role. It was the same role as that of civil 
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servants vis-a-vis Ministers: 'don't speak unless spoken to. ' There was 
sometimes working meetings but they were less frequent than lunches. Only 
one decision-maker claimed to know lobbyists well socially. There was no 
sense from the majority of respondents that lobbyists were intrusive (the 
exceptions were two of the MPs). If lobbyists were persistent, they were not 
so to the point of producing widespread disgruntlement. They were 
generally tolerated because in particular they could offer a relationship of 
some advantage. 
All respondents in this section of the fieldwork saw some benefit in 
relationships with commercial lobbyists. Even Kenneth Carlisle MP, who 
was generally contemptuous, admitted that they 'probably play a useful role 
in that they do get the issues out. ' Liz Symons of the FDA admitted that 
interests with an 'attenuated' relationship with Whitehall could benefit from 
hiring. Benefit was conceived by respondents as mutual in the sense that 
operational information from outside Government was traded off against 
access to Government information and personnel, i. e. access to themselves 
and Ministers. This theme of mutual benefit as a strong tie between lobbyist 
and decision-maker was also reflected in the previous data from lobbyists. 
Decision-makers allowed access to themselves as the price to be paid for 
information. Indeed, where they thought that the relationship with the 
lobbyist regularly yielded valuable information, civil servants were ready to 
cement the relationship by facilitating access to Ministers for the client of the 
lobbyist in order to impress the former, even if it did not advance his case. 
Where the decision-maker was a special adviser, contact with lobbyists could 
yield information to challenge the civil service case for a decision. Mutual 
benefit claims were also made about lobbyists in their 'escort agency' role of 
introducing interests ignorant of the policy process to Government: in this 
way it was argued that public policy was enchanced by wider access and 
better information flows. 
Heinz et al (1993; 61) have commented on an aspect of mutuality in their 
work on commercial lobbyists in Washington: lobbyists have to 
accommodate the needs of decision-makers as well as those of clients. In 
terms of the hyphen metaphor, hired lobbyists need their Government 
knowledge and contacts as a condition of gaining and holding clients: the 
hyphen needs to be secured on both sides for it to work. Relationships with 
decision-makers, therefore, have to be sensitively handled in ways which 
respect their culture and expectations. This need for good relations by 
commercial lobbyists on the Government side of the hyphen was evident in 
the data. For example, a public interest aspect must be contained in the case 
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advanced if it is to make headway; contact should yield new information and 
perspectives for decision-makers; lobbyists should appreciate the systemic 
constraints on public policy. 
No respondent attributed major influence or effectiveness to commercial 
lobbyists in the area of core policy: but they, as corporate agents working for 
powerful principals, could have major influence on decisions at the margins 
of policy, defined as non-core areas of policy design and implementation. It 
is possible that their influence could be significant in two particular sets of 
circumstance: when the policy was the subject of a free vote in the House and 
when the Government was subject to conflicting pressures and sought relief 
in a new policy initiative. Although respondents perceived commercial 
lobbyists as a minor influence, it is important to note that the outcomes they 
facilitate are regarded as major by the clients who hire them. Clients do not 
hire for matters they regard as minor. 
The analysis above of weak influence by lobbyists in core decision-making is 
in line with the conclusion of the Heinz et al thesis (378) about the American 
Federal Government: 'government officials are now more independent from 
the constraints of the interest group environment than in the past. ' 
Even though decision-makers regard commercial lobbyists as minor players 
in the policy process, they still have expectations about the individual 
behaviour of the effective lobbyist, whatever its influence on decisions. See 
Appendix Four, 225-227. 
Notes. 
The good offices of the FDA were sought through their research officer 
Craig Ryan. He put a note in the union's newsletter asking for 
interviewees; mentioned the research to members of the national 
executive, and sought contacts through the private network of union 
officials. 
2. Source is note of a telephone conversation with Jeremy Mayhew, on 
Thursday, September 23,1993. 
I Source is note of a discussion with Cliff Grantham in his office at the 
DfE, on Monday, November 22,1993. 
4. Source is note of a discussion with Kay Dixon in her office at the DfE, 
on Monday, December 20,1993. 
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5. The programme, transmitted at 8.30 pm, was a general review of the 
relationship between lobbyists and MPs, with its major focus on the 
latter. 
6. Letter to the author on Monday, March 21,1994. 
7. A survey of 100 MPs' attitudes to lobbying entitled Effective Lob 
and conducted by Access Opinions Ltd for The Market Access Group 
found that only 4% were happy to meet a professional lobbyist alone 
while 28% were happy to see the company representative only. 33% of 
the sample were happy to meet both together with the company 
representative as the advocate: it was 19% when the lobbyist was the 
advocate. 
The survey also concluded: 'the most valued method for a company or 
organisation to influence MPs is to meet those who have a special 
interest - with research-based lobbyists behind them to ensure the right 
messages reach the appropriate political ears. ' The most favoured 
locations for a meeting were the House of Commons ranked first and 
then, the company's London office; a Westminster restaurant; an out-of- 
London location; and last, a reception. 
8. The BBC Radio Four programme File on Four of 9 February, 1993 gave 
an insight into the scale of US lobbying when a staff officer to Senator 
Bob Dole reported that on important legislation, he received up to 75 
phone calls a day. 
9. Angela Rumbold MP, former PPS to Secretary of State Nicholas Ridley 
and a former Education Minister, said on the Radio 4 programme 
Selling Your Soul, July 17,1993 about lobbying on legislation: 'there is 
also negotiation on individual points; never negotiation on 
fundamental principles. But at the edges, there is always room for 
negotiations. That is the critical point. " 
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Chapter Eight 
Lobbyists for hire: a corporate accessory 
"What we need in the study of commercial lobbying is light, more light and 
still more light. ' 
(Austen Mitchell MP in the Introduction to Jordan, 1991) 
Focus on the hiring 
Commercial lobbying (when lobbyists hire themselves out) is incompletely 
mapped territory. Some aspects of the terrain have been better recorded than 
others; for example, the relationship of hired lobbyists to Parliament. Some 
aspects have been more drawn in self-interest than mapped; for example, 
claims by these lobbyists that they have changed public policy. 
But there has been no mapping of other parts of the terrain. What services 
clients want from their hired lobbyists; how these lobbyists interact with 
their paymasters, and how decision-makers react to these hirings are 
examples of new ground which this research has sought to shine light upon. 
The primary focus here has been the 'for hire' feature of these lobbyists. In 
that, this thesis differs from previous work where the focus has been on them 
as political actors in the public policy-making process. It has looked at 
commercial lobbyists from the viewpoint of their being an extra lobbying 
resource and it has looked through three sets of eyes - the hirer, the hired and 
the decision-makers. Its stance is not, therefore, inside the policy process 
looking out at its subject: rather it is above the process examining how an 
extra resource fits in. 
This 'for hire' characteristic is the most differentiating feature of commercial 
lobbyists and so marks them off from in-house and voluntary cause lobbyists 
serving only one interest. It is not apparent that there are other 
differentiating features: for example, there is very little evidence that how 
commercial lobbyists work is different from their employed peers. 
Previous research has least covered this 'for hire' feature. New data has been 
brought into the public domain as follows: clients (Chapter Four) and 
decision-makers (Chapter Seven) have been surveyed in depth for the first 
time on their attitudes and behaviour towards commercial lobbyists. The 
fieldwork on the lobbyists themselves (Chapters Five and Six) has also 
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presented a more richly detailed and comprehensive portrayal of what they 
do for clients and how they interact with decision-makers than had been 
presented before by UK research. 
The 'for hire' feature makes business people of commercial lobbyists: they 
need clients; they have to satisfy them that they give value for money (1n). 
To locate commercial lobbyists in a market place of changing demand and 
supply is to put them in a new, dynamic perspective. Commercial lobbyists 
have competitors. It can be assumed that in the UK as in the US, 'the lion's 
share of representational work' for interests is done by full-time employees, 
where the ratio is four to one (Heinz et al, 1993; 66,372). Commercial 
lobbyists, therefore, have to seek out clients and they always have an eye for 
business development because clients come and go. They negotiate fees 
which the market for their services will bear. They are seen by many clients 
as a distress purchase and this perception limits their marketing 
opportunities. They have to manage a multiplicity of clients in terms of their 
own time and energy and in terms of avoiding conflicts of interest; activities 
which they generally do to the satisfaction of clients. 
Once hired, commercial lobbyists are professional advisers to mainly large 
and powerful private sector interests: they are accessories to these corporate 
interests, hired for services used to defend and strengthen those interests. 
They are not prime movers on the political scene: they wait to be moved by 
those who need them. They could not exist outside of the competition of 
interests: outside of what The Government Report has pictured as the 
lobbying battle. They have to be a well connected hyphen but they are not 
an independent hyphen: their clients call them into existence if and when 
they want links made with the public policy-making process. 
Heinz et al (1993; 11) make a related point about American hired lobbyists: 
that the US literature has seen them as part of the organisations they 
represent 'with the individual representatives having no separate existence 
or automony. ' 
Commercial lobbying is a business. This is not to state a hitherto unknown 
fact. No previous research has denied it. There are no public statements by 
commercial lobbyists denying it. Rather the perspective has not been 
activated in any UK research beforehand. It is a perspective which has to be 
activated once the 'for hire' feature is the primary focus. Their business form 
of organisation flows directly from that feature. Their work is not capital 
intensive. They get a brief from clients and advise them on how to progress 
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it, with their public role then either more or less visible. They work through 
contacts, using interpersonal skills and their knowledge of the policy-making 
system and of current issues. They are mostly grouped together like other 
corporate advisers into partnerships or private companies and less 
frequently into divisions of public companies. 
Focus on the 'for hire' aspect of lobbying does not imply a moral ferment 
against commercial lobbyists. The focus was identified for two reasons: no 
work had been done using it in the UK and it is a common and well 
established feature of professional advisers. Nor does the focus imply that 
hired lobbyists always work for the highest bidder: the market is much too 
imperfect for that. During fieldwork, one respondent replied that "the 
business-like aspect is not really remarkable; it is the same commercial 
motivation that operates in any consultancy firm in that you try and get 
business. People ask you to work: you charge them a fee. I 
This research concurs with the commonplace that professional advisers work 
for fees: it is the unexplored consequences of a commonplace, not previously 
noted about these lobbyists, which have been set out here. 
The sections below review the major conclusions of the three tranches of 
fieldwork, integrate them where appropriate; make a historical comparison 
and draw conclusions. 
Commercial lobbyists as corl2orate advisers 
The 'for hire' feature is not a unique one among the professional advisers to 
corporate bodies - lawyers, bankers, accountants, architects, advertising and 
public relations agencies all share in it. Making this point of commonality is 
a reminder that the demand for their services ebbs and flows according to the 
imperatives of the larger environment. If lawyers supply advice on the law; 
bankers and accountants on capital and money flows, architects on the built 
environment, what do hired lobbyists offer? Advice about persuasive 
techniques to influence public policy. 
Fieldwork among the clients (Chapter Four, 100-102 ) shows that the hirers 
had varying opinions about individual lobbyists. Like any group of 
corporate advisers, the lobbyists were ranked in terms of overall reputation 
and competence. 
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Fieldwork amongst clients and lobbyists (Chapters Four, 81-93 and Six, 136- 
147) demonstrates that what lobbyists do can be categorised as the supply of 
services under the following heads: the supply of access for clients to 
decision-makers; of representation to decision-makers; of policy advice to 
clients, and of administrative support to clients. How many and how much 
of these services are hired in by the clients can be conceptualised as a 
propensity to hire lobbyists (Chapter Four, 72-75) with clients at different 
positions on a scale. Propensity to hire is a reminder of the great variation in 
what any particular commercial does for a client. Commercial lobbying is 
what clients want it to be. 
The fieldwork does not show any common set of operational circumstances 
facing clients which could explain all or most of the hiring of services. Nor 
does the fieldwork indicate a positive correlation between the companies' 
levels of hiring and externalities, such as inclusion in a particular business 
sector, their position in big company tables of turnover or perceived degrees 
of Government interest in their businesses. Moloney and Jordan (1994) have 
built on client fieldwork in this research to suggest a tentative explanation. 
Large business plcs have a contingency-based approach to lobbying and will 
augment their large, existing lobbying capacity, including hiring in extra 
capacity, if this increases the probability of success. 
What is demonstrable is that commercial lobbyists work for 'the big 
battalions in society' -a phrase used unattributably by one lobbyist 
respondent. The political perspective of neo-pluralism (Chapter Two, 47-49) 
which privileges in a challenged and fractured way the general business 
interest above others in a market economy provides a theoretical explanation 
of this relationship. A small proportion of commercial lobbyists' work is for 
pro bono clients but that proportion has been squeezed by the post-1989 
recession. This research has shown that these 'battalions' are drawn 
currently from the public sector in more significant numbers than they were. 
This amends previous findings that the clients of commercial lobbyists were 
/overwhelmingly-' the big businesses of the private sector. 
Rather, clients are those organisations from whatever sector who are subject 
to changing operating environments by market or government activity; or 
clients who seek to initiate changes in their operating environments, and 
who can afford the fees charged by lobbyists for hire. The composition of 
client lists reflects the market and political developments of the day affecting 
the public and private sectors. 
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This research, at the level of theoretical political perspective, takes the neo- 
pluralist perspective. But, as argued in Chapter Two, 47-49, that does not 
imply that each business or any one business sector is dominant in its 
relationships. Businesses are in a constant, competitive struggle for 
advantage inside the single most influential interest bloc. They lobby 
government in order that the public policy environment is most 
sympathetically arranged to aid their competitive struggle. The above 
argument is consistent with the empirical findings of this research about the 
public sector hirings of lobbyists. These hirings fall into two categories. 
Some are about the terms of the ejection of the hirer into the business sector 
and out of the diminished public sector. Some are about new internal 
arrangements inside the diminished public sector which Government wants 
run on more business-like lines. 
Commercial lobbyists aS DOlitical advocates 
Being like barristers - high status corporate advisers - is one comparison 
some commercial lobbyists like to make: they see themselves as political 
advocates. The language used by respondents was 'they advocate a case on a 
client's behalf' (Miller); 'you're presenting a case, preparing a client"s 
argument ... '(Jeger); 'I very much think of myself as being a political 
advocate' (Rycroft). UK lobbyists of this bent may look approvingly to the 
US where Heinz et al (1993; 60) have argued that 'The most pervasive 
professional group among representatives ... is the legal profession. I 
The lawyer comparison made by UK commercial lobbyists is often - but not 
always - associated with an anti-public relations stance. Looked at from this 
angle, it is powered by a search for a well established and prestigious 
professional status; by a longing to escape from the negative connotations of 
lobbying and into a functional category of high social status such as the legal 
profession. The foregrounder and backgrounder typology developed in 
Chapter Five, 135-136 accommodates a barrister and solicitor distinction. 
But there are limits to the comparison, the more the role of the hired lobbyist 
is understood. Michael Burrell (Chapter Five 108) has pointed out that 
barristers accept that everybody has a right to legal representation, 'however 
dastardly they may be. ' But hired lobbyists need to empathise with clients 
because '. .. in practice you can't really give good advice to clients to whom 
you feel hostile. " Berry (1991) argued that there are no recognised exams or 
declared standards of behaviour for lobbyists. Douglas Smith argued two 
other limitations. Firstly that the legal system is highly established, visible 
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and legitimated and that there is no comparable sytem of lobbying. 
Secondly, that cogency of case may be a necessary condition for lobbying 
success but it is not sufficient: '. .. you need the contacts to translate cogency 
into the desired political behaviour! 
Overall, the comparsion with barristers is a reminder that commercial 
lobbyists are aware of the competitive nature of their position: they are 
competing with other types of corporate adviser, most of whom are more 
established and more prestigious and some of whom could do their work. 
Lawyers already do so and it is under-researched how much case 
presentation and representational work they do privately before decision- 
makers: some lobbyists believe that it is substantial. Equally the comparison 
is a reminder that commercial lobbyists operate in a world which calls for a 
range of skills: and which ones are used depends on circumstances. Where 
the matter lobbied is much technical and little political, case advocacy will be 
to the fore: where the matter lobbied is much political and little technical, 
influencing personal contacts and creating public pressures will be to the 
fore. Douglas Smith said: 
You talk to people about the case for ten minutes and then about, 
say, Oldham football for fifty minutes. The case and the human 
pressure created by contacts is the right combination. 
Commercial lobbyists are client-led 
The focus on hiring reveals how the hiring principle and lobbying services 
offered to the hirer are inter-related. These inter-relationships are analysed 
now. 
Commercial lobbyists are business sensitive and are active in seeking out 
more. They see their peers in a competitive way. They have a market pricing 
approach to fees as opposed to a cost plus one: they will charge what their 
clients will stand. Their fee structure is entirely responsive: it is a vehicle 
designed principally to maximise their revenue and the vehicle is made out 
of components designed for that purpose. They like retainers because it 
guarantees a cash flow; but they have to do specific project work. 
Timesheets are widely used for monthly billing: one respondent told that 'all 
our thinking is done by the hour or by, in fact, quarter of an hour units. ' Fees 
related to pre-defined lobbying outcomes - success fees - are probably more 
commonly charged than lobbyists are ready to admit. Few think such fees 
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raise an issue of propriety. Sometimes they will do work on a loss-leader 
basis to encourage more work later. When clients are in straitened 
circumstances as when market regulators appear, fees rise exponentially. 
Hired lobbyists do not work on behalf of issues: they work for clients. They 
are client-led. They offer a range of services to clients and within it, they will 
do what clients want. They let clients 'pick 'n mix' their services. 
Commercial lobbyists do what clients want but they do have work 
preferences. Their pattern of preferences suggests (Chapter Six, 135-136) two 
conceptually ideal types of lobbyist: the backgrounder and the 
foregrounder. These types can be useful in categorising and analysing the 
work of lobbyists but no lobbyist can be, by definition, a backgrounder or a 
foregrounder. The balance of data in this research is that backgrounder 
characteristics are more common in lobbyists. For business reasons, they 
more frequently do the process work of advising about whom to contact and 
about how a case should be presented: they prefer not to represent clients 
alone before decision-makers; and they work for too many different clients to 
be policy experts of any depth. They are content to be more silent and 
unseen in public than voluble and visible. They would prefer not to run 
public media campaigns but will if these further the clients' interest. They 
are more unsighted advisers than public actors. They are temporary civil 
servants to their client principals. 
Varied relationships with decision-makers 
To satisfy clients, commercial lobbyists need at least the acquiescence of the 
decision-makers so that they can be role players in the policy-making 
process. To embellish the hyphen metaphor of Norton and Grantham (1986), 
they need to be well connected on both the business and political sides of 
their decision-making. In fact, they have a range of relationships with 
decision-makers, the latter being anything from suspicious or envious to 
supportive (Chapter Seven). Some decision-makers see them as unwelcome 
interlopers in a bilateral relationship between interests and policy-makers. 
But in general they have enough of the neutral opinion and of the passive co- 
operation of decision-makers in order to operate. (There is some evidence 
that the good opinion of MPs is being strained. ) 
Commercial lobbyists believe that they are offering the advantage of mutual 
benefit to decision-makers in the form of an information exchange about how 
policies do or would work. They most commonly say that decision-makers 
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see the benefit but they also note the presence of distorting filters, such as 
personal chemistry, political partisanship and their own reputation. The "for 
hire' feature works assymetrically here both for and against their interests. It 
can mean that with many clients, they do not concentrate their contacts on 
small numbers of decision-makers and so fray relationships; but they can be 
seen by some decision-makers as dilettantes or as seekers of public policy 
information for profit. 
On the other side of the relationship, fieldwork with the decision-makers 
indicates that the latter accept commercial lobbyists in the sense of tolerating 
an extant feature of the policy process to which they have occasional 
recourse. Some of the toleration edges towards enthusiasm: some borders on 
contempt. Decision-makers see new information as the benefit of their 
relationship with the lobbyists. In fact, it is the major - if not the only - 
benefit in their perception of the relationship. (York [1986] argued that 
lobbying could be seen as a social good because it supplies information on 
policy costs and benefits) 
Commercial lobbyists are not seen as central role players: rather they are 
viewed as not very visible and as passive aides to a principal. Although 
decision-makers identify cases of effectiveness involving individual 
lobbyists, the latters' role as influencers of policy is, except in unusual 
circumstances, put at the margin. The data on this point suggests the 
potency of the backgrounder category of lobbying behaviour. But this 
picture of lobbyist as passive support is from a specific social location - that 
of the decision-maker. From the client's location, the lobbyist he has hired 
may be much more active and initiating and in line with the foregrounder 
category of behaviour. Decision-makers see hired lobbyists from the 
constitutional and macro political point of view. Clients see things 
differently: they see the matters about which they hire lobbyists as major 
influences on their affairs. What is minor to Government may be major to an 
interest. 
1950 to 1994: 
_a 
long 12ersl2ective 
It is illuminating to contrast commercial lobbyists today with their 
equivalents or near-equivalents in the late 1940s for what the comparison 
reveals by way of similarities and differences. 
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The Report of the Committee on Intermediaries was presented to Prime 
Minister Attlee in March, 1950. Its terms of references instructed it (par 1) 'to 
inquire how far persons are making a business of acting as specialists in the 
submission of applications for licences and permits, or otherwise as 
intermediaries between Government Departments and the public; and to 
report whether the activities of such persons are liable to give rise to 
abuses .. . (2n) 
The Committee gave examples of areas covered by commercial lobbyists of 
the 1940s: income tax disputes and claims; Admiralty contracts; import/ 
export licences; help for a 'firm with a synthetic substitute for a natural 
material who had retained him to help them put that product on the market' 
(157); patent claims; pension claims; making supplementary petrol 
applications, getting building licences and seeking departmental purchasing 
contracts. Many of the intermediaries had been civil servants in wartime: 
references to accountants were frequent. The examples reflected the 
activities of Government of the day - "the working of a widespread system of 
controls' (105) - and it is apparent that much of the work was about 
representing individuals as well as companies. 'Big firms' were not found to 
need intermediaries while a few -smaller firms'did. (108-115) Whitehall 
Departments reported a stream of intermediaries coming and going before 
them: it was understood that one 'has now taken up a fried fish shop and 
grocery business. (160) 
It concluded that (206) 'there are persons making a business' but that 'they 
are few in number and do not occupy an important part in the field in which 
scope for intermediary activities exists' and 'that the activities of such 
persons are clearly liable to give rise to abuse but we are not satisfied that 
these activities are on such a scale as would justify the attempt to apply any 
general restriction on them. ' 
The Committee (207) did not want to hinder the hyphen function. It said: 
"without some form of intermediary activity, using the term in its widest 
sense, it is difficult to see how some of the controls could be effectively 
operated. ' This one sentence concedes the conceptual case for contemporary 
commercial lobbyists. 
The Committee offered (203) the following reasons why intermediaries 
would stay few in number. The administrative machine of the day, still 
running elements of the wartime command economy with many 
bureaucratic controls, was too complex for an individual to patrol. 
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Further, in an early appearance of the legal comparison., it noted that the 
intermediary 'is in much the same position as a lawyer would be in if there 
were no books or methods of instruction both in the substance of the law and 
the procedure of its administration. ' Thirdly, the intermediary's contacts in 
the civil service would be moving posts through job changes and 
promotions. The report called the contact knowledge of lobbyists 'a wasting 
asset. ' It also noted the need the intermediary has of a good reputation with 
decision-makers: to be regarded as a 'responsible and reliable person. " (204) 
Reputation would be risked by taking up bad cases. 
The Committee also noted (205) that the need for intermediaries diminishes 
'in proportion to the extent to which a Department succeeds in making itself 
accessible to, and its procedure understood by, the public'. Intermediaries 
are needed when Departments are 'remote and incomprehensible. ' The need 
for simple and understandable administrative procedures was stressed in the 
Committee's recommendations: as was that private intermediaries should 
declare who they were acting for and that if the declaration did not satisfy 
the Department,, it should deal directly with the 'applicant. ' ( 209) 
The similarities and differences between 1950 and 1994 are striking. The 
most noticeable difference between then and now is the existence of the 
contemporary intermediaries - commercial lobbyists - as a broadly accepted 
set of role players in the public policy-making process, a group with an 
estimated, current E25m fee turnover. The Report was therefore wrong in its 
basic judgement that there was little scope for intermediaries. Doig (1990) 
noted this, saying that it was not foreseen how former politicans and civil 
servants could exploit their knowledge as intermediaries. Also different is 
the absence today of any widespread sense that the intermediaries exist 
because of inadequate public administration by Government or that 
Government holds the key to the future of commercial lobbyists in its own 
administrative reform. That view of active, reforming Government was 
explicit in the 1950 Report. Today one strong theme in any debate about the 
reasons for the existence of lobbying firms would be that a private business 
provides services which public administration cannot or should not. 
It can also be noted that, over the last forty years, although the type of 
Government involvement in the economy has moved away from direct, 
physical control and rationing, the policy of involvement is not diminished: it 
now takes the form of group regulation. (3n) Government continues to 
create the demand for lobbying. 
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Another link with the 1950 Report is the view of decision-makers now that 
Whitehall could reduce demand by interests for hired lobbyists. 
Departments could do this through procedural devices of openness and 
direct contact with the external world. This would reduce the nurturing 
conditions of ignorance, alienation and dazzlement about Westminster and 
Whitehall amongst interests which encourage the growth of commercial 
lobbyists. 
We have been much impressed by the fact that the usefulness of 
an intermediary diminishes in proportion to the extent to which a 
Department succeeds in making itself accessible to and its 
procedure understood by the public. (205) 
In developing this argument of departmental openness, it is useful to 
remember that intermediaries (third parties in a relationship) can take many 
forms, including the collective and individual. One such collective form was 
suggested by the unattributable Under-secretary who talked of conferences, 
seminars, meetings organised under the auspices of his Department. It is 
also possible to reduce the need for intermediaries through personal access: 
departments could nominate individual officials as 'easy entry points' for 
groups. A civil servant respondent talked about the need for these forms of 
direct contact in an actively critical sense when he said that Departments 
were 'at fault' when public sector bodies used hired lobbyists in their 
relationship with Whitehall and Westminster. 
Direct contact can also be a potential sanction in any regulatory regime 
against commercial lobbyists. The 1950 Committee saw this when it 
recommended that departments should by-pass intermediaries if 
relationships were not satisfactory. One intermediary said that 'the Ministry 
had put him out of business. ' 
This research has shown that commercial lobbyists today are needed by 'big 
firms' in a way unknown in the late 1940s while the representation of 
individuals is now rarely done by them: today's intermediaries are corporate 
representatives. The 1940s pattern of work with its emphasis on individual 
interests was a response to a widespread command economy including retail 
rationing. The same responsiveness can be seen today, albeit in areas 
affected by the contemporary pattern of Government activity. For example, 
it can be seen in the large number of local authorities which have hired 
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lobbyists to deal with the review of local government; and also in private and 
public sector bodies who have hired lobbyists as they cope with regulatory 
regimes . 
The well connected hyphen 
Commercial lobbyists need corporate clients to survive as a business: equally 
they need Government in the sense that the Government's policies of 
regulation and reform create circumstances where there is a demand from 
large plcs for lobbyists. They also need Government in a narrower, 
operational sense: they supply access and representational services to clients 
and they could not deliver these to clients if the Government refused to deal 
with them. There can be tension in these linkages. In their contemporary 
study of hired lobbyists in Washington, Heinz et al (1993; 61) said: 
The ability of private representatives [hired lobbyists] to trade on 
their knowledge and contacts at an agency where they were 
previously employed gives Washington insiders a large stake in 
their relationships with the agencies. They may thus be as 
concerned to accommodate government officials as to satisfy their 
clients. Because Washington representatives are pulled toward 
both the client and the government, they may play one against the 
other and attempt to please both. 
Hyphens can be seen as pulling elements together or separating them. The 
data from this research is in support of the connecting function. As noted 
above, the 1950 Committee spoke of the need by Government for 
'intermediary activity, using the term in its widest sense' and this is reflected 
in the fieldwork with lobbyists (Chapters Five and Six) and with decision- 
makers (Chapter Seven): Government needs contact, information and ideas 
from outside itself. If commercial lobbyists in the UK today were faced with 
a hostile regulatory regime against them., this argument of beneficial 
information flows for the public policy-making process would be a powerful 
counter to their critics. 
Potential threats about - but never actual introduction of - regulation of 
lobbyists is another similarity with the latter 1940s. The scale of abuse then 
was too small to justify a general regulation: the recommendation was 
different behaviour by the Departments. Today, there is hardly any attention 
on this Departmental /commercial lobbyist relationship. Instead, the 
203 
Commons in 1992 decided not to press ahead with a partial restriction in the 
form of a Parliamentary Register of hired lobbyists and referred the matter 
back to the Select Committee. 
In summary, it is argued that hired lobbyists today excite a low level, non- 
specific concern: but the concern has so far never translated into any direct 
regulation of their activities, partial or general. Illustrating the unfocused 
and weak nature of that concern is the provenance of the latest proposal for 
regulation. The source is the PRCA (Public Relations Consultants' 
Association), a private trade association which has stepped in following the 
current refusal of Parliament to start a lobbyists' register (4n). The PRCA's 
jurisdiction, and even presence, in the field of commercial lobbying is 
strongly disputed by some major lobbying firms. To the larger public, it is an 
unknown body. 
But the matter of which body - if any - regulates commercial lobbyists is 
dependent on an earlier question of whether their role in public policy- 
making can be evaluated and so judgements made about their effectiveness 
in influencing lobbying outcomes. If they are not effective or influential, 
there is no case for regulating them. 
Commercial lobbyists and effectiveness 
It can be argued that the more academic work done on lobbying, the less the 
ability of the observer to predict or even accurately describe the activity. It is 
as though the fabric under hand cannot bear too heavy a stitch. The certainty 
of the "iron triangle' (where lobbyists could be placed as reinforcing bolts at 
the interest group corner) has been replaced by the more delicate and diffuse 
images of 'policy networks' and 'policy communities. ' Richardson (1993; 7) 
comments on this loss of predictability. 
This progression of image towards the diaphanous continues. Heinz et al 
write about the 'hollow core: that is the title of their decade-long study of 
interest group activity in Washington with particular reference to the 
representative (commercial) lobbyist. They have dispelled any image of 
/capture' of the policy-making process by private interests or their agents. 
They write that: 
A part of the reason for the uncertainty in outcomes that we 
observed ... is that power countervailed power. 
In any real 
contest, it is problematic to predict outcomes with certainty. (391) 
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In their preface (xvi), they explain that their preferred meaning of the title 
was that: 
... it might mean that the networks of policy- makers lack central 
actors who stand in the middle of the system and have the ability 
to shape winning coalitions. That is, the hollow core might be an 
image that is something like the opposite of the power elite. 
Furthermore, they doubt (369) the effectiveness of interest group activity 
generally: 
Although greater numbers of organisations, of all types ... actively 
monitor and participate in the making of national policy, and 
although the scope and intensity of their efforts has [sic] increased 
significantly, the returns on these efforts are not at all clear. 
They add (407) that the 'absence of strong effects here [private interest 
representation] is not a methodological failing so much as a reflection of the 
uncertain and situational nature of influence in national policy-making 
systems. ' 
Their final judgement is that increased interest group activity does not 
change the balance of power amongst policy-making players and that the 
policy-making system is stable: 'thus the policy system may move very little 
despite escalating effort. ' (412) 
The Heinz et al study had a wider purview than this thesis in that it 
broadened out into the general aspects of (American) interest group politics. 
But this thesis has reached similar conclusions about evaluation and about 
effectiveness. The literature review here suggests that the problems of 
evaluating the effectiveness of interest group activity in the UK is 
unresolved: and that the problems extend to the agents of groups, such as 
hired lobbyists. This research confirms Grant's judgement (1989) that it is the 
methodological problems facing the whole field of group activity which 
prevents evaluation of effectiveness. But if effectiveness cannot be 
demonstrated via a coherent and explicit methodology, can it be inferred 
intuitively and judgementally from the data? The data from this research 
suggests that commercial lobbyists achieve low levels of effectiveness, 
defined as the ability to achieve pre-stated and measurable goals by their 
own behaviours. The general inference is that, in most cases, they are minor 
role-players of low effectiveness in the public policy-making process. 
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The fieldwork shows that the clients do not hire lobbyists on the assumption 
that they are per se the crucial, extra resource which will win the battle for 
advantage for their employers. Rather clients are hiring an extra resource, an 
aide, an auxiliary. They hire in a range of services - basic document 
monitoring upwards - from commercial lobbyists as a support for their pre- 
existing lobbying activities. These hirings are reinforcements: large plcs 
invariably have their own political network of contacts and also the capacity 
to articulate their case. Commercial lobbyists are wanted for what extra they 
bring to a scene already supplied with lobbying capacity. In that sense they 
are a corporate access= and when hired, a needed and valued one. They 
are part of somebody else's team; they usually follow somebody else's game 
plan, and they play on a pitch not of their choosing. 
Commercial lobbyists themselves invariably hesitate to claim a clear, causal 
relationship between their efforts and lobbying outcomes. They do not claim 
a formula for successful lobbying; they accept that evaluation of their 
effectiveness is difficult. Typically their promotional literature talks about 
advising clients on "how to influence events in the political arena'; that 
political contacts can reveal 'commercial opportunities and provide 
protection from potentially harmful legislation' and 'advice and assistance in 
preparing, presenting and assessing cases made to Government. ' 
Commercial lobbyists are sensitive about the evaluation of their outcomes as 
a group and as individuals and it is, in part, because of their 'for hire' feature. 
Faced towards decision-makers, they can accept with constitutional 
propriety and professional equanimity both the general case that group 
effectiveness is difficult to evaluate and that their own effectiveness as a 
supporting service to groups is also difficult to evaluate. 
But they cannot be so relaxed when they face their clients. Their first task is 
to please the client paying their fees: to provide their clients with value for 
money, a phrase which is effectiveness looked at from the point of view of 
the hirer-hired relationship. They do not have to provide - unless asked -a 
definition of their own effectiveness. In this, they are like all corporate 
advisers. They are client-led in everything that they do. For them, therefore, 
the key question is not how they themselves evaluate effectiveness; rather it 
is how do clients evaluate it. 
In their relationship with clients, commercial lobbyists benefit from these 
difficulties of evaluation. Empirically, clients show considerable diversity in 
their evaluation benchmarks: from being better understood by policy- 
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makers; to a 'feel good' factor that they have set foot in the inner sanctum of 
policy-making, to a demand that a fixed legislative outcome happens. There 
is no universal benchmark. 
In their client relationships therefore, commercial lobbyists firstly listen and 
usually then suggest a simultaneous, twin-track approach to evaluating 
effectiveness. The first track is to make judgements about observable 
activities which are agreed as - or are implied to be - goals; e. g. seeing an 
important Minister, civil servant, special adviser or MP; or winning a tax 
concession. The second track is to agree or imply as goals less observable 
activities, e. g. gaining higher personal profile among decision-makers or 
creating greater awareness about the client. In this way, the measurable and 
imponderable aspects of evaluating effectiveness are incorporated into 
clients' judgements about value for money and are inextricably mixed 
together. The corporate adviser can survive for another hiring. 
The fieldwork showed this process at work. Measurable effectiveness was 
claimed for a Private Members' Bill on bingo advertising; for aspects of the 
Broadcasting Act in relation to the ITV Association; for aspects of the Water 
Act in relation to the Water Services Association and for the contents of EU 
directives on packaging. More imponderable were claims such as 'you've 
positioned the client as an adviser to Government' and the impact on 
/opinion forming and in moving a particular policy issue forward. ' 
The analysis above has been about evaluating the effectiveness of commercial 
lobbyists as agents of interests. The literature review showed that 
effectiveness could also be approached at a more micro level of activity: 
namely the operational behaviour of individual lobbyists. This is the 
attribute-listing, the good practice approach to the work of professionals, 
with its focus on individual behaviours rather than group outcomes. This 
research further developed this approach in Appendix Four, 225 when 
decision-makers were asked about individual attributes of lobbyists. But this 
research can find no consistent positive correlations between good practice 
by individual UK commercial lobbyists and outcomes they sought for their 
hirers. It can describe desirable behaviour noted by other policy players: it 
cannot describe effective behaviour needed for desired outcomes. 
This is in line with the finding of Heinz et al (408) who concluded that there 
was no clear connection between the hiring of 'Washington heavyweights" as 
lobbyists and desired policy outcomes: 'we doubt that the search for 
individual influence is likely to produce many theoretical insights into the 
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nature of the national policy-making process. ' The individual attributes of 
commercial lobbyists therefore have not been identified in this research as a 
determinant of - or as a significant pre-disposing factor making for - desired 
lobbying outcomes. The lobbyists who display the attributes of good 
practice may get hired more frequently but it is not clear that their lobbying 
achieves more. 
Claims of individual, good, lobbying practice were made by the lobbyists 
themselves, by clients and decision-makers. Most of the claims reported in 
the fieldwork were already cited in the literature reviewed at the start. But 
there was one noticeable difference between the fieldwork and the American 
literature. The most commonly reported attribute of American good practice 
was a good ethical opinion about the lobbyist: the ethical attribute did not 
emerge from the UK fieldwork. 
Theoretical perspectives on commercial lobbying 
Chapter Two on theoretical perspectives argued that neo-pluralism, as 
elaborated by Lindblom (197), offered the best 'fit' explanation of commercial 
lobbying as portrayed in the literature. Is this confirmed by the fieldwork? 
Generally yes but in an attenuated way. 
The answer is reviewed below alongside some methodological problems 
which arises in the process of answering. The question of best theoretical 'fit' 
was asked before the fieldwork and this timing allows the possibility of a 
self-fulfilling answer: that the data has been unconsciously "fitted' by the 
researcher to the neo-pluralist expectation. This speculation propels this 
thesis into profound questions about the nature of research. There is no easy 
epistemological answer for it is not sustainable in a philosophical sense to 
argue that the researcher's mind be drained of pre-suppositions before 
research began (Eagleton 1991). 
But safeguards can be constructed against this fallacy. Firstly, there is the 
nature of the PhD task itself which encourages the public statement of 
theoretical underpinnings of fieldwork, both philosophical and 
methodological, and then scrutinises the relationship between fieldwork and 
theory. This has happened here. Perspectives other than the neo-pluralist 
(the classical pluralist and the neo-Marxist from the standpoint of public 
relations and group behaviour) were posited and found relatively lacking in 
explanatory power. Fieldwork confirmed the strong links between large 
companies and hired lobbyists suggested in the secondary research. It is 
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argued that the classical pluralist perspective could not persuasively explain 
why business provides the majority of clients for hired lobbyists or the issues 
lobbied. The data provided little demonstration of the validity of the critical, 
neo-Marxist perspective. The classical was too weak and too thinly 
elaborated a perspective to accommodate the richness of the data; the critical 
perspective too elusive to be operationalised by the fieldwork. But the 
exploration of these two rejected perspectives was not a waste of research 
effort. The classical reminded the research that the business/hired lobbyist 
link happened in a context of general lobbying by a great range of interests 
and that there was a complicated 'balance wheel' (Truman's phrase) keeping 
this general competition of interests stable. The critical perspective was a 
reminder that an analytically powerful tool such as information subsidy 
could provide conceptual insights even if the fieldwork did not yield 
empirical support for the validity of the tool. 
Another constraint against the self-fulfilling fallacy was the fieldwork 
approach adopted. The same data fields were covered with the three sub- 
populations involved in commercial lobbying - clients, lobbyists and 
decision-makers. This triangulation confirmed the salience of business/ 
businesses as clients; the perceived importance of these businesses to the UK 
economy and to Government as market regulator; the struggle for 
competitive advantage by sectors and single entities inside the business bloc; 
the success and failure of lobbies; the large lobbying resources available to 
big companies and a varying propensity to hire lobbyists. These findings are 
supportive of a neo-pluralist, Lindblomite perspective: hiring lobbyists is an 
expression of the privileged but challenged and fractured position of 
business /businesses in a market economy. 
The above analysis assumes commercial lobbying is an accessory to group 
activity and it is an attempt to answer the question why businesses lobby 
using hired lobbyists. In this formulation, the role of commercial lobbyists is 
predicated on the independent and undifferentiated activity of business 
lobbying; commercial lobbying is a subordinate variable. The neo-pluralist 
perspective therefore provides only a strong, implied answer to the 
particular question 'why hire lobbyists. ' It cannot very specifically handle 
the centrality in this thesis of the hired lobbyist. 
The future - regular soldiers of the Transl2arent Em ", 
There is no evidence of an organised and persistent critical voice against 
commercial lobbyists in the UK. Doig's critical academic work about them 
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(1986,1990,1991) has not been echoed by others. Hollingsworth's more 
popular approach (1991) which looked at MPs and their outside interests has 
not been taken up in sustained newspaper or civil liberties campaigns. The 
Observer and The Independent newspapers periodically publish critical 
pieces but they have not led to a public outcry and popular calls for reform. 
Berry (1993) has sought to re-assure the centre-left that commercial lobbyists 
are not a matter for concern. PR Week periodically urges them to self- 
regulate before they are regulated. 
What does exist - and the literature shows has existed immemorially - is a 
popular suspicion that hired lobbyists are helping the already powerful to 
become more powerful. This suspicion surfaces in unflattering epithets such 
as 'corridor creeps' and 'influence peddlers' if the speaker is basically 
antipathetic; and in 'naughty and nice', 'escort agency' and 'access brokers' 
imagery if the speaker is more forgiving. Suspicion is also increased when 
commercial lobbyists charge success fees where they gain financially from 
the achievement of a pre-defined outcome. This practice is potentially a 
corrosive influence on standards of public propriety for it makes a direct 
linkage between the individual behaviour of players in policy-making and 
their monetary reward and so raises questions about motivation. 
Commercial lobbyists react to these overall concerns by talking generically 
about lobbying and lobbyists but by hardly ever using the terms as self- 
descriptors. 
Commercial lobbyists are a small, distinct, accepted but minor addition to 
the dramatis -personae of UK public policy-making. They cannot be avoided 
in the policy Process because the general right to lobby is admitted and that 
right is much demanded by the powerful interests in UK society. The 
fieldwork for this research demonstrates that both the hirers of lobbyists and 
the decision-makers who are lobbied accept a role for commercial lobbyists. 
In 1994, they are too well established to be excluded from the policy-making 
process for they live off the opportunities and threats generated by active 
Government in the UK. Ironically, there is work for them when regulation is 
being created and when regulation is being abolished. 
Their contribution to the effectiveness of their clients' lobbying cannot be 
isolated with any precision. They, therefore, cannot be isolated enough from 
their clients to identify them as an 'unethical' or 'undemocratic' distortion of 
the public policy-making process. The agent can hardly be castigated if the 
liberty of the principal to lobby is constitutionally enshrined and politically 
unstoppable. And in a sense, this inability to separate out the hired lobbyists 
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works to their favour, given that they are an extra resource for their clients. 
Like the advertising agency, they may be the marginal addition which makes 
the favourable difference for the client but usually it cannot be demonstrated. 
But even after the data and analysis above, a residue of concern remains. Its 
locus is to be found in some of the current relationships of MPs with 
commercial lobbyists and in some civil service attitudes. This research 
agrees with Berry (1993; 344), who wrote as lobbyist turned academic, that 
'there is no evidence to support the general view that commercial lobbyists 
have in some way set out to corrupt Parliament or to buy special favours in 
Whitehall and Westminster. ' Earlier, he had found (1991; 248) that 'the level 
and scale of abuse appears to be minimal. ' That is an informal finding of this 
research too, although it was not a purpose of this work to investigate such 
evidence. 
But what encourages the populist and negative view of lobbying and 
engenders the conditions for the occasional abuse of Parliament involving 
lobbyists (5n) is the lack of sufficient transparency and openness concerning 
the outside interests of MPs. Progress is slowly being made through 
clarification and tightening up of the rules of disclosure of the Register of 
Members' Interests. The Register now requires (6n) MPs to declare the 
names of any final end client of a lobbying company to which they are linked 
and whose affairs they actively represent. But there is still no requirement 
for MPs to declare what they do for these clients or any reward, pecuniary or 
otherwise, they receive for lobbying on behalf of those clients. No doubt this 
disclosure of fees will be subject to criticism by some MPs on the grounds 
that it is an invasion of their privacy. The most politically potent reply to 
that is Doig's argument that MPs should not be paid for this lobbying work 
as they are already paid to represent interests. The only standard of 
behaviour to allay concerns about the MP/lobbyist link is that Members 
should openly represent whatever interest they like but they should take no 
fees. 
The 40 or so MPs (7n) who work for lobbying firms are doing so in 
accordance with current House rules on disclosure of Members' outside 
interests but the rules are inadequate in regard to transparency and 
openness. These rules do Parliament a disservice and lower its reputation: 
they also mire the reputation of commercial lobbyists. (8n) Not only can it 
be argued that MPs are being double paid to represent interests but they are 
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blurring the distinction between MIP and paid lobbyist; between their 
constitutional freedom to represent any interest in the public interest and 
their political freedom to represent any interest for a fee. 
Berry wrote (1993; 345) that 'lobbyists after all must deal with the system as 
they find it. ' He is right to emphasise the passive and secondary position of 
commercial lobbyists. Their activity is a symptom of and a response to 
systemic needs, not the cause of those needs. They are in themselves minor 
role players in policy-making but because they are lobbyists, they can - 
because of that very designation - be used as a ready-made and convenient 
smokescreen to distract criticism from more important players and more 
important relationships. This may be the case with the external interests of 
MPs. It is therefore argued that systemic reform of aspects of MPs 
relationships with outside interests will benefit the reputation of commercial 
lobbyists. What is publicly known and publicly acceptable should not 
tarnish their reputations and may reduce the unfocused concern felt about 
them. 
The fieldwork among special advisers and civil servants suggests another, 
and possibly more important, area for systemic change. In Whitehall, 
openness and direct contact by Departments with interests would diminish 
the demand by those interests for hired lobbyists. In consequence, the 
interests could in many cases lobby on their own behalf. In a sense, civil 
servants and commercial lobbyists are in competition for access to interests. 
The officials want information and the lobbyists want fees. Officials have it 
in their own power to change their behaviour enough to overcome much of 
that competition. One Under-secretary wrote to this research that his 
colleagues were not in contact with lobbyists and he put this down to "our 
success in making ourselves so accessible as to ruin the lobbyists' sales pitch. ' 
(9n) 
The response of Departments is never likely to be co-ordinated enough and 
their information needs never likely to be simple enough, for the complete 
ruin of the "sales pitch" of lobbyists but it could be reduced in its attraction 
to clients. Again, the point is that commercial lobbyists are a symptom of 
other more important relationships, i. e. the Governmental and interest 
group relationship. This research has listed above two ways (p. 202) for this 
direct contact to increase. 
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Intermediaries can be justified when the interest is in the private sector but 
the justification is not obvious when the interest is in the public sector. It is 
surely a mis-use of public money that one part of the public sector has to buy 
the services of private companies to introduce and represent itself to another 
part of the same sector. 
This research began with the simile of commercial lobbyists as mercenary 
soldiers for Finer's Anonymous Empire of lobbying interests. The Empire 
still needs them today, always as junior officers. More light on all the players 
in the Empire will show clearly what these mercenaries do. And then they 
can be quite safely counted as regular foot soldiers of a Transparent Empire. 
Notes 
L The PR Week editorial of 17 February, 1994 urged commercial lobbyists 
to regulate themselves before someone else did. It noted that 
Parliament has an interest. .. but lobbyists should remember they are 
not part of some quasi-statutory organisation or club. They are 
commercial operators, offering their services for profit. ' This is one of 
the very few public print references to the commercial lobbyists as 
businesses. Two self-regulatory bodies were set up in autumn 1994: the 
Association of Professional Political Consultants (letter from the APPC 
to the author 19 September 1994. ) and 'a rival initiative launched jointly 
by the PRCA and the Institute of Public Relations ... ' (PR Week, 30 
September 1994). The same article also reported a new code of conduct 
for lobbyists in Brussels. 
2. But the terms of references excluded the following class of 
intermediary: 'The inquiry is not intended to cover the activities on 
behalf of their clients by members of recognised professions. ' 
3. The Independent p1 of 20 January, 1994 reported that President of the 
Board of Trade Michael Heseltine had set up seven deregulation task 
forces which had recommended 8 regulations to be repealed out of a 
total of 3,500 reviewed. Heinz et al (385) provide an American 
perspective on the size of regulatory regimes: 'The size of the Federal 
Register, a rough measure of the degree of regulatory change, almost 
tripled from about 30,000 pages in 1970 to just under 90,000 in 1980, 
although the de-regulation of the Reagan era reduced this bureaucratic 
output to 50,000 by 1985-f 
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4. The PRCA was reported in PR Week 17 February, 1994 to be launching 
a Register of Professional Parliamentary Advisers, open to its members 
and non-members. It would list clients and MPs with a pecuniary 
interest in the lobbyist and be lodged at the House of Commons. 
5. The Observer carried a report on 9 April, 1989, alleging 'venal MPs' and 
the payment to MPs of E200 for a written Parliamentary Question. The 
fieldwork for this research did not come across any declared or implied 
improprieties by lobbyists in relation to MPs. John Cole, then BBC 
political editor, said on BBC 2 Newsnight 7 March, 1990 that the rules 
on Members' interests were "shady at the edges': a judgement 
confirmed by embarrassed and angry reaction in the House and 
broadsheet press to the the Riddick/Tredinnick 'questions for afl, 000' 
allegations of 10 July, 1994. 
6. Information confirmed in a telephone conversation with the Office of 
the Registrar in the Commons at 12.30 pm on 4 March, 1994. 
PR Week of 10 March, 1994 listed 43 MPs, all but six Conservatives, 
with links to PR consultancies and lobbying firms. The source was 
reported to be the latest edition of the Register of Members' Interests. 
8. One of the new self-regulatory body the APPC (see 1 above) has in its 
code of conduct for members the following: 'Not to place themselves in 
a position of potential conflict by appointing any MP to their main or 
any subsidiary or associated board or by paying any retainer or 
commission to an MP or person acting on their account. ' (letter to the 
author of 19 September, 1994. ) 




Below is the brief research summary which was sent to all potential 
respondents ahead of interview. 
Commercial lobbyists: a thesis on the 'for hire' 
aspects of their lobbying. 
This research project shows commercial lobbyists to be a small, distinct 
addition to the dramatis personae of UK public policy making; an addition 
which grew in size and influence in the 1980s. They work in businesses 
offering paid services to clients and seek to ensure that client interests are 
treated as favourably as possible in the on-going public policy process. Their 
effectiveness is judged against personal attributes and professional actions 
which achieve - or do not - that favourable treatment. They trade under 
various titles and some declare themselves to be in public relations. Their 
public image is a mixed one. 
By occupational background, they are mostly men from political and public 
administrative areas. They sell their services generally to the highest bidder 
and work mostly for big business. Relatively little is known about the 
identity of their clients and how they relate to their clients: how their clients 
define value for fees is unknown. 
Commercial lobbyists are mostly discreet about their clients' identities and 
about the issues lobbied on and about methods. But there is no or little 
evidence that the lobbying methods they employ are different from the 
methods of in-house lobbyists. Good practice on when to lobby in policy 
formation, on what aspects and to whom seems common with in-house 
lobbyists. 
This research therefore suggests that there is a significant knowledge gap 
about commercial lobbyists in relation to their 'for hire' characteristic - their 
most differentiating feature. The task of this thesis is therefore to investigate 
questions generated by this characteristic. Questions such as: why and how 
are clients selected; how are fees agreed; how do clients define successful 
lobbying by hired specialists; how do MPs, Ministers and civil servants view 
lobbyists with multiple clients? 
Kevin Moloney, Bournemouth University, 8 February, 1993. 
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Agoendix Two 
The Interview Schedule 
A total of thirty eight interviews were carried out for the research. Issues of 
research design, sampling, interview structure and technique are discussed 
in Chapter Three on Methodology. 
Eleven of the interviews were with clients; 17 with lobbyists (four of them 
were pilot interviews) and ten with decision-makers (including one with a 
representative of senior civil servants). Thirty two were recorded at the time 
of interview and then transcribed. In the case of three (David Wedgewood, 
Tom Watson and Douglas Smith), transcriptions of the interviews were 
prepared afterwards and agreed with the interviewees. In the case of 
another three (Patrick Robertson of Taskforce Communications, Eleanor 
Laing, special adviser to the Secretary of State for Transport and an unnamed 
Under-secretary), a recorded note of the interviews was made within hours 
by the research author and then transcribed. The interview with Eleanor 
Laing was the only telephone interview. 
The interviews were attributable in 32 cases. Of the six others, Eleanor Laing 
and Patrick Robertson were happy to be named as research respondents as 
long as their views were not attributed to them. 
The pilot interviews 
Interview with lobbyist David Wedgwood of Wedgwood Markham 
Associates at Senate House, University of London, March 15,199 1. 
2. Interview with lobbyist jenny Jeger of GJW in her office at 64, Clapham 
Rd., Kennington, London, June 21,199 1. 
3. Interview with local lobbyist Tom Watson, managing director of 
Hallmark Marketing Services, at his office in Winchester, Tuesday, July 
23,1991. 
4. Interview with Douglas Smith, Managing Director of Westminster 
Advisers at Rodin's Restaurant, Millbank, Friday, December 18,1992. 
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Interviews with clients 
Eleven interviews were carried out with the following corporate managers of 
private sector companies. Moore (1991, p. 27) found individual firms to be of 
'overwhelming importance' in his monograph of lobbyists GJW. One 
interview in this section was on an unattributable basis and the name of the 
person and the company are known only to the author and his supervisors. 
la. Unattributable interview with the former Government Relations 
Manager of a UK based international energy group at his home, March 
1,1993. 
2a. Interview with Charles Lewis, Corporate Communications Manager of 
British Steel at corporate headquarters, London April 8,1993. 
3a. Interview with Frances Elliott, Government Relations Manager of 
Thorn-EMI at corporate headquarters, London, April 23,1993. 
4a. Interview with Martin Knight, Parliamentary and Corporate Relations 
Manager of IBM UK at corporate headquarters, London, April 24,1993. 
5a. Interview with David Ramsden, Public Affairs Manager of the stores 
group Kingfisher at the Royal Bath Hotel, Bournemouth, April 26,1993. 
6a. Interview with Anthony Weale, Goverrument and Trade Affairs 
Manager, ICI at corporate headquarters, Millbank, London, May 13, 
1993. 
7a. Interview with Keith Lockwood, Government Affairs Manager for 
Vauxhall and General Motors in the UK, at the Reform Club, London, 
May 25,1993. 
8a. Interview with Brian Millner, Public Affairs Adviser to Pilkington, at 
Selwyn House, St. james's, London, May 25,1993. 
9a. Interview with Christopher Leaver, Public Relations Director of J. 
Sainsbury, at corporate headquarters, Samford St, London, June 9,1993. 
10a. Interview with Tessa Marston, Director of European Government 
Relations for Grand Metropolitan, at corporate headquarters, St. James's 
Square, London, Wednesday, June 20,1993. 
Ila. Interview with Chrissie Kimmons, Director of Industry and External 
Affairs for Glaxo Pharmaceuticals UK at company headquarters, 
Stockley Park West, Uxbridge, Friday, August 6,1993. 
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Interviews with lobbyists 
Thirteen interviews were carried out with the following lobbyists: 
lb. Interview with Fred Morgan, partner in Westminster Advisers. at their 
offices at 29 Tufton St., Westminster, London., June 22,, 1993. 
2b. Interview with Peter Moore of Market Access International at their 
offices at 7 The Sanctuary, Parliament Square, Westminster, London, 
July 14,1993. 
3b. Interview with Michael Burrell, managing director of Westminister 
Strategy, at their offices at I Dean's Yard, Westminster, London, July 30, 
1993. 
4b. Interview with Dr. Martin Smith, Managing Director of Government 
Policy Consultants, at their offices at 29 Tufton St., Westminster, 
London, July 30,1993. 
5b. Interview with David Perchard of David Perchard Associates at their 
offices at 1, College St., St. Albans, Hertfordshire, July 30,1993. 
6b. Interview with Simon Nayyar, Account Manager of Westminster 
Communications, at their offices at 9 Little Cowley St., Westminster, 
August 9,1993. 
7b. Interview with Tim Rycroft of Good Relations at 7 Hertford St, Mayfair, 
London, August 20,1993. 
8b. Interview with Charles Miller of The Public Policy Unit, at their offices 
at 50 Rochester Row, Victoria, London, August 20,1993. 
9b. Interview with Evie Soames, Managing Director of Charles Barker 
Public Affairs Group, at their offices at 56 Dean St., Soho, London, 
August 26,1993. 
10b. Unattributable interview with a'senior consultant' in public affairs for a 
London public relations consultancy at their City of London offices, 
August 26,1993. 
11b. Interview with Tessa Devlin, public affairs consultant of College Hill 
Associates, at their offices at College Hill, Cannon St., City of London, 
September 24,1993. 
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12b. Interview with Tom McNally, Director of Shandwick Public Affairs, at 
their City of London offices at Dauntsey House, Frederick St., Old 
Jewry, October 11,1993. 
13a Interview with Patrick Robertson of Taskforce Communications at his 
home/office at Denbigh St., Plimico, London, January 24,1994. He was 
happy to be identified as a research participant but did not want his 
views attributed to him. 
Interviews with decision-makers 
Interviews were held with following nine decision-makers and a 
representative of senior civil servants: 
1c. Interview with Kenneth Carlisle MP, former Minister for Defence 
Procurement and for Roads, in the House of Commons, November 22, 
1993. 
2c. Interview with Robert Dunn MP, Chairman of the Conservative 
Backbench Transport Committee, in the House of Commons, November 
22,1993. 
3c. Interview with Sir Anthony Durant MP, Chairman of the Conservative 
Backbench Environment Committee, in the House of Commons, 
December 6,1993. 
4c Interview with John Mills, the Under-Secretary who is Director of 
Consumer Affairs at the Office of Fair Trading, at the OFT office in 
Bream's Buildings, off Chancery Lane, December 20,1993. 
5c. Interview with Cliff Grantham, special adviser, at the Department for 
Education, Sanctuary Building, Great Smith St., Westminster, December 
20,1993. 
6c. Interview on the telephone with Eleanor Laing, special adviser to the 
Secretary of State for Transport,, at 4.15. pm, January 14,1994. Notes of 
the 20 minute conversation recorded on tape one hour later. She was 
happy to be listed as a research participant but did not want her views 
attributed. 
7c. Interview on May 17,1994 in London with an anonymous former 
special adviser who had worked in a Department of State and in the 
Downing St. Policy Unit. The person is now a commercial lobbyist. 
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8c. Interview with Bill Robinson, former special adviser for two and a half 
years to Norman Lamont when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, at 
his office in London Economics, New Cavendish St., London, 17 
January, 1994. 
9c. Interview with an anonymous Under-Secretary in a Department of 
State implementing an active reform programme in his London office, 
January 24,1994. 
10c. Interview with Liz Symons, General Secretary of The Association of 
First Division Civil Servants (FDA) at 2, Caxton St., London, head 
office, April 20,1994. 
Fieldwork contributors 
The following individuals made data and views available to the fieldwork 
for this research but were not part of the formal interview schedule: Craig 
Ryan, research officer of the senior civil servants union, the FDA; Jeremy 
Mayhew, a former special adviser at the Department of Trade and Industry; 
Kay Dixon, former secretary to Robert Adley, the deceased MP for 
Christchurch and now personal assistant at the Department for Education; 
Robert Keen, a public affairs consultant 1969-1992, latterly wih Charles 
Barker and currently guest lecturer at Bournemouth University. 
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ADr)endix Three 
A note on commercial lobbying and 
Parliamentary representation 
Lobbyists represent the collectivity of a group interest while MPs represent 
the individuals in a territory defined as a Parliamentary constituency. Thus 
Parliament is a formal political institution representing electors and is the 
focus of attention from group interests. It is relevant therefore to examine 
the role of commercial lobbyists as an element in the tension between 
theories of individual representation and functional representation. judge 
(1993; 106 -132) has reviewed theories of pluralism, corporatism and policy 
communities and networks in the light of Parliamentary representation. In 
that review, commercial lobbyists made an explicit entrance in the form of 
Ian Greer Associates when the latter were hired by Thames Water Authority 
(127) 'in order to amplify its opposition within Westminster to the regulatory 
authority. . .' The theoretical explanation is the concept of 'issue escape' 
where there is a breakdown in a policy community /network and there is an 
exceptional transfer of the issue to Parliament for resolution. judge also 
notes the likelihood of backbench revolt in relation to 'issue escape. ' 
In the light of judge, it is possible to elaborate the hyphen metaphor of 
commercial lobbyists. That hyphen operates within theories of functional 
representation and there is therefore a tension between the hyphen and 
liberal theories of individual representation. Functional representation 
draws policy-making away from formal political institutions into policy 
communities /networks and commercial lobbyists are part of the latter as 
when they make direct linkages between their client interests and civil 
servants. But equally they can be part of the apparatus of shifting policy- 
making back to formal institutions (part of the 'issue escape' team) as when 
commercial lobbyists organise briefings for MPs (see references to the 
Sunday trading issue in Chapter Four, 82-83). 
Commercial lobbyists in their hyphen role are a business and it is 
theoretically likely that they will be attracted to interests which can pay and 
those interests are likely to be the more powerful in society. It is therefore 
likely that most commercial lobbying will be for business interests and will 
strengthen the 'special advantages' of business in government decision- 
making noted by Truman (1951; 259). 
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Many UK commercial lobbyists - but not all - are discreet about their clients 
and thus their hyphens are very often invisible ones. This opaqueness 
mirrors judge's argument (1993; 113) that British pluralism is different to 
American in this aspect of openness. To those who still would echo today 
Finer's famous cry in 1958 and 1965 for 'Light! More Light! ' on interest 
group politics, the torch of transparency should be able to shine on the 
hyphens. 
Theorists such as Judge who argue for the centrality of Parliament in 
decision-making have to attempt a fusion of Liberal theories of 
representation which focus on the individual citizen as the object to be 
represented and functional representation theories such as Whig theory - 
especially as articulated by Burke - which make a corporate interest the 
object to be represented. Clearly the individual elector-MP relationship and 
the lobbyist-MP relationship have a resonance in both Liberal and Whig 
theories in that the voter and the lobbyist can be one and the same person 
and judge (1990; 19-28) has set out some of the similarities and differences. 
Yet it is possible to argue that the rise of the commercial lobbyist represents - 
under certain circumstances -a strengthening of interest groups in the 
politics of Parliament and that the modern role of the MP has to account for 
the tensions created by these competing theories of representation in 
Parliament. 
For example, historically as MPs have been subjected to more lobbying by 
interests, they may find themselves overworked and like Hamlet's 'a man to 
double business bound', they could have their overall effectiveness reduced 
by both overload and internal contradictory pressures. Increasing volumes 
of lobbying make the process of reconciling the constituency interests of 
individual electors, group interests espoused by the MP and the national 
interest -a reconciliation required by Whig theory - correspondingly more 
complex in the terms of a coherent role for the MP-as-decision-maker. 
Reconciliation becomes more difficult also for another reason: interests can 
no longer be so exclusively identified with regions and therefore 
constituencies. For example, MPs in South Wales and Lancashire no longer 
represent the coal industry in the same way today as they did in the 1950s: 
then constituency and group interests corresponded. But today, the number 
of pits in these regions has severely declined. Now the interests these MPs 
may be asked to represent could be associated with the whole national 
territory, e. g. food safety or water pollution. A non-exclusive link between a 
MP"s constituency and the interest represented leads on to a new problematic 
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for the Whig theory to digest. MPs are offered choice about the interests they 
take up in a way that Burke himself did not have when he sat for the great 
seaport of Bristol. Modem characteristics of interests - their number, their 
increasingly pan-national nature., the character of their physical distribution, 
their transience in a fast changing society - suggests questions about the 
ability of MPs to adequately brief themselves about interests they represent: 
choosing interests to represent, developing knowledge and expertise to do so 
effectively may become harder. 
Some empirical light has been shed on these matters by The Government 
(1987) which carried out its aforementioned survey among 120 MPs, 
28 ministers and 43 current or former officials. Eighty per cent of these MPs 
complained about the volume of representation they receive and 79% said 
they have very little time to read and assimilate detailed information. The 
survey also showed that without exception the MPs sampled are committed 
to their role of constituency representative and that a third were not 
interested in representations from outside their constituency and just under 
half the remainder did not wish to consider national lobbies unless they were 
represented in their constituency. 
Despite the growth in lobbying, the survey found that the majority of MPs 
wanted lobbyists to pay regard to their (i. e. that of MPs) specialist interests - 
interests that the majority of the MPs surveyed thought that they should 
develop. The authors of The Government Report are commercial lobbyists 
themselves and they report the reaction to this type of lobbying as tolerant 
but with the proviso that government generally expected lobbying to be done 
directly by clients themselves. 
Another limiting factor for the commercial lobbyist is the constituency focus 
of MPs mentioned above: the implication is that unless the lobbyist can show 
a substantial link in policy or people with the constituency, then the 
lobbyist's role is severely hampered. Michael Burrell, managing director of 
lobbyists Westminster Strategy, (1991; 5), noted this constituency orientation 
and responded by suggesting that lobbyists should provide opportunities for 
MPs to meet voters from their constituencies. Former minister jock Bruce- 
Gardyne (1986) also noted the power of the constituency link: 
Far more effective for the lobbyists, if more expensive and time- 
consuming, is pressure through the grass roots. For no MP can 
safely ignore representations from his voters, however these 
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voters may have been motivated. Nor can the opinions of an MP 
be discounted when they reflect views pressed upon him by his 
voters. (154) 
This constituency constraint on lobbying puts in some doubt the claims of 
lobbyists, especially commercial ones, that one of their functional strengths is 
better access to MPs than that enjoyed by non-professionally represented 
interests. Such a constraint half closes the door to interests and issues which 
cannot be constituency linked and makes way for the unmediated voice of 
local electors. Commercial lobbyists perhaps now need to qualify their 
claims of superior access in the face of the reported strong preference of MPs 
for constituency-related interests and issues. 
In summary, commercial lobbying, representing corporate interests, 
challenges the liberal theory of Parliamentary representation where the focus 
is on the individual voter. But it also poses questions for the Whig theory of 
representation when the sheer number and geographical spread of interests 
raise questions about the effectiveness of any representation by MPs. 
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Amendix Four 
Attributes of the 'perfect' lobbyist for hire 
American literature on contract lobbyists (commercial lobbyists) contains 
several attempts at an attribute-listing analysis of the behaviour of the 
effective lobbyist (see Milbrath, 1963; Dexter, 1969; Berry, 1984; Drew, 1985) 
with considerable emphasis on ethical behaviour. Cigler and Loomis (1991; 
25) also refer to this literature. A review of the American literature Uordon 
and Moloney 1993) has shown that the single most mentioned attribute in the 
USA was the personal ethics of the lobbyist but this feature did not surface in 
any fieldwork data of this research. For the decision-maker respondents 
interviewed here, the focus for ethical concern was themselves in the ways 
shown in Chapter 7, rather than the behaviour of lobbyists. 
The attributes listed below by decision-maker respondents (some 
unattributable) were in reply to the question "describe the behaviour of the 
perfect hired lobbyist': 
Personableness 
'He's aware; he knows the system... he's the sort of person with whom you 
can feel reasonably at ease and that sort of chemistry is very important. ' 
(John Mills) 
'. .. they need an extensive network of contacts in the political world. 
' (Bill 
Robinson) 
Representations are eased with lobbyists who are known beforehand. 
Lobbyists should not press for information which decision-makers are 
reluctant to give. 
'Personal chemistry' with lobbyists was a key to access with the anonymous 
Under-Secretary. 
". .. you need to 
be personable and friendly and not a bore to have a lunch 
with because I think a lot of it depends on that and getting the people over a 
lunch table. ' (Bill Robinson) 
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Policv knowle 
"He's someone who ... knows his patch quite well; who knows that he 
shouldn't phone you up constantly for trivial information. ' (John Mills) 
". 
-. being in a position to tell you something you may not be aware of. ' (Cliff 
Grantham) 
Avoiding the 'superficial and the presentational' and exhibiting policy 
knowledge. (the anonymous Under-Secretary) 
'They have looked at an issue from the perspective of Government and not 
just from their client's interest. They are sensitive to the decision-making 
process and know what is the right time to raise an issue and with whom. ' 
(ex-special adviser) 
'The good ones combine that [personableness] with the ability to master the 
brief of the client.. -' (Bill Robinson) 
'Genuinely deliver access ... and help point up an argument. ' (Liz Symons) 
Recognition of mutualRy- 
'. .. he recognises that you're quite busy and that if he wants to use you in an 
effective way, it's got to be two-way and he's got to offer you meetings or 
visits or conferences which provide a value to the civil servant. ' Uohn Mills) 
Don't waste time, especially with lunches: have focused, half-hour business 
meetings instead. 
Don't ask decision-makers to meet clients when there is no substantial 
benefit forthcoming for the former. 
A good lunch and the company of beautiful women in exchange for 
information already available or easily accessible. (the anonymous Under- 
Secretary) 
Timing 
,(... a firm that approaches you early on is optimising advantage. ' (Cliff 
Grantham) 
'. .. the 
bad lobbyist is somebody who elevates an issue too high, too early 
and ends up just creating ... aggravation. ' 
(ex-special adviser) 
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'. .. trying to get something on the agenda or off the agenda at the 
last 
minute never works. ' (ex-special adviser) 
Contact with client 
".. it's important after the initial contact has been made, to facilitate meetings 
with clients themselves, possibly with the attendance of consultants there if 
necessary. And a good follow-up to that meeting. ' (Cliff Grantham) 
I ... a good lobbyist is somebody whose main involvement is restricted to 
providing advice, intelligence and analysis and who isn't up front ... lets the 
interest they are representing do the talking. .. ' (ex-special adviser) 
'. .. to identify who in the client organisation understands the arguments, 
actually has the personal and other skills to deploy over a lunch table, in a 
meeting or whatever. ' (Bill Robinson) 
227 
Annotated bibliography 
This listing includes referenced texts and those thought to have been 
formative in developing this thesis. The comments are framed in terms of 
the perceived relationship of texts to this research. Entries should be checked 
under the various sub-heads, i. e. books, journals, etc. 
Off icialDublications 
House of Commons. (1984-5). Select Committee on Members' Interests. 
First Report. HOC 408. 
House of Commons. (1987-88). Select Committee on Members' Interests, 
Parliamentary Lobbying. HC 518-1, -2, -3, -4, -6. 
House of Commons. (1990-91). Select Committee on Members' Interests, 
Third Report, Parliamentary Lobbying. HC 586. 
House of Commons. (1991-92). Registration and Declaration of Members' 
Financial Interests. HC 326. 
Local Government Information Unit. (1986). Lifting The Lid on Lobbying. 
London. 
Public Relations Consultants Association. (1988). How to lobby in Britain. 
London. 
Report of the Committee on Intermediaries. (1950). London, HMSO. Cmnd. 
7904. 
Books and monogral2hs 
Abercrombie, N., Hill, S. & Turner, B. (1980) The Dominant Ideology Thesis. 
London, George Allen & Unwin. 
The ruling ideology fractu red. 
Alderman, G. (1984). Pressure Groups and Government in Great Britain. 
London, Longman. 
An early commentator on rise of commercial lobbyists: advocate role butfees hinder 
wider access. 
Baker, T. (1988). arch. Hemel Hempstead, McGraw-Hill. 
228 
Baskin, 0& Aronoff, C. (1988). Public Relations The Profession and the 
Practice. Iowa, USA; Wm- C. Brown. 
PR textbook: lobbying as pluralism. 
Beer, S. H. (1982). Britain Against itself. London, Faber & Faber. 
Berry, J. M. (1984). The Interest Group Socidy. Boston, USA; Little Brown. 
Bottornore, T. (1984). The Frankfurt School. London, Tavistock Publications. 
Bruce-Gardyne, J. (1986). Ministers and Mandarins. London, Sidgwick and 
Jackson. 
Bryce, A. (1928). The American Commonwealth. New York, USA; 
Macmillan. 
Reminds that popular mistrust of lobbying is historical. 
Burnard, P. (1991). "A method of analysing interview transcripts in 
qualitative research. ' In: Nurse Education Today. London, Longman. 461- 
466. 
Burrell, G. & Morgan G. (1979). Sociological Paradigms and Organisational 
Analysis. London, Heinemann. 
Paradigmatic underpinnings for methodology. 
Canfield, B. & Moore, H. (1973). Public Relations: Principles, Cases and 
Problems. Homewood, USA; Richard D. Irwin. 
Textbook. 
Cates, P. (1988). 'Realities of Lobbying and Governmental Affairs. ' In: 
Heath, R. L. and Assocs. Strategic Issues Management. San Francisco, USA; 
Jossey Bass. 238-257. 
Lobbyist's viewfrom an American state. 
Choate, P. (1990). Agents of Influence. London, Business Books. 
Conspiracy view of 'how Japanese lobbyists are manipulating western political and 
economic system. ' 
Cigler, A. & Loomis, B. (1983,1st. ed; 1986,2nd; 1991,3rd. ). Interest 
_politics. 
Washington, USA; CQ Press. 
Outcomes of US group politics more uncertain. 
229 
Cockett, R. (1989). Twilight of Truth London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
In part , history of Downing 
St. press office in context of 1930s appeasementl 
newspaper relations. 
Corbin, J. (1986). 'Coding, writing memos and diagramming. ' 
In: Chenitz, W. & Swanson, J. From Practice to Grounded Theory. 
Qualitative Research in Nursing. Menlo Park, USA; Addison Wesley 
Publications. Ch. 9. 
Researcher-friendly account of developing conceptual patterns in qualitative data. 
Coxall, W. (1985) Parties and Pressure GroWs. London, Longman. 
Crable, R. E. & Vibbert, S. L. (1986). Public Relations as Communication 
Management. Edina, USA; Bellwether. 
Systems approach to public relations. 
Cutlip, S., Center, A. & Broom, G. (1985). Effective Public Relations. 
London, Prenctice-Hall. 
Dahl, R. (1956). A Preface to Democratic Chicago, USA; The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Dahl, R. (1961). Who Governs? New Haven, USA; Yale University Press. 
Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: 12articil2ation and opposition. New Haven, USA; 
Yale University Press. 
Dahl, R. (1989). Democracy and its Critics. New Haven, USA; Yale 
University Press. 
Davies, M. (1985). Politics of Pressure. London, BBC Publications. 
deKieffer, D. (1981). How To Lobby Congress: A Guide For The Citizen 
Lobbyist. New York, USA; Dood Mead. 
A non-business view of lobbying. 
Dexter, L. A. (1969). How Organisations are represented in Washingto 
Indianapolis, USA; Bobbs-Merrill. 
Doig, A. (1990). Westminster Ba London, Allison & Busby. 
In part, statement of the anti MP-as-lobbyist thesis. 
Domhoff, G. (1978). The Powers That Be. New York, USA; Random House. 
230 
Downs, A. (1957). The Economic Base of Democracy. New York, USA; 
Harper & Row. 
Drew, E. (1983; lst. ed. ). 'A Portrait of a Lobbyist. ' In: Cigler, A. & Loomis, 
B. Interest Group Politics. Washington, USA; CQ Press. 217-250. 
The Washington contract lobbyist by an investigative journalist. 
Dubs, A. (1989). Lobbying An Insider's Guide to the Parliamentary Process. 
London, Pluto Press. 
A manualfor voluntary sector lobbying. 
Dunleavy, P. & O'Leary, B. (1987). Theories of the State. 
Basingstoke, Macmillan Education. 
Review of neo-pluralism. 
Eagleton T. (1991). Ideology. London, Verso. 
Views on the underpinning of qualitative research. 
Ellis, N. (1990). Parliamentary Lobbying: Putting The Business Case to 
Parliament. London, Heinemann. 
DIY guide. 
Finer, S. E. (1958; 1966). Anonymous Empire: A Study of the Lobby in Great 
Britain. London, Pall Mall. 
Early evidence of emerging commercial lobbyists. 
Gandy, 0. (1982). Beyond Agenda Setting. Information subsidies and 
Public Norwood, USA; Ablex. 
Develops thesis that lobbying is information subsidised by powerful interests. 
Gandy, 0. (1992). 'Public relations and Public Policy: The Structuration of 
Dominance in the Information Age. ' In: Toth, E. & Heath, R. Rhetorical and 
Critical Approa hes to Public Relations. Hove, Lawrence Erlbaum. 131-163. 
Gardner, J. (1991). Effective Lobbying in the European Community. 
Deventer, The Netherlands; Kluwer Law & Taxation. 
Gill, J. & Johnson, P. (1991). Research Methods For Managers. London Paul 
Chapman. 
Glaser, B. (1978). Theoretical Sensitivity. Mill Hill, USA; The Sociology 
Press. 
Glaser, B. & Strauss, A. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theo 
London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
231 
Grant, W& Marsh, D. (1977). The CBI. London, Hodder and Stoughton. 
Grant, W. (1982). The political economy of industrial policy. London, 
Butterworths. 
Analysis, inter alia, of UK system of industrial representation. 
Grant, W. & Nath, S. (1984). The politics of economic policy making. 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 
Grant, W. (with Sargent, J. ). (1987). Business and Politics in Britain. 
Basingstoke, Macmillan Education. 
Grant, W. (1989). Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain. 
London, Philip Allan. 
Reviews , inter alia, methodological problems of evaluating group effectiveness. 
Grant, W. (1993). 'Pressure Groups and the European Community. ' In: 
Mazey, S. & Richardson, J. Lobbying in the European Community. Oxford, 
OUP. 27-46. 
A view on business as afissiparous interest. 
Grant, W. (1994; 2nd ed. ) Business and Politics in Britain. Basingstoke, The 
Macmillan Press. 
Grantham, C& Seymour-Ure, C. (1990) 'Political Consultants. ' 
In: Parliament and Pressure Politics. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 45-84. 
Broad analysis of commercial lobbyists in policy-making. 
Green, P. (1992). Reputation Risk Management. London, Pitman 
Publishing. 
Greer, 1. (1985). Right to be Heard. London, Ian Greer Associates. 
The commercial lobbyist as polemicist. 
Grunig, J. (1989). 'Symmetrical Presuppositions as a Framework for Public 
Relations Theory. ' In: Botan, C. & Hazleton, V. Jr. (eds. ) Public Relations 
Theory. Hove, Lawrence Erlbaum. 17-44. 
Grunig, J. & Hunt, T. (1984). Managing Public Relations. New York, USA; 
Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 
First statement of current ruling paradigm in public relations practice and theory. 
232 
Grunig, J. & White, J. (1992). 'The Effects of Worldviews on Public Relations 
Theory and Practice. ' In: Grunig, J. (ed. ) Excellence in Public Relations and 
Communication Management. Hove, Lawrence Erlbaum. 31-64. 
Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (1989). Comparative Government and Politics. 
Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
Hamilton, D. et al. (1978) Beyond the Numbers Game. London, Macmillan 
Education. 
Harnmersley, M. (1989). The Dilemma of Qualitative Method. London, 
Routledge. 
Harnmersley, M. & Atkinson, P. (1983). Ethnography: Principles in Practice.. 
London, Tavistock. 
Hayes, M. (1981). Lobbyists and Legislators. New Brunswick, Canada; 
Rutgers University Press. 
Heath, R. & Nelson, R. (1986). Issues Management: Corporate Public 
Policyrnaking in an Information Society. London, Sage. 
A corporate justification for lobbying. 
Heath, R. and Assocs. (1988). Strategic Issues Management. San Fransico, 
USA; Jossey Bass. 
A management theory settingfor lobbying. 
Heinz, J., Laumann, E., Nelson, R. & Salisbury, R. (1993). The Hollow Core. 
Cambridge, USA; Harvard University Press. 
Comprehensive analysis of contract lobbyists in Washington. 
Hennessy, P. (1989). Whitehall. London, Seeker & Warburg. 
Hiebert, R. (1966). Courtier to the crowd: The story of Ivy Lee and the 
develop ent of public relations. Ames, USA; Iowa State University Press. 
Hoffman, J. E. (1980). 'Problems of Access in the Study of Social Elites and 
Boards of Directors. ' In: Shafer, W. B., Stebbins, R. A., & Turowetz, A. 
(Editors) Experiencing Fieldwork. New York, USA; St. Martins Press. 45- 
56. 
Hollingsworth, M. (1991). MPs For Hire. London, Bloomsbury. 
Some MPsconnections with commercial lobbYists. 
233 
Holtzman, A. (1966). Interest groups and Lobbying. New York, USA; 
Macmillan. 
Hughes, J. (1990). The Philosophy of Social Science. Harlow, Longman. 
Researcher-friendly account of methodological underpinnings. 
Jorgensen, D. L. (1989). Participant Observation. London, Sage. 
Jones, B. et al. (1991) Politics UK. Hemel Hempstead, Philip Allan. 
Contemporary UK pressure group analysis. 
Jordan, G. & Richardson, J. (1987). Government and Pressure Grouvs in 
Britain. Oxford, OUP. 
Early use and review of term commercial lobbyists. 
Jordan, G. (ed) (1991). The Commercial Lobbyists. Aberdeen, Aberdeen 
University Press. 
Only dedicated UK text on subject. 
Judge, D. (1990). 'Parliament and Interest Representation. ' In: Rush, M. 
(ed) Parliament and Pressure Politics. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 18-42. 
Judge, D. (1993). The Parliamenta London, Sage. 
In part on how hired lobbyists affect Parliamentary representation. 
Key, V. (1968). Politics, Parties and Pressure GroWs. New York, USA; 
Crowell. 
Kimber, R. & Richardson, J. (eds. ) (1974) Pressure Groups in Britain. 
London, Dent. 
Kuzel, A. (1992). 'Sampling in Qualitative Inquiry. ' In: Crabtree, B. & 
Miller, W. (ed) Doing Qualitative Research in Primary Care: Multiple 
Strategies. Newbury Park, USA; Sage. 31-44. 
Defence of small scale sampling. 
Lesly, P. (ed) (1991) The Handbook of Public Relations and 
Communications. London, McGraw-Hill. 
Lewis, N. "Corporatism and Accountability: The Democratic Dilemma. ' In: 
Crouch, C. & Dore, R. (editors) (1990). CoLporatism and Accoun 
Organised Interests in British Public Life. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 63-101 
Lindblom, C. (1977). Politics and Markets. New York, USA; Basic Books. 
234 
Marsh, D. & Locksley, G. (1983). 'Capital: The Neglected Face of PowerT In: 
Marsh, D. (ed). Pressure Politics. 53-83. London, junction Book. 
Supportive of Lindblom. 
Marquand, D. (1988). The Unl2rincil2led Society. London, Jonathan Cape. 
I 
McConnell, G. (1966). Private Power and American Democracy. New York, 
USA; Knopf. 
McFarland, A. (1976). Public Interest Lobbies. Washington, USA; American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Milbrath, L. (1963). The Washington Lobbyists. Westport, USA; Greenwood 
Press. 
Miller, C. (1987). Lobbying Government. Oxford, Blackwell. 
Best DIY account of how to be a lobbyist by a practitioner. 
Mitchell, A. (1991) 'The View from the Lobbied: A Consumer's Guide. " In: 
Grant, J. (ed) The Commercial Lobbyists. Aberdeen, AUP. 3-12. 
Morse J. (1991). 'Strategies for Sampling. ' In: Morse, J. Qualitative Nursing 
Research: A Contemporary Dialogue. Newbury Park, USA; Sage. 127-145. 
Norton, P. (1991). "The Changing Face of Parliament and its Consequences. ' 
In: Norton, P. (ed. ) New Directions in Britsh Politics. Aldershot, Edward 
Elgar. 58-82. 
Olasky, M. (1987). Corporate Public Relations A New Historical 
Perspective. Hove, Lawrence ErIbaum. 
Critique of public relations (and lobbying) as free market distortion. 
Olsen, M. E. (1970). Power in Societies. New York, USA; Macmillan. 
Olson, M, Jr. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Washington, USA; 
Harvard University Press. 
Olson, M. Jr. (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, USA; 
Yale University Press. 
Patton, M. (1980). Qualitative Evaluation Methods. London, Sage. 
Patton, M. (1990). Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods. London, 
Sage. 
Detailed account of naturalistic interview techniques. 
235 
Pearson, R. (1992) 'Perspectives on Public Relations History. ' In: Toth, E. & 
Heath, R. (ed) Rhetorical and Critical Approaches to Public Relations. 
Hove, Lawrence Erlbaum. 111-130. 
Perry, K. (1994) Business and the European Comm London, Made 
Simple. 
Euro-lobbying channels reviewed. 
Pimlott, J. (1951). Public Relations and American Democrqcy. Princeton, 
USA; Princeton University Press. 
Early and superior critique of public relations practice. 
Potter, A. (1961). Organised Groups in British National Politics. London, 
Faber. 
Pross, A. (1992). Group Policy and Public Don Mills, Ontario; 
Oxford University Press. 
Sympathetic Canadian view of lobbying. 
Ricci, D. (1984). The Tragedy of Political Science. New Haven, USA; Yale 
University Press. 
Richardson, J. & Jordan, G. (1979). Governing Under Pressure; The P 
Process in a Post-Parliamentary Democrag: y. Oxford, Blackwell. 
Richardson, J. (ed) (1993) Pressure Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
Marginal on commercial lobbyists. 
Riley, J. (1990). Getting the Most from Your Data. Bristol, Technical and 
Educational Services. 
Rivers, P. (1974). Politics by Pressure. London, Harrap. 
Roberts, G. (1970) Political parties and pressure- groups in Britain. London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
Ross, R. (1977) The Management of Public Relations. New York, USA; John 
Wiley. 
Textbook. 
Rush, M. (ed) (1990). Parliament and Pressure Groups. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
Chapter on commercial lobbyists. 
236 
Sawatsky, J. (1987). The Insiders. Toronto; McClelland & Stewart. 
journalistic account of Ottawa lobbying. 
Schatzman, L& Strauss, A. (1973). Field Research, Strategies for a Natural 
SociolQgy. New York, USA; Prentice Hall. 
Schlozman, K. & Tierney, J. T. (1986). Organised Interests and American 
Democracy. New York, USA; Harper Row. 
Silverman, D. (1985). Qualitative Methodology. London, Gower. 
Researcher-friendly introduction to research methods. 
Simons, H. (1981). 'Conversation Piece: the Practice of Interviewing in Case 
Study Research. ' In: Adelman, C. (ed. ) Uttering, Muttering. Oxford, Grant 
McIntyre (now Blackwell Scientific). 27-50. 
Shaw, M. (1990). 'Members of Parliament. ' In: Rush, M. (editor) 
Parliament and Pressure Politics. Oxford, ClarendonPress. 85-116. 
Smith, H. (1988). Power Game. New York, USA; Random House. 
Smythe, D. (1981). Dependency Road: Communications, Capitalism, 
Consciousness and Canada. Norwood, USA; Ablex. 
Stewart, J. (1958) British Pressure London, Martin Robertson. 
Strauss, A, & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of Qualitative Research. London, Sage. 
Truman, D. (1951). The Governmental Process. New York, USA; Alfred 
Knopf. 
Van Schendelen, M. (editor) (1993). National Public and Private EC 
Lobbying. Aldershot, Dartmouth. 
Marginal on commercial lobbying. 
Vogel, D. (1989). Fluctuating Fortunes. New York, USA; Basic Books. 
'. .. business 
does make its own political history, but ... in circumstances that are 
largely beyond its control. " (292) 
Wenner, L. (1990). US Energy and Environmental Groups: Institutional 
Profiles. New York, USA; Greenwood Press. 
Business dominance 'due to the belief infree enterprise embraced by most 
Americans. ' 
White, J. (1991). How to Underst ublic Relations. London, 
Business Books. 
237 
Whiteley, P. F. and Winyard, S. J. (1987). Pressure for the Poor. London, 
Metheun. 
Willis, D. & Grant, W. (1987). 'The United Kingdom: Still a Company State. ' 
In: Van Schendelen, M& Jackson, R. (eds) The Politicisation of Business in 
Western Eurove. London; Croom Helm. 158-183. 
Government1business relations surveyed where business is responsiblefor economic 
management - "the company state 
Wilson, G. (1991). 'Contract Lobbying in the USA. ' In: Jordan, G. (ed) The 
Commercial Lobbyists. Aberdeen, Aberdeen University Press. 65-75. 
Critique that cost makes US contract lobbyists an asymmetrical influence in 
decision-making. 
Wilson, G. K. (1985). Business and Politics. Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
Wilson, G. K. (1990) Interest Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 
Notes emergence of American contract lobbyists as separate industry. 
Wilson, M. (1979). "Variety in Social Science Research. ' In: DE 304, Blockl- 
Milton Keynes, Open University Press. 3-25; 80-127. 
Wiseman, J. & Aron, M. (1972). Field Projects in Sociology. London, 
Transworld Publishers. 
Wittenberg, E. & Lesly, P. (1991). 'Working with Federal Government. ' In: 
Lesly, P. (ed) The Handbook of Public Relations and Communications. 
Hemel Hempstead, McGraw-Hill. 74-85. 
Lobbying as free market lubrication. 
Wittenberg, E. & Wittenberg, E. (1989). How to Win in Washington. 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
Wolpe, B. (1990). Lobbying Congress How the System Works. Washington, 
USA; Congressional Quarterly Inc. 
Wootton, G. (1970) Interest- New Jersey, USA; Prentice Hall. 
Short history of PR development in US and UK. Ambiguous on influence of 
business. 
Wootton, G. (1975). Pressure Groups in Britain, 1720-1970: An Essay in 
Interp etation with Original Documents. London, Allen Lane. 
Worsley, P. (1970). Introducing Sociology., London, Penguin Press. 
238 
Ungublished theses 
Berry, S. P. (1991). The growth and development of the commercial 
lobbying industLry in Britain during the 1980s. PhD thesis, London 
University. London. 
A portrait good on systemic concerns raised about hired lobbyists. 
York, K. (1986). Lobbying, Information and Welfare. PhD thesis, University 
of Michigan. Ann Arbor, USA. 
Informationfrom lobbyists can be social good 
JoUrnal articles. 12al2ers and booklets 
Berry, S. P. (1992). 'Lobbyists and Their Techniques. ' In: Parliamentary 
Affairs. 45 (2), 220 - 232. 
Includes insightsfrom aformer lobbyist turned academic. 
Berry, S. P. (1993). 'The rise of the professional lobbyist: a cause for 
concern? -' In: Political Quarterly. July, 344-351. 
The casefor reforming MPs relationships; not lobbyists 
British Interest Group Project. (1992). What is studied when pressure 
groups are studied? Aberdeen, Aberdeen University Press. 
Bruce, A. (1994). 'Public Affairs in "Tomorrow's Company". 'For: The 
Management of Public Affairs seminar. Oxford, Templeton College. Sept. 9. 
Quotes survey that medium-size companies lobby via trade associations. 
Burrell, M. (1991). 'Lobbying the Regions. ' Public Relations. January, 5. 
London, Institute of Public Relations. 
The casefor the constituency routefor lobbyists. 
Butler, A, & Smith, D. (1986). Lobbying in the British Parliament. London, 
Public Relations Consultants' Association. 
Casey, M. (1991). The Power of the Lobbyist: Regulation and Vested 
Interest. Edinburgh, The David Hume Institute. 
A viewfrom aformer Under-Secretary turned lobbyist. 
The Communication Group plc (1994) Your Guide to Westminster and 
Whitehall. London, The Communication Group. 
Doig, A. (1986). 'Access to Parliament and the Rise of the Professional 
Lobbyist. ' Public Money March. 39-43. 
239 
Doig, A. (1986 a) 'Influencing Westminster: Registering the Lobbyists. ' 
Parliamentary Affairs. Vol 39,517 - 535. 
Two critical viewsfrom the persistent critic. 
Doig, A. (1994) 'Full Circle or Dead End? What Next for The Select 
Committee on Members' Interests? ' Parliamentary Affairs. July, 356-373. 
Elkin, S. (1989). 'The Political Theory of American Business. `In: Business In 
The Contemporary World. Spring, 25-37. 
A statist view: business and government in mutual control create the "commercial 
republic. / 
Galle, M. (1992). 'Soaring Growth of Lobbying Dangerous. ' Newsletter 
European Association of Public Relations Education and Research. Vol. 1,2; 
25-26. Ghent, Belgium; CERP Education. 
An early, if not thefirst , proposal to regulate EU lobbying. 
The Government Report. (1987). The Public Policy Consultants. London. 
A rare survey of how Government sees commercial lobbyistsfrom the viewpoint of 
process. 
Grant, W. (1984). "Pressure Groups and the Policy Process. ' Social Studies 
Review. March, 156-9. 
Grant, W. (1990). 'Insider and Outsider Pressure Groups. ' Social Studies 
Review. January, 107-111. 
Grantham, C. (1989). 'Parliament and Political Consultants. ' Parliamentary 
Affairs. Vol 42,503-518. 
Useful viewsfrom a lobbyist turned special adviser. 
Haug, M. & Koppang, H. (1993). Lobbying and PR From a research project 
on the PR Department's role in company lobbying. At: CERP Autumn 
Conference. Nov. 6. France, Strasbourg. 
In part, a parallel projectfrom a Norwegian stance. 
Holbeche, B. (1986). 'Policy and Influence: MAFF and the NFU. ' In: Public 
Policy and Administration. Vol. 1,3; 40-47. 
Hunt, J& Nash, T. (1986). "Lobbying: Art, Craft or Profession. ' Chief 
Executive. Feb, 14-16. 
240 
Hull, R. (1991). Presentation to the Seminar on Pressure Groups and Policy 
Making in the European Corn May 17. Oxford, Nuffield College. 
Insights from former EU official. 
Jordan, G. (1989). 'Inside Lobbying: the British Version. ' Political Studies. 
Vol 37; 1,107-113. 
Jordan, G. & Moloney, K. (1993). 'Why are Lobbyists Successful: God, 
Background or Training? ' -For: 
Symposium at LSE, March 24, organised by 
Politics Department Newcastle University and by Hansard Society. 
Laptev, M. (1993). Background Note to the EC Institutions. London, 
Charles Barker. 
A lobbyist's view. 
Loveridge, R. (1990). 'Triangulation - or how to survive your choice of 
business school PhD course. ' Graduate Manag ment Research. Winter, 18- 
25. 
Mackey, S. (1994) Controversy in Town Hall Public Relations. Arts Faculty, 
Deakin University, Warrnambool, Victoria, Australia. 
Introduction to public relations paradigms. 
MacMillan, K. (1991). The Management of European Public Affairs. 
European Centre for Public Affairs. Oxford, Templeton College. Occasional 
Paper No. 1, July. 
Commercial lobbyists as gap-fillers in company campaigns. 
Mancuso, M. (1993). 'The Ethical Attitudes of British MPs: A Typology. ' In: 
Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 46,2; 179-19 1. 
Manley, J. (1983). 'Neopluralism -a class analysis of pluralism I and 
pluralism IL' American Political Science Review. Vol. 77,371-383. 
Marsh, 1. (1988). "Interest Groups and Policy Making. ' In: Parliamentary 
Affairs. Vol. 41,4; 469-489. 
Mazey, S. & Richardson, J. (1992). 'British Pressure Groups in the European 
Community: The Challenge of Brussels. ' In: Parliamentary Affairs. Vol. 45, 
1; 92-107. 
Mazey, S. & Richardson, J. (1992). "Environmental Groups and the EC: 
Challenges and Opportunities. In: Environmental Politics. Vol. 1,4; 109-128. 
241 
Miller, C. (1987). "Lobbying: New Trends in the UK. " In: Contemporajy 
Record. Spring, 13-15. 
Miller, C. & Hayes, R. (1984). Lobbyists: Public Service or Expensive Sham. 
London, Bow Group. 
Moloney, K. & Jordan, G. (1994). 'Why Companies Hire Lobbyists. ' 
Unpublished paper, Department of Marketing, Advertising and Public 
Relations, Bournemouth University. 
Moore, P. (1991). A Market in Influence? A Study of the Personnel, 
Clientele, Methodology and Effectivenesss in a Leading UK Government 
Relations Cons London, Brunel, University of West London, 
Government Dept. 
Informative analysis of business aspects of one lobbyingfirm. 
Norton, P. & Grantham, C. (1986). 'The Hyphen in British Politics? 
Parliament and Professional Lobbying. ' British Politics Group Newsletter. 
no. 45,4-8. 
The hyphenfunction. 
Pedler, R. (1994). The Management of Public Affairs. Oxford, Templeton 
College. 
Survey evidence - widespread hirings of lobbyistsfor diverse support roles. 
Post, J. (1982). 'The Public Affairs Function in American Corporations. ' 
Long Range Planning. April. Vol. 15,12-21. 
Presthus, R. (1974) 'Interest Groups and Lobbying: Canada and the US. ' 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 44-57. 1 
Cultural variation and effectiveness perceptions. 
Richardson, J. (1990). 'Government and Groups in Britain: Changing Styles. ' 
Strathclyde Papers on Government and Politics. Glasgow. 
Rush, M. (1990). 'Lobbying Parliament. " Parliamentary Affairs. April. Vol. 
43; 2,141-148. 
Rush, M. (1993). 'Registering the Lobbyists: Canadian Experience and a 
British Proposal. ' For: Symi2osium at LSE, March 24, organised by Politics 
Department, Newcastle University and by Hansard Society. 
Detailed review of one Parliament's experience of lobbyist regulation. 
242 
Sargent, J. (1991). 'In Defence of a Commercial Approach to Lobbying. ' 
For: Pressure Groups and Policy Making in the European WorkshW. May 
17-19. Nuffield College, Oxford. 
Smith, M. (1986). 'The lobbyist's business. ' Government and I 
Issue 18; 3.1,01-19. 
Smith, M. (1992). Lobb London, Government Policy Consultants. 
Smith, M. J. (1990). 'Pluralism, Reformed Pluralism and Neopluralism: the 
Role of Pressure Groups in Policy-Making. ' Political Studies. Vol. 38,302- 
322. 
Thomas, C. & Hrebenar, R. (1990). 'A New Look at Lobbyists and the 
Lobbying Community in The American States. ' For: American Political 
Science Association Annual Meeting, Aug. 30-Sept. 2. Hilton Hotel, San 
Francisco, USA. 
Commercial lobbyists in the US states. 
Thomas, C. & Hrebenar, R. (1991a). 'The Regulation of Interest Groups and 
the Lobbying Community in the Fifty States: Some Preliminary Findings. ' 
For: Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting. The Palmer 
House Hotel, Chicago, USA. April 18-20. 
Thomas, C. & Hrebenar, R. (1991b). "Lobbyists in the Fifty States: The 
Results of Recent Research. ' For: Western Political Science Association. 
Turk, J. (1985). 'Information Subsidies and Influence. ' In: Public Relations 
Review. Vol. 11,3; 10-25. Maryland, USA; University of Maryland. 
Fieldwork on the Gandy thesis. 
Wedgewood, D. (1987). 'Dialogue with Whitehall and Westminster. ' For: 
Conference on Corporate Communications, London International Press 
Centre, Oct. 15. Organised by Tolloy Conferences. 
A lobbying definition and insightsfrom a lobbyist. 
Windsor, D. (1989). 'The Theory of Business Politics. ' For: American 
Political Science Association Annual M Atlanta, USA, Aug 31-Sept 3. 
Section 32. 
A review of business politics models. 
Whiteley, P. & Winyard, S. (1983). "Influencing Social Policy: The 
Effectiveness of the Poverty Lobby in Britain! In: journal of Social 
January, Vol 12,1; 1-26. 
243 
Whiteley, P. & Winyard, S. (1988). 'The Poverty Lobby in British Politics. ' 
Im Parliamentary Affairs. April, Vol. 41,2; 195-208. 
Both above reviews of non-business lobbying. 
Newspapers. Magazines. Yearbooks and Directories 
Cabinet Office (1993,1994). The Civil Service Year Book. London, HMSO. 
Dod's Parliamentary Companion. (1987,1989,1993). Hurst Green, Dod"s 
Parliamentary Companion. 
Greatorex, W. (1989). 'Is Your MP in Somebody's Pocket. ' The Reader's 
Jan. 34,31-36. 
Helm, S. (1991). 'Private Words on Public Matters. ' The Independent - 
London. November 18,23. 
Lobbyists as private sector diplomats. 
Howard, A. (1989). 'The Unsavoury Enemies of Democracy. ' The 
Independent. Sept. 23,19. 
The Independent. (1993). 'Clampdown on Senators' gifts. ' 
May 8,10. 
Marr, A. (1992). 'A giant U-turn to get the party back on track. ' The 
Independent Nov 19,25. 
Marketing (1984). 'The Keys to the House. ' May 10,30. 
Observer. (1989). 'A flOm Trade in Influence. ' April 9. 
Observer Magazine. (1990). 'Something To Declare: The Inside Guide To 
MPs Outside Interests. ' Oct. 14.1 
PR Week. (1989). 'The Lobby falls foul of its "booze and bribes' image. ' 
April 20. 
PR Week (1990). 'Lobbying begins to lose out. ' Sept. 7. 
PR Week (1990). 'Weeding out Whitehall Waste. ' Oct. 18. 
PR Week (1993). 'Calling the House to order. ' Jan. 28. 
PR Week (1993). 'CERP proposes EC lobby controls. ' Feb. 18. 
PR Week (1993). 'Darkness before the Dawn. ' April 29. 
244 
PR Week (1993). 'Out of the shadows. ' April 29. 
PR Week (1993). Letters. May 13. 
PR Week (1993) Special Report Lobbying. Oct. 7. 
PR Week (1994). 'No reason to hide. ' Feb. 17. 
PR Week (1994). TRCA Registers Concern. ' Feb 17. 
PR Week (1994). 'Vote of Confidence for MPs' March 10. 
PR Week. (1994). 'High demand for lobbying skills. ' May 26. 
PR Week. (1994) 'Brussels lobbyist code of conduct launched. ' Sept. 30. 
The PRCA Public Relations Year Book. (1989). London, Financial Times 
Business Information. 
Russell, L. & Atack, S. (editors). (1991). The Directory of Public Affairs and 
Government Relations. London, Berkeley Press. 
Shipley, P. (1979,2nd. ed. ) Directory of Pressure Gro 
Representative Organisations. London, Bowker. 
Soames, E. in Faulder, C. (1984). The politics of persuasion. 
GoodHousek April. 
The Times 1000 1992-3. Times Books. 
The Times. (1993). Obituaries. June 11,17. 
245 
